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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In December 1985, a three-person team from INTERTECT 
conducted an assessment of the food situation in Ethiopia and of 
the famine relief operations of Catholic Relief Services and its 
principal operating partners in Ethiopia. The findings of this 
mission are as follows:
1. The CRS program is effectively reaching approximately 
2 million people per month. Despite early problems, 
the program has made a substantial impact on improving 
the health and nutritional status of those persons 
enrolled in the program.
2. While it is difficult to extrapolate nutritional data
for the population in general (due to imprecise
population figures and a lack of information about the 
nutritional status of persons not enrolled in the 
program), it does appear that the program has had a 
significant impact on reducing mortality among the 
population in general and has contributed dramatically 
to reducing death rates throughout the areas served.
3. The famine conditions in the country have not
substantially abated. In many cases, the zones of
famine have shifted and new areas of need have 
developed. Despite one and a half years of intensive 
famine relief operations, substantial portions of the 
population of Ethiopia still remain at risk from 
famine, necessitating that extensive food relief
operations continue for at least one more year. The 
reasons why food relief must be continued include:
a) geographic shifts in the zones of famine;
b) continued drought conditions in large areas of the 
country;
c) a failure of relief agencies and the Government of 
Ethiopia to distribute adequate seeds in those 
areas where rains and climatic conditions would 
have permitted modest recovery in the recent meher 
(summer rains) season;
d) continued fighting in the northern part of the 
country, principally Eritrea, Tigrai and portions 
of Wello, which has continued to disrupt food 
production in those regions;
e) failure of relief agencies to provide adequate 
agricultural inputs such as tools, oxen, etc., 
that would have increased harvests in those areas 
with normal or near normal conditions;
f) disruptive agricultural programs carried out in 
certain portions of the country by the Government 
of Ethiopia, principally resettlement and a lack 
of financial incentives for agricultural recovery.
4. Many areas of the country are experiencing a "green 
famine", i.e., in areas where food production appears 
to be normal from visual observation, substantial food 
shortages are expected to occur. This is because:
a) the amount of seeds planted in these areas is 
20-40% less than normal;
b) in some areas, seeds were planted late and were 
unable to take advantage of the full rainy season;
c) in many areas, the meher rains ended early; thus, 
full maturing of the crops was not possible;
d) in certain highland areas above 2 ,0 0 0 meters, 
frosts occurred which partially damaged some of 
the standing crops;
e) crop blights, insect infestations, grasshopper 
attacks, etc., have further reduced standing 
crops; and
f) larger-than-average-sized families and high 
population densities in several of the 
food-producing regions create higher demands on 
the food per hectare than in other regions.
5. Approximately 1.3 million tons of food will be required 
for calendar year 1986 if all the food needs are to be 
met and extensive hunger is to be averted. This figure 
is based, on:
a) a nutrition-centered needs assessment;
b) a structural deficit of approximately 700,000 tons 
of food;
c) an estimated adjusted population of 40.2 million 
people;
d) the capacity of the transport system and its 
ability to move the tonnages required.
6 . While agreeing in principle with many of the 
assumptions of food needs assessments of both USAID and 
the Ethiopian Early Warning System, the INTERTECT team 
finds that food requirements are actually higher than 
both previous assessments. The tonnages are higher 
than the USAID assessment because:
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a) the rains, which were normal during the USAID 
assessment, ended shortly thereafter, reducing 
harvests throughout the meher regions;
b) geographic shifts in the famine have threatened 
new segments of the population which were not 
counted in the USAID report;
c) substantial populations, such as returnees from 
Somalia, were not included in USAID estimates.
Tonnages are higher than the Ethiopian EWS assessments 
because large segments of the population that should be 
eligible for food aid are omitted for "official" 
reasons; these populations include persons living in 
small towns, persons ineligible because of quota
systems, and certain political populations such as the 
refugees returning from Somalia.
(The INTERTECT assessment does not include persons who 
are currently being resettled, either from their
original homes or in their new settlements.)
7. .Analysis of the nutritional data tends to indicate that
persons receiving food from the CRS or counterpart 
programs are showing improvement in their nutritional 
status. Extensive mortality information, however, is 
not available on a region-by-region basis. Therefore, 
it is difficult to tell what impact the aid is having 
on the country as a whole. Data from other sources do 
indicate, however, that the programs have had a 
substantial impact on alleviating famine conditions 
throughout the regions in which the programs are
operating.
8 . After one year of famine relief operations, the 
implementing agencies have established a solid 
operational basis which should permit tightening the 
criteria under which persons or families are admitted 
to the food programs. By applying stricter criteria, 
and with closer monitoring, the food distribution 
programs can be "fine-tuned" and more accurate 
recipient targeting can take place. These adjustments 
will make it possible to enroll many persons who should 
qualify for food aid and discharge many of those 
families that have experienced agricultural, economic 
or nutritional recovery. Even with the fine-tuning, 
however, it is not foreseen that the tonnages of food 
required on a nation-wide basis will be greatly 
affected, for those who are phased out can easily be 
replaced in equal number by those who should qualify 
and are not now enrolled.
9. In many areas, persons who have recovered (and in some 
cases persons who should have been ineligible) appear 
to have been kept on the rolls much longer than is
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necessary. It is felt that stricter admissions
criteria can now be established and many recovered 
persons discharged so that others in need can be 
enrolled.
10. The Northern Initiative Program, while relatively new, 
does appear to be having the intended impact of 
providing food in the conflict areas. However, the 
program has proved difficult to monitor and the actual 
impact on reducing mortality cannot be evaluated, at 
this time. The relative impact of the program can be 
seen by the fact that large numbers of people have not 
moved into towns seeking food. Conversely, many people 
who did move to relief centers in the towns have 
returned to their villages to receive food there. In 
addition, the numbers of people who were projected to 
flee to neighboring Sudan have been substantially 
downgraded and, at this writing, large numbers of those 
currently in Sudan appear ready to return to Ethiopia. 
It is felt that, in part, this is due to increased food 
availability, not only from agricultural recovery 
during the meher season, but also to availability of 
food from the Northern Initiative.
11. Closer monitoring of the Northern Initiative Program 
could be achieved by modeling the population,
monitoring burials conducted by the priests currently 
monitoring the program, and extrapolating that 
information to the general population. Such modeling 
will be necessary to - judge the effectiveness of the 
program and make adjustments in the coming year.
12. The nature of the relief operations has changed due, in 
part, to the efficiency of the food distribution 
program. However, the underlying conditions that cause 
famine have only changed slightly. In several areas, 
massive needs will be clearly discernible (especially 
in Harerg'e and Wello). However, in most cases, the 
famine will be characterized by "pockets of hunger" 
scattered throughout the country. These pockets will 
be more difficult to detect since they will occur in 
the villages and remote areas.
13. .An analysis of the underlying causes of famine in 
Ethiopia shows that:
a) the conditions that cause famine are still present 
in large sections of the country;
b) famine interventions have thus far played only a 
minor part in alleviating the conditions that 
contribute to famine vulnerability; and
c) if food aid were to be discontinued or
substantially reduced in the coming year,
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widespread famine conditions could occur in a 
relatively short period of time.
Overall, the famine has tended to shift geographically, 
moving generally in a more southern and eastwardly 
direction. The same trend has been noted in past 
famines.
14. Approximately 1 million tons of food can be imported in 
1986 to meet emergency food needs without having a 
negative impact on agricultural recovery. However, 
imports above this level mandate that much closer 
monitoring of food distribution take place at the local 
level to ensure that agricultural disincentives do not 
occur.
15. In 1985, food aid had the demonstrated effect of 
lowering food prices in most regions of the country, 
but prices were not lowered below a level at which they 
would have been a major disincentive to agricultural 
production. This was due, in part, to the fact that 
substantial areas of unmet needs existed prior to the 
time when large-scale food distribution was established 
on a continuous basis throughout the country. In 1986, 
it will be imperative to monitor food aid levels more 
closely since moderate agricultural recovery has 
occurred in many areas.
16. Food imports are reaching the level at which possible 
disincentives to agricultural production could happen 
if proper targeting of food distribution and close 
monitoring of real needs is not carried out.
17. Closer monitoring of food needs should permit agencies
to adopt a variety of alternative food distribution 
strategies. These could include food-for-work,
cash-for-work, grain-sharing, and food coupon programs.
Implementing agencies should consider using a mix of 
these projects to lessen the likelihood that food 
distribution could create disincentives to agricultural 
production or that long-term food distribution could 
create perceived dependencies among the population. It 
is especially important that food-for-work schemes be 
carefully planned not to coincide with food harvests, 
and that special attention be given to ensuring that 
food distributed in FFW projects reaches those most in 
need, especially women and small children.
18. Criteria for selecting alternative food distribution 
programs and projects must be developed and adjusted 
according to the situation in Ethiopia. Uniform 
criteria should be developed and observed by all
agencies receiving food through the CRS food
distribution network.
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19. A food buffer stock strategy will be necessary in order 
to combat the changing nature of food needs for 1986. 
The recommended strategy is for the implementing 
agencies to develop small buffer stocks in the forward 
areas which could be reallocated to meet various 
contingencies if and when they arise. If the food is 
not needed, it can be distributed in the normal program 
the following year. Other buffer stock strategies do 
not appear to be feasible, given the current political 
climate.
20. Buffer stocks will be required to meet the following 
contingencies:
a) The potential return of many non-refugee
Ethiopians currently being fed in Somalia.
b) Former refugees who have returned from Somalia, 
currently being fed under the auspices of the 
UNHCR.
c) Persons who have been resettled.
d) Pastoralists in various regions who may enter the 
food program unexpectedly due to shifts in the 
drought or famine.
21. It is estimated that the logistics system currently in 
operation has enough capacity to handle the necessary 
1.38 million tons of -food, if it arrives at an even 
pace throughout 1986. However, if food shipping delays 
occur or if purchasing is delayed, congestion could 
occur in the ports or in the primary distribution 
system. It should also be recognized that the conflict 
in the north could cause the GOE to temporarily 
reallocate government trucks or vehicles from the 
national fleet, which could reduce the total capacity 
available to the relief operations.
Some additional trucks are required to improve the 
distribution system at the local level. Trucks of 5-10 
ton capacity are especially needed in the Northern 
Initiative Program.
23. While the chance of creating dependencies is a major 
concern to all operating agencies, the creation of real 
dependencies has not yet occurred.
24. In those areas where dry-ration food distribution will 
continue for another year, it is important to give 
long-term food recipients a chance to maintain a degree 
of dignity while receiving charity. It is recommended 
that the practice of voluntary contribution be 
reinstituted as one means of supporting this dignity.
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25. If emergency needs arise, the available food can be 
stretched by utilizing several strategies to extend 
food aid. These include:
a) improving the targeting of recipients and 
recipient communities;
b) discharging healthy children from the food rolls 
after they have reached a normal weight-for-height 
range for 3 months;
c) instituting a sliding scale for food distribution 
based on nutritional ratios for each individual 
case;
d) reducing rations in areas showing major
improvements in food production;
e) reducing or halting food distribution immediately 
after the harvest period;
f) reducing all rations by 5%;
g) eliminating food-for-work programs and returning 
to strict dry-ration distribution; and
h) gradually phasing down food in each individual
area until a demonstrated impact on nutritional
status is noted.
26. Increased attention should be given to small-scale,
locally-based projects that can reduce famine
vulnerability for the future.
27. A number of government policies and programs appear to 
have a disruptive effect on agricultural recovery. 
These include:
a) restrictions on the movement of food from surplus
areas to food-deficit areas (controlled in part by 
government regulation and government-controlled
sales under the auspices of the Agricultural 
Marketing Corporation);
b) absence of food price supports for subsistence
farmers; and
c) forced resettlement.
Villagization, the government program of requiring 
peasants to move into small villages, does not appear 
to have had a substantial disruptive effect on
agricultural production, nor has it resulted in a 
noticeable increase in production.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. TERMS OF REFERENCE
In November 1985, INTERTECT was retained by Catholic Relief 
Services to undertake an assessment of the food situation and 
CRS famine relief operations in Ethiopia. Specifically, the 
assessment was to:
determine the current food situation in Ethiopia,
identifying food needs and determining food
availability in the country, and
review the CRS famine relief operations and those of 
the agencies participating in the food distribution 
network managed by CRS.
In order to accomplish these overall goals, it was necessary 
for the team to carry out several associated tasks. These 
included:
1. An evaluation of the current estimates of food needs.
Several agencies have recently completed food
assessments, including USAID, the World Food Program 
and the Early Warning System of the Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission of the Ethiopian government. 
Each arrived at different estimates; therefore, a 
primary task of the team was to evaluate each
assessment and recommend figures upon which CRS food 
procurement could be based.
2. An evaluation of the nutrition data obtained by CRS and 
its counterpart food distribution agencies to:
—  determine if current levels of assistance are 
adequate,
identify areas where supplemental food assistance 
will be necessary, and
determine the relative success of the program in 
reaching those most in need, especially vulnerable 
groups such as young children, and pregnant and 
lactating women.
3. A review of the food distribution strategies that could 
be used in the upcoming year. Widespread concern about 
the possibility that food distribution programs might 
be causing dependencies and having an adverse effect on 
agricultural production requires review to determine if 
alternative strategies (such as food-for-work) are 
practical and feasible and, if so, what programmatic 
criteria should be developed and applied.
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4 . An examination of the logistics situation to determine 
the capacities of the overall system, especially in 
relation to the other food distribution programs within 
the country.
5. A determination of what program shifts might be 
necessary due to the changing nature of the famine, in 
terms of both geographic areas and program emphasis. 
Of specific concern is the possible need to establish 
food buffer stocks in areas where the harvests may be 
marginal to guard against the possibility that sudden 
agricultural calamities (such as insect infestations, 
an early end to rains, frosts in the highland areas, or 
other events) could cause a major shortfall in the 
amount of food expected.
B. DEFINITION OF FAMINE
Famine is a set of conditions resulting in the
non-availability of food for large numbers of people which 
causes widespread, acute malnutrition. (Acute malnutrition is a 
state where the lack of food causes the human body to consume 
whatever is stored in the body, and which, left unchecked, will 
result in death.) Famine is not merely a deficiency of food, 
but often an absolute lack of food.(l)
It is important to note that famine is a set of conditions. 
These can include drought, war, political policies, crop 
failures, market effects, and general chronic hunger. It is 
also important to understand that drought is a contributor to 
famine and not the absolute cause.
There is a difference between famine and chronic
malnutrition and hunger. Unfortunately, many countries
(Ethiopia among them) experience continuous food shortfalls, 
resulting in widespread hunger among significant numbers of the 
population. Chronic hunger is caused by deficiency of food or 
by the lack of resources to acquire food that is available. It 
can lead to stunting of growth, physical deficiencies and an 
increase in infant mortality rates. While chronic hunger is a 
problem of major concern, different long-term developmental 
approaches are required to overcome it, rather than the crisis 
intervention needed to avert and correct famine.
It is also important to note that famines are generally a 
rural phenomenon. It is a paradox that the persons who produce 
food are those most likely to be affected. Rarely does famine 
spread into urban areas. This, more than any other factor, is 
an indicator of the underlying social causes of famine, and 
points out the inequities in the social fabric of a country.
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Results of Famine
The consequences of famine go far beyond acute 
malnutrition. The most serious result is death for large 
numbers of people. Those most likely to be affected are the 
"vulnerable groups”: children between the ages of 9 months and 
5 years of age, and women who are pregnant and lactating. In 
short, death affects those who are least able to care for 
themselves.
Famines also increase the risk of disease. As the human 
body deteriorates, it becomes more susceptible to the diseases 
and vitamin deficiencies prevalent in developing countries. Of 
special concern are measles, cholera, diarrhea, tuberculosis, 
and xerophthalmia (Vitamin A deficiency).
Famine conditions result in economic hardships for the rural 
poor. This can include loss of cash, loss of livestock and, 
most importantly, loss of opportunity. As conditions persist, 
there can be an economic regression or "setback” for an entire 
community or region.
At some point, persons will be forced to leave their land 
and go elsewhere in search of food. This can lead to mass 
migrations within a country and, in cases of conflict, can lead 
to migration from one country to another. In 1984-85, Ethiopia 
witnessed both phenomena. Large numbers of people migrated to 
relief centers such as Korem, Ibnath and Makele, while several 
hundred thousand Tigraians and Eritreans crossed the border into 
Sudan seeking food.
The sum total of these effects, if left unchecked, can set 
the stage for the next famine. In other words, if corrective 
measures are not taken, vulnerability to famine is likely to 
increase rather than decrease.
The primary counter-famine intervention is provision of 
food. If food is not available from internal sources, it must 
be imported. When this occurs, the burden of developing more 
than simple feeding strategies falls on the donor community as 
well as the national government. This shared responsibility is 
important because food aid can only relieve the food needs and 
not eliminate the causes, nor in itself promote recovery. 
Furthermore, unchecked food aid can have adverse consequences, 
delaying agricultural recovery and creating dependencies on food 
aid. It is therefore of utmost importance that a balanced 
famine-fighting strategy be developed which includes not only 
provision of food aid, but also agricultural recovery and 
development assistance.
Vulnerability to Famine
Vulnerab i 1 i ty to famine is also defined by a set of 
conditions: subsistence agriculture, socio-economic forces, 
political constraints, and susceptibility to natural events.
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"An agricultural population must first be made vulnerable to 
famine by the socio-economic and political forces before any 
adverse natural factor initiates the process of food shortage 
that leads to famine."(2)
Why is subsistence agriculture so vulnerable? Figure 1-1 
shows the inputs and requirements that are needed from planting 
until the harvest is sold. The nature of farming is such that 
there is continued risk and exposure to risk from the time that 
seeds are planted until the crop is harvested and sold. If any 
of the factors shown in Figure 1-1 at any one stage become a 
problem, the result can be a major shortfall or even total 
failure of the farmer’s crop. Therefore, risk is not simply a 
function of weather, but rather of two dozen different factors 
occurring at different times in the planting/harvesting cycle.
Subsistence agriculture has the following characteristics:
1. Small and often fragmented land.
2. Primitive tools and implements.
3. Production geared to personal needs rather than to 
market needs.
4. Lack of alternative or seasonal employment 
opportunities.
5. An almost total absence of reserves of either grain or 
cash.
Therefore, as an economic activity, subsistence production 
may be defined as: production = consumption.(3)
In this situation, there is no area-wide specialization of 
production. Each peasant attempts to produce almost all that he 
needs. Diversification is practiced by the farmers not only as 
insurance against risk, but also as a means of 
self-sufficiency. Therefore, lands which could produce more of 
another crop must be devoted to producing consumables for each 
peasant’s family.
The combined effect of subsistence agriculture is that
farmers have no reserves of grain or cash. "Subsistence
production is an activity in which peasants are perennially 
engaged in the struggle for existence in the most basic sense, 
that of producing what will keep them alive until the next 
harvest. Very often they fail to achieve that objective, their
produce lasting them for only from 6 to 9 months. The poorer
subsistence producers occupy marginal areas... Poor peasants 
cultivate land that is not only too small and fragmented, but 
also rocky and impoverished by overuse and misuse. For the vast 
majority of peasants, therefore, output is so low that grain 
reserves are simply out of the question."(4)
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The fact that the farmers can produce no reserves for 
themselves means there are no reserves for rural communities. 
This in turn means that whole regions are perpetually vulnerable 
to famine without any corrective mechanism to release food into 
the rural areas when famine conditions begin to occur.
It is also important to note the role of agricultural
policies in a subsistence production area. Any agricultural 
policy or program must have an incentive effect in order to 
increase production. The usual incentives used to begin the 
modernization of agriculture are:
increasing the amount of money paid for crops produced 
(financial incentives), or
increasing the amount of land that farmers can own
(input incentives).
At present, however, there are many government programs 
which could have a disruptive effect. These include
resettlement and villagization. In addition, some government 
activities or policies could have a disincentive effect on 
production. These include the famine taxes (farmers in
producing areas are required to give a portion, which varies 
according to region, of their harvests to fight the famine), 
certain marketing controls that restrict the sale of food to the 
government-controlled Agricultural Marketing Board, and
government-regulated sale prices which limit the amount of
profit that the farmers can make for their produce. The last of 
these policies can also delay recovery by denying farmers the 
additional capital that is needed to invest in replacement 
seeds, draft animals and tools.
C. HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM
History of Famine in Ethiopia
Famine is not new to Ethiopia. While most outside observers 
focus their attention on the widespread national famines that 
occur with depressing regularity, studies have shown that famine 
conditions are almost always present somewhere in the country. 
Mesfin Wolde-Mariam, a noted Ethiopian geographer, has 
classified famines into three categories: local, regional, and 
national. In one twenty-year period (1958-1977), he noted that 
there were four national famines, twelve regional famines and 
four local famines.(5)
The first major famine which was systematically studied was the 
famine of 1882-92 caused by the spread of Rinderpest, a disease 
which affects cattle. By 1892, Rinderpest had killed
approximately 90% of the Ethiopian cattle population. Without 
their cattle, especially oxen, the Ethiopian peasants could not 
carry on their normal farm operations. As a result, the famine 
swept the entire country. It is estimated that approximately 
1/3 of the population died. The fact that the loss of only one
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element of the agricultural inputs could induce such a 
tremendous loss of lives illustrates how precarious the 
Ethiopian subsistence farmer’s situation had become by the 
beginning of the 20th century.
Famines continued throughout the early part of this century, 
yet attracted no major widespread concern on the part of 
outsiders. Famines came to the attention of the western world 
in 1958 and again in 1966, due in part to better communications 
and an increase in the number of persons from abroad living in 
Ethiopia. In 1973, a major famine struck Ethiopia which spurred 
a strong response from European and American donors; it also 
contributed to toppling the Haile Selassie regime and led to the 
installation of a revolutionary military government with a 
Marxist (pro-Soviet) orientation.
As a result of the 1973 famine, as well as increased 
international research and development in counter-famine 
activities, the Government of Ethiopia established an Earl^ 
Warning System in 1974 to monitor drought and famine conditions 
and forecast when emergency interventions would be necessary.
During the period of 1976 to 1980, many changes to the basic 
agricultural production system were initiated by the Government 
of Ethiopia to increase agricultural production. Some of these 
measures included! establishing farmers associations (Kabeles) 
in every district of the country; establishing the beginnings of 
an agricultural extension service; and expanding the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission to each high risk area to detect food 
shortages and provide early warning as well as emergency relief 
measures.
At the same time that these positive measures were being 
taken, other more radical changes, which many feared would have 
a disruptive effect on agricultural production, were being 
introduced. These included! the establishment of government 
institutions to control food production and marketing; the 
establishment of price controls for basic commodities; and the 
restriction of sales of privately-sold foods to the awraja 
(administrative district) where they were produced.
Even more controversial were two additional actions that 
many outside observers felt would have a major disruptive effect 
on agricultural production: the nation-wide villagization 
schemes, and expansion of the government’s resettlement 
program. Villagization is a scheme whereby persons living in 
the rural areas are moved into small clusters of between 20 and 
40 families each to form small villages. The GOE has stated 
that the purpose of villagization is to bring the farmers 
together so that basic services such as water, sanitation and 
rural electrification can be provided. Villagization will also 
serve the purpose of freeing up for farming small amounts of 
land formerly occupied by the home site. In the larger 
settlements, it will also be easier to provide schooling and 
other general development services. Critics of villagization
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point out that villagization may be disruptive, especially if it 
is carried out forcibly and if it is carried out during the 
planting or harvesting seasons. Hard data to support these 
claims is lacking, however. In most cases, people remain near 
their land and are able to work it even during the move. Others 
fear that villagization is the first step towards 
collectivization of farming, a step that many feel would be 
strongly contested by the farmers.
The resettlement program is far more controversial. Under 
this program, the Government proposes to reduce the density of 
the highly populated areas, especially those in the north, and 
resettle the populations to more fertile areas with higher 
annual rainfall. Resettlement plans call for moving 
approximately two million people over the next five-year 
period. Currently, certain highly populated zones in Tigrai, 
Wello, Harerge and N. Sidamo are targeted for resettlement. 
(See Figure 1-2.)
The relocation program has recently come under much 
criticism over the manner in which it is being carried out. The 
program, which began under the Haile Selassie regime, gained 
major momentum as the famine spread in 1984-85. Many people 
point out that the program is disruptive, not only to the people 
being resettled, but also to the communities which they are 
leaving and to the new areas where they are being relocated. 
Some observers also point out that certain areas are 
agriculturally incapable of supporting the new settlements. 
During and after resettlement, these farmers are temporarily out 
of production and must depend on food donations in order to 
survive.
Other long-term developments have occurred which affect the 
overall food situation in Ethiopia. The most important of these 
is deforestation. Figure 1-3 shows the extent of deforestation 
in this century. The loss of this ground cover may be having a 
major effect on the hydrologic cycle (the process of water 
transpiration, evaporation and rainfall). Ethiopia historically 
has been blessed by high rainfalls, because the highlands 
deflect the air moving across the continent upward, and 
moisture, which has accumulated from the green mountain slopes, 
rises. When the air cools, the moisture condenses and falls 
back to earth as rain. However, as forests and other ground 
cover are depleted, there is less vegetation to accumulate the 
moisture and the rain that does fall quickly drains into the 
rivers which flow out of the country. Thus, each year there is 
less moisture to be lifted into the atmosphere and, therefore, 
less rain.
Deforestation has been compounded by ecological changes 
taking place in neighboring Sudan. Large-scale farming schemes 
along Sudan’s eastern border have been initiated during the past 
few years. These have entailed massive deforestation in the 
zone between Khartoum and Kassala, south to the Blue Nile (see 
Figure 1-3). The result is that Sudan itself has been faced
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with rapid desertification at a scale never anticipated by 
proponents of mechanized farming, and is now desperately seeking 
to reverse the process of desertification by reforesting large 
areas between Shouak and Wad Medani. While the exact impact of 
Sudan’s deforestation and desertification are debated among 
experts, all agree that the impact of such rapid deforestation, 
if left unchecked, will be felt region-wide.
Another major contributor to the famine conditions has been 
the continuing warfare in the north. Eritrea (which is seeking 
independence), Tigrai (which is seeking greater autonomy), and 
various other liberation groups in Wello and periodically 
Gonder, have had a continuing disruptive effect on agricultural 
production. In many of the contested areas, the governmen 
controls only the larger cities and towns and their immediate 
environs. Many of the principal farm-to-market roads are 
periodically cut off by fighting, and principal arteries are 
occasionally mined, reducing the willingness of civilian
truckers to routinely transit these roads. In the conteste 
areas, the distribution of seed and fertilizers (such as they 
are) and efforts to increase agricultural production are all 
problematic. Once a famine starts, distribution of food to 
counter the famine is extremely difficult, especially if the 
food is being provided from the government side of the lines.
All of these conditions combined to set the stage for the 
famine which began in 1981.
Some relief agency personnel fear that the number of famines 
in Ethiopia has been gradually increasing. While it is probably 
too early to tell whether this is the case, it is clear that the 
number of people vulnerable to famine is increasing, as is t e 
likelihood that regional famines could become national ones. 
Thus, the relative severity of famine is greater now than in the 
past. This is due primarily to an increasing population of 
vulnerable people, resulting in the further marginalization of 
agricultural production, and secondly to human-induced 
environmental factors, especially deforestation, that contribute 
to vulnerability.
Background of the Current Famine
The current crisis has many parallels to the 1973 drought 
and famine, although the seriousness of current conditions in 
Ethiopia far surpasses that of prior situations. 
estimated that 7.9 million Ethiopians have been affected bj the 
drought, with 5.5 million of these located m  the northern 
provinces of Eritrea, Tigrai and Wello. This complicates the 
situation since, for many years, the northern provinces of 
Eritrea and Tigrai have been in revolt against the Ethiopian 
government and, at present, insurgent forces control a large 
portion of these areas. In Eritrea, insurgents currently
control most of the province with government control limited to 
major towns and roads. In Tigrai, the insurgents control about 
S5% of the countryside. Prior to the buildup of famine
8
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operations, international relief workers and other observers 
were able to obtain only limited access to the provinces in 
these regions.
The international relief community has been aware of growing 
food problems in Ethiopia since 1982. By the spring of 1983, 
over 3 million people in the four northern provinces (Eritrea, 
Tigrai, Gonder and Wello) were suffering from large shortfalls 
of food. The Ethiopian Government's Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission (RRC) reported in late 1982 that there was a major 
drought in northern Ethiopia and, during the same period, large 
numbers of people began to seek assistance in neighboring 
Sudan. However, some confusion between the RRC and the
Ethiopian Department of Agriculture resulted in the delay of 
official requests for aid. In April 1983, the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) issued an appeal for 100,000 tons 
of food for 1 million people, and the League of Red Cross 
Societies appealed for 2.9 million U.S. dollars for 
supplementary food and other relief supplies for areas of Wello 
and Gonder.
Despite continued warnings and appeals throughout 1983 and 
into 1984, the official situation was confusing. The Ethiopian 
Government did not provide data to confirm the extent of food 
needs, and many agencies were convinced that ample food was 
either pledged by external donors or could be found from 
in-country stocks. Even the failure of rains in the spring of 
1983, which led to a disastrous harvest in northern Ethiopia, 
failed to arouse much interest from major donors.
In December 1982, CRS requested 838 metric tons of food from 
USAID to initiate an emergency feeding program in Makele, the 
capital of Tigrai. Six months later, in May 1983, the U.S. 
Embassy determined that the food shortage conditions constituted 
a disaster situation and made available $25,000 in disaster 
assistance funds to enable CRS to start its emergency feeding 
program in Makele. In November 1983, CRS requested an 
additional 16,000 MT of food to maintain the Makele program and 
to expand into the neighboring province of Eritrea. Despite 
optimistic reports that the main fall (meher season) harvest of 
1983 would be substantially better than previous years and would 
alleviate in-country shortages, the situation continued to 
deteriorate. In March 1984, U.N. officials indicated that 
existing food would last only through the end of May and 
estimated that Ethiopia would require an additional 125,000 MT 
of food for the year. In the meantime, the RRC indicated in 
March that an additional 400,000 MT were needed.
Throughout this period, USAID was cautious about committing 
large amounts of food assistance. The reasons were:
1. reservations about feeding people in the conflict areas 
where monitoring of the food aid program would not be 
accurate;
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2. concerns about giving food assistance to a Marxist 
country, often at odds with the U.S. government;
3. concerns about committing large amounts of food where 
detailed and accurate assessment and verification of 
real food needs could not be accomplished and where the 
possibility of large-scale food diversions existed.
The third concern raised the most political problems for 
USAID. The GOE priorities were to feed the army, then the
capital and other major urban areas. In addition, the GOE made 
no secret of its desire to use food aid to help feed persons who 
were being resettled through a program which is vigorously 
opposed for humanitarian reasons by the U.S. Government. For 
this reason, USAID often considered Ethiopian food aid requests 
for much longer periods than normal. These delays may have 
allowed famine conditions to spread much more rapidly than if 
large-scale food aid had been provided at an earlier date. 
Thus, by the fall of 1984, several hundred thousand Ethiopians 
in the northern provinces alone had already died and the food 
relief agencies operating in the country found it impossible to 
meet all the needs in their project areas.
The relief situation 
mid-September of 1984. 
officials informed USAID 
without additional major 
U.S. begin channeling
was not to change substantially until 
At that time, senior voluntary agency 
that they could not increase food aid 
assistance, and recommended that the 
food aid through the Ethiopian 
Government. At the same time, other officials were reporting 
that the situation had reached crisis proportions and that 
hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians were at risk and likely to 
die even before food aid could arrive. At about the same time, 
the BBC aired a television documentary on the situation. This 
stirred world-wide concern and initiated the massive relief 
donations that propelled the donors and relief system into 
action.
Since Catholic Relief Services was already in the country 
and operating a food aid program, it was logical that CRS be one 
of the major consignees for all U.S. food aid. As more agencies 
responded to public pressure to become involved in Ethiopia, it 
became mandatory that some form of organization be developed 
through which CRS could supply these agencies with the food they 
required. For this reason, CRS and three other agencies 
(Lutheran World Federation, the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, 
and the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus) formed a 
working group which was referred to as Churches Drought Action 
Africa. (The term CDAA is no longer used due to objections by 
the Ethiopian Government that it represented a new organization 
which was not officially recognized by the GOE. In this report 
the agencies working with CRS will be referred to as the 
"consortium" or as participating agencies.) The consortium 
divided responsibilities for managing the food relief operations 
throughout the country (see Figure 1-4) and began supplying food 
to smaller voluntary organizations in the provinces.
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Divisions of Responsibility
Catholic Relief Services 
Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat
Figure 1-4
At present, twenty-nine agencies participate in the food 
distribution network managed by the consortium. CRS also 
operates feeding programs while serving as the consignee for, 
and distributor of food to, the other agencies. The consortium 
works in all the provinces except Arssi. The programs carried 
out by the consortium are in the government-controlled areas and 
are designed to provide food to persons or families where food 
monitoring can take place. In this report, this will be 
referred to as the "emergency program" to distinguish it from 
CRS’s pre-emergency normal feeding program operating prior to 
May 1983, and from the special program for feeding famine 
victims in the nongovernment-controlled areas in the north, 
referred to as the "Northern Initiative".
How the Consortium's Program Works.
The following is a basic description of the way in which the 
agencies working in the CRS consortium receive and distribute 
their food.
The RRC’s Early Warning System monitors food production 
levels in different areas. If food production drops, if 
agricultural prices increase above a certain point, or if 
livestock sales reach a certain level, the local staff is 
instructed to carry out a nutrition survey with help from the 
kabeles (local farmers' associations). The surveys, which use 
the middle upper arm circumference measuring method (MUAC), 
evaluate children under 5; if a significant portion of the 
children are found to have arm circumferences of less than 12.5 
centimeters, a famine area is designated.
The KRC then invites relief agencies to start a program in 
the affected area. Agency representatives visit the area, 
calculate needs based on the numbers of children identified by 
the RRC survey, and apply to CRS for food to meet the demands.
CRS then submits a request to USAID for food. When USAID 
approves the food, the total tonnage available is reviewed and 
CRS makes an allocations list for the different agencies.
Food shipments arrive at one of three ports: Massawa and 
Assab in Ethiopia, and the port of Djibouti. The food is 
cleared from the ports by Maritime Transit Services Corporation, 
then sent to the primary distribution centers located at 
Nazareth, Asmara, Dessi, Addis, and Dira Dawa (by rail from 
Dj ibouti).
From the primary warehouses, food is sent by CRS-contracted 
lorries to secondary distribution centers run by agencies in the 
consortium. The food is then distributed directly from these 
centers or sent to tertiary warehouses for distribution in the 
villages.
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To speed monitoring at the centers, only one child from each 
family is monitored. Families designated by the kabeles are 
instructed to bring their thinnest child to the distribution 
center when food allocations are made. The children are weighed 
and measured monthly and records of their progress are 
maintained.
The overall nutrition program is closely monitored not only 
by the staff of the implementing agency, but also by the 
nutrition staff of the consortium. (However, some of the 
agencies are slow in providing the needed data, so that regional 
and national trends are difficult to monitor.)
In those cases where families do not have children or where 
individuals are in need, they are grouped together in artificial 
families referred to as ''destitutes''. This classification is 
for administrative purposes only and, while the term is seen by 
many to be paternalistic, administratively the system works.
Assessment Concerns
In assessing the emergency program, there are several 
questions of concern:
1. Is food reaching the people most in need?
2. Could food be better targeted?
3. What appropriate alternative food distribution methods 
might be employed, such as food-for-work or 
cash-for-work, and what criteria should be used for 
admission to those programs?
4. What will be the level of need for the next calendar 
year?
5. Which areas will require food aid for the next year?
6. What trends can be seen from evaluating the program, 
especially nutritional trends, needs and geographic 
shifts of the program?
7. Is the existing logistics system adequate, especially 
the trucking fleet and warehouses?
8. Are the foods being provided appropriate and culturally 
acceptable0
9. What efficiencies or economies in the program could be 
made without an adverse effect on the food distribution 
program?
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The Northern Initiative
The Northern Initiative is a special program established in 
mid-1985 to feed famine victims in the conflict areas of Tigrai, 
Eritrea and parts of Wello. CRS is responsible for the Eritrean 
portion of the program. In 1983, the U.S. initiated support for 
a cross-border feeding program to supply food from Sudan to 
rebel-held areas in northern Ethiopia. The overall success of 
this program was limited, however, due to logistics problems and 
the tonnages that were available. By late 1984, the famine 
situation had reached such proportions that hundreds of
thousands of persons were streaming into Sudan, and millions 
were estimated to be in a food crisis situation in the 
rebel-held areas. The Ethiopian Government made it clear that 
attempts to increase the amount of food coming in from Sudan 
were not acceptable. Thus, the U.S. sought permission to 
initiate feeding programs from bases in the GOE-controlled 
areas. After much negotiation, the Ethiopian Government agreed 
to a program whereby food could be placed at the forward edge of 
the government lines; local villagers would be allowed to pass 
through the lines to collect food and return it to their
communities. It was hoped that this program would feed the 
famine victims and keep people from becoming refugees or 
displaced persons.
The program works as follows: CRS delivers food to remote 
sites in the government-held areas and works through local 
churches to handle and monitor distribution. Village elders 
identify people in the villages that are in need of food and 
prepare lists of the affected families. These are submitted to 
church food aid officials who then prepare estimates of the
monthly tonnages required. On appointed dates, villagers come 
through the lines to collect the food and return to their
villages.
Priests cross the lines and monitor the village
distribution, although the monitoring is problematic (see 
Section V). By December 1985, approximately 3,000 MT of food 
per month were being distributed by CRS in Eritrea for a target 
population of 200,000 people.
Food aid has reached towns that have been completely cut off 
by the insurgents. Towns with airstrips, such as Barentu, have 
been supplied by C-130s. To some extent this may be more a 
result of availability of aircraft than of the government’s 
inability to control the roads. The government claims that, if 
necessary, it can open the major roads to the feeding centers. 
The ICRC has had experience of delivering food to the isolated 
areas, using their own convoys, without undue incident.
Questions of concern in the monitoring of the Northern 
Initiative Program are:
1. Does the food actually reach the people most in need?
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2. How is nutritional status being affected0
3. What is the real level of need, and can all those in 
need be reached?
4. Are the distribution sites we11-situated?
5. Can food be supplied to the remote, encircled sites 
after the airlift is terminated?
6. Do protection problems exist, i.e., are people who are 
crossing the lines harassed by either government or 
rebel forces?
D. MAJOR ISSUES TO BE EVALUATED
The following is a summary of the major issues that confront 
the overall relief effort and affect the CRS program for 1986.
1. Why is food aid still needed? Donors are aware of 
reports that many aid programs are winding down. News 
media have reported that many people have left the 
major feeding centers that made headlines only six 
months ago. Yet total food aid requests remain high. 
In this environment, many donors are asking why food 
aid is still needed.
2. How much food aid is required? Donors, especially
those that are showing signs of fatigue with the entire 
situation, are asking how much food is absolutely 
necessary for 1986. They argue that fine-tuning the 
program should result in a reduction of food aid 
requests.
3. How long will food aid be needed0 Donors are concerned
that food aid not continue indefinitely. Some are
concerned about the government's capacity to monitor
and handle distribution; others are concerned about 
possible dependencies; while others are simply ready to 
pull out if short-term needs can be met. All hope to 
see a situation where food aid can be phased out or 
substantially reduced in the short term.
4. Where in the country will food aid be most needed0
Recognizing that food aid requirements may be shifting, 
donors and operational agencies alike are concerned 
about where the primary needs will be for 1986. Is the 
famine shifting and, if so, which new areas will need 
massive assistance in the next year0
5. Where will the food come from0 Operational agencies 
are understandably concerned that pledges of food aid 
are rvinning below the forecast needs. The U.S. 
Government has pledged to meet 1/3 of the total food 
aid requirement but, for political as well as
14
administrative reasons, has declined to promise more 
than that target. The other donors (including Canada, 
Australia and the EEC) have not announced their 
commitments as of this writing, but indications are 
that the tonnages they can or are willing to provide 
will not total the additional 2/3 required.
(l)Mesfin Wolde-Mariam, Rural Vulnerability to Famine in 
Ethiopia (New Delhi, Vrikas Press), p. 8.
(2)Ibid., P- 14-15
(3)Ibid., P- 23
(4)Ibid., P- 24
(5)Ibid., P- 154.
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II. THE RELIEF SETTING
A. THE TERRAIN
Ethiopia comprises approximately 1.2 million square 
kilometers of diverse terrain, consisting of forests, tropical 
woodlands, grasslands, savannas, swamps and semi-desert areas. 
The country’s elevation varies from 120 meters below sea level 
in the Danakil Depression in the northeast, to about 
4,620 meters above sea level at Mount Ros Dejen in the north 
central part of the country.
PBis broad range in elevation forms three distinct 
environmental zones! the cool highlands, the temperate midlands, 
and the hot lowlands.
The highlands consist largely of severely dissected plains 
and precipitous hills and mountains, as well as high plateaus 
extending almost continuously over central Ethiopia in a north 
to southwesterly direction. Elevations range from 2400 meters 
to 4620 meters.
The midlands consist of rugged terrain and plateaus 
surrounding the highland mass. Elevations range from 1800 to 
2400 meters.
The lowlands consist generally of rugged but less abrupt 
land forms. They include the coastal lands in the northeast and 
land along the periphery of the country bordering Djibouti and 
Somalia in the east, Kenya in the south, and Sudan in the west. 
Elevations range from sea level to 1800 meters.
Figure 2-1 illustrates these general areas.
B. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
The bulk of Ethiopia’s food production comes from small 
subsistence farms located in the highlands, the midlands and the 
upper lowlands. Farmers in the highlands and parts of the upper 
midlands produce mainly teff, wheat and barley. Farmers in the 
midlands and upper lowlands produce mainly maize, sorghum and 
millet. Enset or false banana, a root crop, is another staple 
important to people in the southwest. Both highland and midxand 
areas also have grasslands to carry livestock.
The lowlands are largely grasslands, unfit for most crop 
production activities, and are used primarily for grazing the 
livestock of migrating pastoralists.
All of the cropping areas depend on timely, adequate 
rainfall. (There is little or no irrigation in Ethiopia.) For 
most parts of the country, this rainfall occurs between February 
and May (the "belg" rains), and again between June and December
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(the "meher", or main rains). The belg rains are inconsistent 
and generally unpredictable throughout most of the country. 
However, in some parts of the country, they are more consistent 
and are responsible for the belg cropping season where shorter 
maturation crops such as wheat, barley, some varieties of teff 
and vegetables are grown. This belg season can produce up to 
280,000 metric tons of food during normal years.
The meher, or main season, rains are responsible for 
producing the bulk of the food crops in Ethiopia. Teff, wheat 
and barley are grown during this season, as well as maize and 
sorghum (longer-maturing crops) that are planted towards the end 
of the belg rains. This main cropping season accounts for 6 to 
7 million metric tons of food during normal years. (See Figure 
2-2 . )
C. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
Of the 40.2 million people making up the population of 
Ethiopia, approximately 87% (35.0 million) live in a rural 
setting, while the remaining 13% (5.2 million) live in urban 
areas. The rural population consists of farmers and 
pastoralists, the latter comprising approximately 10-12% of the 
rural population, or 3.5 to 4.2 million people. Most of the 
pastoralists live and migrate with their livestock in the 
lowland areas, while the remainder of the population lives 
scattered throughout the rugged, mountainous terrain of the cool 
highlands and temperate midland areas.
Figure 2-3 indicates the approximate densities of the 
population. By comparing this map with Figure 2-1, it is clear 
that the majority of the population lives within the highland 
and midland areas.
D. LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS
Figure 2-4 is a schematic illustrating common problems and 
where they might occur in a typical logistics system. The 
diverse, rugged terrain and wide dispersion of the population in 
Ethiopia pose additional logistical problems for relief 
operations.
Food enters Ethiopia via one of three ports: Massawa, Assab, 
or Djibouti. Food arriving at Djibouti enters Ethiopia via rail 
from Djibouti to Dira Dawa in Harerge. The food is then taken 
overland via the road system.
Ethiopia’s road system consists of approximately 12,300 km. 
of main, all-weather roads (i.e., paved or gravel roads) and 
approximately 24,000 km. of secondary feeder roads and trails, 
which are generally usable in dry weather only.
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Altitudes
Lowlands (less than 1800 meters) 
Midlands (1800-2400 meters) 
Highlands (+  2400 meters)
Food Production 
Cropping Areas
Non-cropping areas; pastureland 
Maize, sorghum, millet
Teff, barley, wheat
Population Densities
0-14 persons/square km.
15-62 persons/square km.
over 62 persons/square km.
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O — Major ports and % of food aid received at 
that port.
A  — Major primary distribution centers. 
mm m m— Main paved highways.
11' 11 — Railway
(%) — Percent of total food aid received in each region.Figure 2-5
There are two main paved highway systems. The first runs 
from the port of Massawa in the north, to Asmara, and then south 
through Dessi, Addis Ababa, Awasa, and finally to the Kenyan 
border. (Currently, the portions of this road from Idaga Hamus 
to Wikro and from Adi Gudom to Maichew in Tigrai region are cut 
off due to civil conflict in the area. Much of the food aid 
going into this area has been delivered by air.) The second 
main highway runs from the port of Assab, southwest to Dessi, 
then south to Addis Ababa. (See Figure 2-5.)
Most sections of these main highways are in fair to good 
condition. Conditions of other paved roads are poor to fair. 
All-weather gravel roads are generally in poor to fair 
condition.
The bulk of the food aid (approximately 85%) coming into the 
country is transported on these two main highways by truck to 
the primary storage warehouses. These warehouses are located at 
Dessi, Addis Ababa, Nazareth and .Asmara.
The remaining food aid (approximately 15%) enters the 
country via a port in Djibouti, and is delivered to a primary 
warehouse at Dira Dawa by approximately 780 Ian. of railway. The 
supplies are then delivered by truck from the primary warehouse 
to secondary warehouses and food distribution centers.
Four to five months will have elapsed from the time a food, 
order is requested from a donor country until that food arrives 
in the secondary distribution centers. Three to four months are 
required for the donor country to process the request and 
deliver the food to one of the three ports. Food is then 
offloaded at an estimated maximum rate of 150,000 MT/month (see 
Appendix C) and delivered by truck or rail to the primary 
warehouse centers, the secondary warehouse centers, and the food 
distribution centers throughout the country. Then food is 
distributed to the recipients. (It is estimated that 3/4 of all 
farms are more than 1/2 day’s walking distance to the nearest 
road or distribution center. This puts an increased burden on 
the people when collecting food aid.)
This process of food delivery, from port to distribution 
center, takes approximately one month. Although port off-take 
rates, port take-away rates, warehousing capacities and trucking 
fleets have been insufficient in the past, they are now 
considered adequate to meet these needs.
Approximately 1.25 million MT of foreign food aid entered 
Ethiopia during 1985. Figure 2-5 also indicates the approximate 
percentages of tonnages delivered at each port, and the 
approximate percentages of tonnages distributed to each region 
during 1985.
E . POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
All counter-famine operations are carried out in a complex 
political environment. Since 1974, Ethiopia has chosen to 
embark on a course designed to move the country from an 
inefficient feudal society to a centrally-governed Marxist 
state. This choice on the part of Ethiopia’s revolutionary 
leadership has led to a decline in development assistance, 
declining foreign investment, and more difficulty in obtaining 
the necessary loans needed for industrialization and 
modernization of the agricultural sector. Relations between the 
GOE and the western countries that supply most of the food aid 
have been rocky since the 1974 revolution.
Relations with the United States have been particularly 
troublesome (the United States has had only a Charge d ’Affaires 
there since 1979) and have not only affected development 
assistance but also accounted in part for the delay in initial 
famine response. A particular obstacle to diversification of 
assistance until recently was the fact that Ethiopia had not 
paid compensation to American interests which were expropriated 
in the wake of the 1974 revolution. The Hickenlooper Amendment, 
which states that development assistance cannot be provided to 
any country which fails to compensate American firms for 
expropriation, has been cited as the primary reason why more 
sophisticated rehabilitation and longer-term agricultural- 
recovery programs have not been supported with financial 
assistance from the U.S. In December 1985, the U.S. and the 
Ethiopian Government reached an accord whereby Ethiopia agreed 
to pay compensation, although at this writing it is not clear i 
this will have the immediate effect of making more development 
and agricultural recovery assistance available.
As an offshoot of fundamental differences in approaches to 
development, other political considerations abound. The 
following are some of the more important that affect overal 
famine relief operations.
1. Western opposition to the Marxist government has had 
two major effects on the relief environment. First, it 
has meant that foreign assistance has been channeled 
primarily through foreign voluntary agencies rather 
than through the Government of Ethiopia. While the 
voluntary agencies have done a commendable job in the 
famine, their own resources are limited and many 
operations were conducted on an ad hoc basis. 
Normally, in a situation of this magnitude, the host 
government would be the primary channel for relief aid, 
and the tremendous duplication of administratee 
services, personnel, etc., (and administrative costs) 
would be substantially reduced; furthermore, internal 
communications and the ability to transfer resources to 
meet various contingencies would be facilitated.
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Second, reliance on voluntary agencies instead of the 
GOE means that long-term experience in famine
operations management cannot be achieved. This is 
unfortunate because Ethiopia is likely to continue to 
experience drought and famine conditions for the 
foreseeable future. Development of stronger
institutions could play a major part in lessening the 
effects of famine in coming decades.
2. Western, and especially U.S., opposition to
resettlement has had several effects on relief
operations. First, in order to reduce attention to the
resettlement program, the Government of Ethiopia has 
administratively decided to exclude persons targeted 
for resettlement from immediate food assistance. This 
means that substantial numbers of people in Tigrai, 
Wello and Harerge (three of the most affected areas), 
as well as Keffa, Wellega and N. Sidamo, are excluded 
from the food rolls. In many cases, this has resulted 
in hunger for those who are targeted.
Second, people w^° bave been resettled are not eligible 
for food assistance with food supplied by the U.S. 
Government. The unavailability of American food has 
had no visible effect on the GOE's plans to continue 
resettlement. Some critics claim that, for those being 
resettled, the burden is even greater, since food is 
often not available when they arrive at relocation 
sites. The few foreign agencies working at relocation 
sites have tended to be smaller agencies with far more 
limited resources and are incapable of providing the 
levels of food needed to prevent hunger in the
relocation settlements.
3. The Ethiopian Government’s food allocation priorities 
during times of shortage have been: (1) the military,
(2) the urban populations, (3) resettlement, and
(4) those in government-controlled rural areas. Most 
western countries, especially the United States, have 
criticized these priorities since the massive famine 
has principally struck the rural areas, many of which 
are not controlled by the government. The government 
has demonstrated its priorities by confiscating food 
from several of the regional warehouses where it is 
held in reserve for the rural areas, and diverting it 
to the military and to urban areas. As a result, the 
United States ceased to support the concept of regional 
buffer stocks (the "strategic reserve") which is an 
important famine-fighting measure, particularly at this 
stage of the famine.
The inability of the RRC to maintain control over food 
stocks and prevent them from being confiscated or 
diverted by the GOE has also resulted in a further 
decline of U.S. Government support for the RRC. In
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fiscal year 1986, no food allocations have been made to 
the RRC. At a time when many of the smaller agencies
are unable to continue their programs due to a lack of 
resources, it would be advantageous if the RRC could 
move into these areas and continue food relief.
4. American opposition to forced villagization has been 
felt in several ways. First, major donor assistance is 
unavailable to people who have been forcibly moved to 
villages. Second, longer-term economic assistance, 
which could help the villagers to recover and to adjust 
to their new way of life, cannot be approved if the 
source of funds is the U.S. Government. Again, the 
lack of aid to these programs has not had a discernible 
braking effect on villagization plans. And some 
critics have stated that the policy of non-support of 
persons who have already been moved into the villages 
is "punishing the victims". In areas such as Harerge, 
where 98% of all rural people are now living in the new 
villages, the policy appears to be especially limiting, 
and several organizations have mentioned that the major 
donors could have far more leverage with the GOE if 
they were providing limited development assistance for 
the new settlements.
5. The numerous restraints on recovery and development 
assistance are the most constraining to overall 
recovery. Agencies are forced to remain in a relief 
mode beyond the normal period. At this stage of a 
famine, relief agencies should be shifting the majority 
of their efforts to long-term, structural changes that 
will increase food production, reduce future food 
deficits, and provide means for responding to future 
food crises. Interventions to achieve these objectives 
are both costly and long-term, and must be initiated at 
this stage. Without whole-hearted U.S. participation, 
it is unlikely that much progress can be made in the 
near term to solve many of the root causes of 
continuing food shortages, for the U.S. not only has 
the resources, it also has the technology and know-how.
6. The most important political consideration by far is a
decision by the U.S. to support only one-third of the 
total food requirement for 1986. Officially, the 
reasons stated for the .American decision is that other 
donors can and should meet the other two-thirds
requirement. It is pointed out that the U.S. is
currently supporting many other countries in Africa, 
especially Sudan, and that the burden should be more 
equally distributed among donor nations. Privately, 
many top USG officials have stated that the U.S. wants 
to reduce its exposure in Ethiopia and, by limiting the 
percentage of food aid, to underscore .American 
dissatisfaction with overall Ethiopian agricultural 
policies and national priorities. These
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officials point out that, while the U.S. has assumed 
and will continue to assume a humanitarian burden, it 
is not prepared to further support a government whose 
basic policies are diametrically opposed to or at 
variance with U.S. government policies and practices.
The overall result of the "one-third decision" remains 
to be seen. Several of last year’s major donors 
(including the EEC, Canada and Australia) have 
indicated that they are either unwilling or unable to 
supply the amount necessary to equal the other 
two-thirds of the food. The principal donors have been 
meeting to determine the level of food required and to 
allocate donations. However, if these matters are not 
handled quickly, serious shortfalls could occur by mid- 
April 1986. The lag-time from approval of the food 
request to the time when it is delivered to the 
distribution centers is four to six months for American 
food, seven to eight for Canadian and Australian food, 
and up to one year for EEC food.
Political constraints imposed from the Ethiopian side have 
been just as problematic. In the north, the major priority for 
the GOE is the war, and government attention to famine 
operations has taken a lower priority. This has been felt in 
the logistics system. During 1984 and 1985, government trucks 
were often unavailable for relief supplies because they were 
being used for military cargoes or because government 
authorities were reluctant to allow them to travel along routes 
that might be mined. This resulted in large areas receiving 
minimal food until adequate trucks could be provided by relief 
agencies or until airlifts (and in some cases airdrops) could be 
arranged. The air supply operations in the north became quite 
extensive during the last six months of 1985, with over a dozen 
large aircraft (predominately C-130s) participating at one 
time. Later, the GOE permitted food to be flown into sites such 
as Barentu and Mekele for distribution by the Northern 
Initiative program. However, in some areas the extremely 
formidable terrain prevented large amounts of food from reaching 
isolated pockets. Requests by several agencies to airdrop food 
to those settlements were rejected by the GOE on military and 
political grounds. (Extensive airdrop operations were 
permitted, however, in government-controlled areas, and many 
remote villages which otherwise would not have received food 
were able to receive much-needed supplies.)
A major set of constraints to famine recovery has been the 
GOE’s unwillingness to even temporarily terminate many of its 
restrictive agricultural policies. Two major constraints are 
the government policy requiring farmers to sell the major 
portion of their crop surplus to the government (often according 
to a quota system), and restricting farmers from selling the 
remainder of their crops in areas outside the awraja where they 
were produced. The first policy is considered to have had a
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disincentive effect on production; by having to sell the 
majority of their crop surplus to the government at reduced 
prices, farmers have not been able to acquire the capital needed 
to purchase seeds, draught animals or farm implements lost 
during the drought. Therefore, full agricultural recovery will 
be more difficult in the most severely affected regions.
The restrictions on free-market sales of the remaining food 
have had the effect of lessening the flow of food from areas 
where moderate surpluses were produced into areas where deficits 
exist. In some areas, the combination of policies has resulted 
in farmers hoarding surpluses or secretly channeling them into 
areas where they can be sold on the black market.
F . BASELINE STANDARDS FOR THIS REPORT
The findings of this report are the result of numerous 
interviews; the review of literature, reports and previous 
assessments; site visits; and the establishing of baseline 
standards. The baseline standards were established using
available information that the team believed best reflected the 
situation in Ethiopia. The following is a summary of the 
baseline standards used in this report.
1) Nutritional Standard
An average per capita daily caloric intake of 2100 kcal 
is recognized as the minimum required for long-term 
nutritional maintenance and stability.
An average per capita daily caloric intake of 1500 kcal 
is recognized as the minimum required for short-term 
emergency sustenance of life.
(See Section IV for details.)
2) Population Base. For the purpose of this report, the 
following populations are recognized:
rural population = 34,952,776 
urban population = 5,282,688
total population = 40,235,464
(See Appendix A for details.)
3) Structural Deficit. Based on the nutritional standard 
and the population base above, the structural deficit 
is determined to be 704,925 MT.
(See Appendix B for details.)
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4) Logistics Standard. Based on various information 
sources, the following logistics standards aie 
recognized:
a) Maximum average take-away capacity for all 3 ports 
is 150,000 MT per month.
b) Available CRS secondary warehouse storage capacity 
is 88,250 m.
c) CRS 1986 haulage capacity is 21,673 MT per month.
(See Appendix C for details.)
III. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS
In an attempt to preview and facilitate planning for 
anticipated food needs in 1986, USAID, FAO, CSO and RRC ha\e all 
issued food needs estimates based on recent studies. A brief 
review of each assessment follows.
A. USAID
David Atwood issued a report to USAID in September 1985 
estimating Ethiopia’s anticipated 1986 emergency food 
requirements. His report was based on 3 weeks of preparation 
and interviews in Washington and 7 weeks of field work in 
Ethiopia during August - September.
The report is an extremely well-written and well-organized 
account of the possible food shortages likely in Ethiopia in 
1986. (Much of the information used in this report is based on
his findings.) The report’s methodology is appropriate for 
estimating the overall national food needs of Ethiopia. It 
bases its food consumption estimates on past actual consumption 
estimates during periods of relatively normal food production, 
and its crop production estimates are based on past production 
estimates (a "normal” production year being the average
production of the 1979/80 
percentage upgrading or
1983/84 period) and a regional 
downgrading depending on field 
is taken from CSO/EWS reports, FAO 
field observations. Given the 
to use, his methodology is clear, 
logical and appropriate for arriving at a good indication of 
food requirements.
observation. Information 
reports, interviews and 
assumptions that he chose
However, several issues have been incorporated into his 
methodology which may create a less-than-accurate picture of 
1986 food needs, and Mr. Atwood is the first to point these 
out. First, the fact that his assessment was based on field 
observations carried out in August and early September allows 
the possibility of huge discrepancies in estimated and actual 
crop production during the 1985 meher harvest. Mr. Atwood s 
estimated 1985 crop productions were based on continued 
favorable climatic conditions, which in fact did not take place 
in many areas.
Second, he points out that the methodology incorporated into 
his report was an attempt to determine an estimate of total 
national food needs, and not necessarily to point out specific 
food need issues on a regional or sub-regional basis. His 
report therefore assumes food flows from surplus areas into 
deficit areas, which may or may not be the case, depending on 
the areas and their political and logistical frameworks. (We 
have used the Early Warning System estimates of needy 
populations as an indicator of food flow.)
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Third, estimates of basic per capita food requirements 
assume normal average per capita daily consumption of main foods 
to be 1561 kcal (446 gms). Allowing for an additional per 
capita daily consumption of 207 kcal from foods other than main 
foods (as he has estimated), then the total normal average per 
capita daily consumption of all foods is 1767 kcal. If we 
assume that our normal long-term maintenance caloric intake 
requirement of 2100 kcal is appropriate, and that our emergency 
caloric intake requirement of 1500 kcal is appropriate (both 
were defined as baselines in Section II-F of this report), then 
the 1767 kcal normal average daily per capita intake suggests:
(x)(2100 kcal) + (l-x)(1500 kcal) = 1767 kcal
x = 44.5%,
or that only an average of 44.5% of the population are getting 
the minimal long-term maintenance caloric intake (2100 kcal), 
and an average of 55.5% of the population is getting only the 
minimal emergency caloric intake (1500 kcal) (see Appendix B for 
explanation of similar argument). We hope that this is not the 
case, and believe that it is likely not true. This would 
suggest that either the population figures used in the report 
are probably too large, or that food availability is actually 
greater, or a combination of the two.
B. FAO
FAO attempts to estimate crop production only, and does not 
attempt to analyze the food requirements of the Ethiopian 
population. The methodology is based on field measurements and 
observations of critical and representative farming areas of 
Ethiopia, as well as interviews with farmers and key personnel, 
and a review of CSO/EWS statistics. This information is then 
"weighed", and estimates representative of the areas are made 
and compared to a "base” or "normal" period. (FAO uses an 
average of the 1980-81 and 1982-83 crop production statistics as 
its "average normal" year.) A national crop production forecast 
is then estimated.
The FAO mission has made two previous crop assessments in 
Ethiopia in recent times, the last being in October 1984. On 
both accounts, their assessments proved to be "on target", i.e., 
actual past harvest findings supported the Mission’s previous 
crop assessment. It therefore appears as though the FAO crop 
assessment teams have a good understanding of the Ethiopian 
agricultural sector and that their methodologies are appropriate 
for determining accurate crop production estimates.
C . Central Statistics Office (CSO)
The CSO puts out good information annually on crop forecasts 
and crop estimates for each region, based on quantitative 
estimates of area planted, yield and production. Their staff is 
stationed throughout each region to carry out extensive programs
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of data collection. This information appears to be a very good 
representation of overall crop production, based on samples 
taken from thousands of farms.
Interviews with many government and non-government 
professionals in the field support the CSO statistics as being 
reasonably accurate, fair and dependable.
The only drawback to its reporting system is its
timeliness. Production estimates are usually not available 
until six months after the harvest. Therefore, the production 
information can be considered to be accurate, but not useful in 
regard to anticipating major crop production shortfalls. It is 
very useful information, however, when used to establish trends, 
and when used in conjunction with the Early Warning Service 
(EWS) information, as EWS makes crop production estimates based 
on a percentage of the previous year’s harvest.
D . The Early Warning System (EWS) of the Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission
The EWS provides monthly reports that indicate general 
information of crop production estimates, market trends and 
potential areas of need, by monitoring drought-affected areas 
and estimating the number of people seriously affected by 
drought within the area. EWS utilizes information from the 
National Meteorological Service Agency, the Central Statistics 
Office, the International Livestock Center for Africa, market 
conditions, their own field staff, and other agencies to get 
qualitative impressions of what is happening in the field. 
Although very little of their information is quantitatively 
based, EWS appears to make very reasonable estimates of crop 
production.
EWS’s estimates of needy people, however, can be misleading 
(although we have used their needy people estimates in 
Appendix E to get relative impressions of the locations of food 
need). EWS surveys an area to determine whether or not that 
area is "drought-affected". If an area receives "drought 
affected” status, then peasant associations within that area are 
eligible for food aid. Peasant associations outside the 
"drought-affected" areas are not eligible for food aid.
Although this is probably the best method at present to get 
an idea of the magnitude of needy people in a given area, it 
does not allow for the fact that there may be peasant 
associations outside a designated "drought-affected" area that 
include many needy people.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF NUTRITIONAL DATA
A. REVIEW OF EXISTING STANDARDS
Previous nutrition assessments for Ethiopia were frequently 
based on weight-for-age vs. weight-for-height. Weight-for-age 
can result in higher percentages of malnutrition as it more 
accurately reflects chronic undemutrition (resulting in 
"stunting") rather than the acute malnutrition of famine. The 
nutritional standard used in this report is weight-for-height.
Weight-for-height (amount of muscle mass on the body frame) 
is the best indicator for the assessment of nutritional status 
in emergencies. It is a sensitive indicator of acute 
malnutrition, and is independent of sex, race and age (up to 
puberty). A child’s weight is compared with the expected weight 
of a "reference" (well-nourished) child of the same height. 
Results are expressed as a "percentage of median reference 
weight-for-height", or "percent weight-for-height". Eighty 
percent of median reference weight-for-height is often selected 
as a cut-off point, above which a child's nutritional status is 
considered adequate, and below which it is considered 
inadequate. Eighty percent weight-for-height roughly 
corresponds to two standard deviations below population median, 
into which about 2% of any normally-distributed population 
should be expected to fall.
Under most circumstances, the nutritional status of children 
under five can be taken to reflect the nutritional status of the 
whole community. However, adults also suffer from food 
shortages and, in areas where the feeding of children has 
precedence over that of the parents, it may be the adults who 
are most affected by starvation.
Even during normal times, malnutrition due to protein-energy 
deficiencies is the second major health problem in Ethiopia, 
next to communicable diseases. The figures on percentage of the 
population suffering from malnourishment during normal times 
vary from source to source, according to the method of 
assessment used (wt/ht, wt/age, etc.) and the regions from which 
the information is taken. It is generally found that persons in 
food-producing areas will have lower levels of malnutrition than 
those in areas where a combination of food and cash crops are 
grown, as well as those in cash-crop-producing areas. Persons 
in urban or market centers will also show better nutritional 
status than those in rural areas or those located away from main 
roads.
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PREVALENCE OF MALNUTRITION BY CROP ZONE
Nutritional Indicator 
(% below med.)
Crop zone Wt/Ht Wt/Age No.
Cash crop 45.9 38.2 259
Food + Cash 42.5 39.0 1812
Food Crop 39.5 31.1 1994
All Zones 41.3 36.1 4065
Source: JNSP Baseline Survey (Rural) Preliminary Report,
ENI, 1985.
A WHO report states that in Ethiopia, up to 30-40% of the 
children are believed to be malnourished during normal times, 
and that 10% of the population suffers from extreme 
mainourishment (or < 70% wt./ht.). According to another study
by FAO, from 1969-1971 (a normal period), 26% of the population 
was estimated to be receiving the Basic Minimum Caloric 
Requirement (or less than 1,512 calories per person)) whereas 
from 1972-1974 (a famine period), 38% were receiving the Basic 
Minimum Requirement to sustain life.
B. STANDARDS FOR THIS ASSESSMENT
Based upon a pre-drought five-year average of food 
availability in all regions and an average caloric intake of 
2100 kcal per person per day, the assessment team calculates the 
percentage of malnourished to be about 28%. This means that 28% 
is receiving an average of 1500 kcal per day, the minimum amount 
of energy required to sustain life. This is considered the 
emergency subsistence level, below which large-scale starvation 
and death is expected if the population is of normal body size 
and is required to expend energy or perform work. People can 
survive on 1500 kcal per day for only 1 or 2 months before 
deteriorating. Persons who are already nutritionally deficient 
will deteriorate more rapidly.
The team calculates the balance of the population, 72%, to 
be receiving an average of 2100 kcal per person per day. This 
is based on accountable food sources and does not take into 
consideration traditional "famine foods" often eaten during the 
"hunger season", such as berries, roots and small fruits. The 
2100 kcal average is low compared to the needs of 
moderately-active adults and pregnant and lactating women. From 
age 4+, the minimum calories per day necessary to maintain a 
basic level of health is 1800-2000. A person doing heavy labor 
would suffer nutritionally from this ration. The WHO daily 
energy intake average of all groups for developing countries
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(see table below) is 2195 kcals. The slightly lower average of 
2100 kcal is used for this report for the purpose of 
establishing the food deficit, considering that unaccountable 
food sources could contribute an additional 100-200 kcal per 
person per day.
RECOMMENDED DAILY ENERGY INTAKES 
FOR HEALTHY INDIVIDUALS
ENERGY
GROUP______ _ MJ (kcal th)
0-1 year 3.4 (820)
1-3 years 5.7 (1360)
4-6 years 7.7 (1830)
7-9 years 9.2 (2190)
10-14 years:
males 11.7 (2800)
females 10.3 (2450)
Male adult
(moderately active) 12.6 (3000)
Female adult
(moderately active) 9.2 (2200)
Pregnancy (latter half) 10.7 (2550)
Lactation 11.5 (2750)
Average 9.2 (2195)
Adapted from WHO, Handbook on Human Nutritional Requirements, 
1974.
C. FOOD BASKET
The basic ration provided through the CRS consortium was 
designed as a supplement to some other food source. The ration 
provides 1400 kcal per person/day. This amount is near the 
survival level for adults under resting conditions and without 
illness. It cannot sustain an individual over an extended 
period of time without increased risk of disease and death. The 
general take-home dry ration consists of 45.36 kg. of grain 
(bulgar wheat or soy-fortified sorghum grits), 3.6 kg. of 
soybean vegetable oil, and 4 kg. of non-fat dried skim milk. 
This ration is distributed once a month to families (based on an 
average size of five persons, with at least one child less than 
five years old) and destitutes (families without children under 
five years old, and all others showing need). Rations are 
divided among five persons who are classified as destitutes. 
Priority is given to those with children under five, as these 
are considered among the most vulnerable to food shortages. For
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those belonging to farmers associations located, at great 
distances from distribution centers, it is sometimes too 
difficult and hazardous for the mother to walk the distance 
carrying a child. In such cases, the risks to the child 
outweigh the benefits of the growth monitoring process and these 
recipients would be registered as destitutes.
The following is a breakdown of caloric values for rations 
distributed by the consortium. Persons receiving food aid 
presumably have limited access to other foods which are 
supplemented by the rations distributed through the food 
programs. However, in certain instances where availability of 
rations is limited or other foods are available in the area, 
reduced rations of 840 calories are distributed. If no other 
food sources are available and people are relying totally on 
rations (as in shelters), up to 1950-calorie rations have been 
distributed in certain regions.
CRS, ECS, LWF, EECMY 
Monthly ration per family of 5:
Ration Caloric Value Total Calories
Grain: 45.36kg. 3.6/gm. 163,296 kcal
NFDM 4.00kg. 3.6/gm. 14,400 kcal
Oil: 3.60kg. 9/gm. 32,400 kcal
52.96kg. 210,096 kcal
Daily Calories per capita: 
assuming food sharing; 
using 5 persons/family; 
calculating 30 days/month;
Total monthly calories per ration = 210,096 kcal
Calories per day/family (210,096 t 30) = 7,003 kcal
Average Daily Calories Per Person = 1,400 kcal
D. SELECTING RECIPIENTS
Recipients should be selected from needy families. The 
standards for determining need are:
1. Poverty.
2. Lack of food - as evidenced by thinness.
3. Families with persons at high risk of death due to lack 
of food, especially:
a. children under 5 years; by measure, the child 
should be <105 cm. 60% of the children registered 
in food programs should be <80% weight/height if 
the area is truly needy;
b . elderly plus weak persons;
c. disabled or sick;
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d. pregnant or lactating women (they, as well as the 
nursing children, have special needs).
4. Families with large numbers of children.
E. DATA COLLECTION
Nutritional data is collected monthly at each center. 
Mothers bring the thinnest child under 5 years old to the 
distribution center where they are weighed and measured and a 
percentage of weight-for-height is calculated. Each child has a 
growth surveillance chart on which the percentage 
weight-for-height is plotted. Growth patterns are monitored for 
weight gains and losses. If weight hats stabilized at normal 
levels for several months, the family should be discharged from 
the feeding program.
F. NUTRITION RECORD-KEEPING METHODS
Different record-keeping methods for nutritional levels can 
create difficulties in assessing trends. Because most of the 
distribution centers visited were the cooperating agencies' 
centers, the data collected is very thorough and record-keeping 
methods are generally similar throughout the system. Means of 
recording the data may vary from region to region; however, the 
standards used are the same, allowing the cooperating agencies 
to correlate information to determine trends. In addition, 
nutrition program guidelines were established in early 1985 
which define everything from determining priority areas, to 
screening, feeding, monitoring and record-keeping.
The following are guidelines used by the cooperating 
agencies for recording and reporting data at each distribution 
site.
1. Reporting/monitoring the effectiveness of the program -
Dry Rations
a) Keep monthly checklist of families receiving 
ration with amount of ration indicated. Also keep 
monthly comparison of the child's weight.
b) Use mastercard and individual weight cards as per 
CRS.
c) Keep daily tally of children referred to medical 
care, supplemental feeding, receiving vitamin A; 
admissions; deaths; children with weight 
increased, decreased, staying the same; as well as 
the % weight/height for the children measured.
d) Submit a monthly report with daily summaries for 
the above information.
e) Keep current stock cards reporting all incoming 
and outgoing stock. Submit a monthly summary.
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2. Reporting/monitoring the effectiveness of the program - 
Premix
a) A registration list of children receiving the 
premix, with weekly weights recorded, must be 
kept.
b) Numbers of children receiving the premix, 
discharged, admitted, gaining weight, losing 
weight, remaining the same, must be reported 
monthly.
3. Reporting requirements
a) Keep monthly checklist of families receiving 
ration, with amount of ration distributed daily. 
Ration different than that agreed upon should be 
explained on the checklist (i.e., grain shipment 
did not arrive, etc.).
b) Keep stockcards or received/distributed/balance 
for each commodity received.
c) Submit monthly a daily tally of numbers of 
families receiving ration.
d) Submit monthly a summary of goods received/ 
distributed/balance, by commodity.
e) Submit monthly onsite evaluation form by regional 
supervisor.
G. CORRELATING NUTRITIONAL DATA
Need for a Standardized Reporting System
A real need is apparent for a standardized reporting system 
to correlate data between NGOs. Certain operating agencies use 
different nutritional standards, which will affect the numbers 
of children assessed to be malnourished. This is especially 
obvious when one agency moves into an area and opens a program 
where recipients had been on another program. For example, many 
of the recipients of newly-opened shelters in Tigrai had been on 
ICRC programs which assess nutritional levels according to a 
different standard (arm circumference) from that used by the 
cooperating agencies. A change in standards can result in 
variations of percentages of malnourished and can create 
appearances of a sudden drop or rise in malnourished.
Other groups may use the weight/age vs. weight/height 
standard, or base reports on percentages of children less than 
85% or less than 75%, causing discrepancies. Criteria used to 
assess those eligible for food aid may also vary from program to 
program, causing difficulties in correlating data, especially 
when comparing trends in different regions.
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Certain problems are unavoidable when dealing with such 
large populations and shifting areas of need. Availability or 
lack of commodities within and outside distribution centers, and 
erratic shipments, may affect the rate of nutritional 
improvement. Changes in scale, large numbers of new arrivals, 
and accessibility of the center will also make trends difficult 
to assess. In certain areas where the consortium’s programs 
replace other programs, the rations distributed may be different 
and the change may be reflected in short increases or drops in 
nutritional levels, depending on the caloric intakes. It should 
also be assumed that, because of lack of comparative data (local 
mortality rates and causes, population statistics), the data 
from the individual center reports reflect what is happening 
with the program and should not be viewed as general population 
surveys. Hence, it is possible to evaluate trends within the 
relief system but not necessarily to correlate the data with 
trends occurring outside, unless more thorough assessments are 
made.
Lack of Comparative Data
An analysis of nutritional trends should be placed within 
the context of what is considered normal for Ethiopia in order 
to measure the effectiveness of food programs and assess future 
needs.
Yet "normal" is somewhat difficult to define, as most 
comparative data on malnutrition in Ethiopia focuses on urban 
populations and is measured in terms which reflect chronic 
malnutrition rather than the acute malnutrition of famine. 
Different sources will give different percentages of 
malnutrition within the general population, and standards used 
will vary. Part of the problem is reflective of the wide range 
of figures on population estimates for Ethiopia. In any case, 
without an awareness of what is normal, there is the risk of 
creating dependencies on food aid and disrupting local 
economies. Adversely, there is the risk of relapse and rapid 
nutritional deterioration if food programs are stopped too 
early.
This problem of lack of comparative data is being addressed 
by the Ethiopian Nutrition Institute in conjunction with the 
Central Statistics Office. A first-round Nutrition Situation 
Surveillance published in October 1980 outlines the intentions 
of the surveillance, which includes regular assessments of food 
stocks, dietary intakes, and nutritional status of population 
groups. The project was designed to enable ENI to give 
predictive information and comprehensive data by which distress 
situations could be more easily recognized. Unfortunately, the 
only data covered in the first surveillance is on urban centers, 
which is not reflective of the status of those most affected by 
the famine - the rural peasantry.
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Due to the time limitations of the assessment team’s stay in 
Ethiopia, some of the background data hats been taken from 
previous studies. This information is to be used as comparative 
data for evaluating current nutritional trends. Information on 
current trends is based on monthly reports from the co-operating 
agencies, CRS distribution centers, interviews with health and 
administrative personnel from NGOs and emergency relief 
agencies, and discussions with representatives from the GOE, 
HRC, peasants’ associations, farmers, and local clergy.
Lack of Standards for Establishing Need
Criteria for judging the neediness of an area as a means of 
increasing agencies’ capacities for immediate and appropriate 
response to new crisis areas is a priority of the CSO and RRC. 
However, ambivalent standards are often used to assess the 
effects of the drought on developing famine pockets. Terms such 
as "needy", "drought-affected", "in need of immediate 
assistance", are frequently used in general nutritional surveys 
carried out by the RRC and can be broadly interpreted. This 
necessitates a duplication of effort by agencies to more 
accurately qualify the degree of need. The RRC regularly 
carries out its surveys in conjunction with local officials from 
the awrajas (districts), the woredas (sub-districts), and the 
kabeles (peasants’ associations). Standards set by one group 
may be higher or lower than those set by another, although the 
terms used will be the same. Those using more stringent 
standards may assess a village as having a much lower percentage 
of need than those using less rigid standards. In one awraja, 
for example, it was decided that "in need of immediate 
assistance" meant a family who had lost everything; or who had 
no tools, oxen, or seed; or no food in their stores. 
Unfortunately, even if there have been indications of food 
shortages for months, it is often not until the situation has 
become critical and people are dying that assistance is brought 
in. Situations like this continue to occur as new "pockets of 
need" develop. Those areas currently not within the vicinity of 
established feeding centers, or in difficult-to-access areas, 
can frequently reach critical levels before agencies are alerted 
to their needs.
As explained in a U.N. monthly report, "It seems necessary, 
if we are going to respond in a timely manner to crisis needs as 
they develop in new areas, for us to try and reach agreement 
both with the RRC and with the NGOs on a set of indicators that 
all our Field Monitors would collect in the areas they visit, 
and that interested agencies, with far greater field coverage 
than we, would also monitor".
As sensible as this is, a resolution to the problem is 
impossible without an agreement between donor agencies and local 
authorities on appropriate responses to specific need 
indicators.
35
As a result, those who have reached "normal” status continue 
to receive food, while other areas are experiencing high rates 
of malnutrition or are moving in directions which indicate 
deteriorating states and potential need for emergency food and 
medical aid.
Reporting and Monitoring
The time in which a survey is conducted will also affect the 
outcome. If taken during or after the harvest period, the 
quality of the harvest must be assessed in order to determine 
potential shortages. Several areas surveyed appeared to have 
good harvests, but upon closer inspection and interviews, it was 
discovered that the crop was seedless, or affected by frost, 
blight or army worm infestations. Under normal circumstances, 
farmers are accustomed to these problems, and have the storage 
or traditional back-up mechanisms which would sustain them 
through poor harvests. However, loss of these back-ups, and 
lack of seeds, lack of plow oxen, and inability to plant due to 
weakness or displacement have caused much land to be left 
unplowed. Hence, an area that appears to have food may, in
reality, have critically low yields incapable of supporting its 
population.
On the other hand, if the survey is conducted during the 
pre-harvest months, the area may require emergency food stocks 
on a short-term basis. For these reasons, a regular monitoring 
system and means of reporting is important in order to address 
needs without exaggerating or underestimating what each region 
is capable of sustaining.
H. IMPACT OF FOOD AID ON NUTRITION
In a famine situation, the most vulnerable groups are 
children under five years old, pregnant and lactating mothers, 
the elderly, weak, disabled and sickly. Individuals in these 
groups are at the greatest risk because they are physically less 
capable of enduring long periods without sustenance and are 
consequently more vulnerable to disease and rapid deterioration.
Young children have less fat and body mass from which the 
body can draw energy when food is unavailable, and are incapable 
of foraging for themselves. In most communities in Ethiopia, 
adults will feed their children what little food they may have 
before feeding themselves; thus if the children appear 
malnourished, the rest of the family is probably also 
malnourished. Pregnant and lactating mothers are more 
vulnerable because of the extra energy needed to supply 
themselves and the growing fetus or nursing infant. The 
elderly, the weak and disabled not only suffer from physical 
frailties, but may be incapable of travelling to areas where 
food is available. And frequently, when choices within a family 
are made as to who should survive if only small amounts of food 
are available, it is this last group which is least likely to
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receive anything. Hence, agencies survey the nutritional status 
of the vulnerable groups because they are the first to reflect 
food shortages within a community.
Children are the easiest to monitor, as standard 
anthropometric (body) measurements enable agencies to fairly 
accurately determine degrees of malnutrition. Families with 
children under 5 years are required to bring at least one of 
these children to the distribution center in order to receive 
their monthly dry ration and premix supplement (for each child) 
if needed. The child is weighed and measured at the center, and 
growth patterns are monitored for weight gain or loss. If a 
child’s weight reaches normal status and stabilizes over a 
three-month period, it is assumed that the family has reached 
"normal" status and can be discharged from the feeding program.
Issues
There are certain problems inherent in this system (although 
no real alternative currently exists):
1. Unless surveys are made in the villages and residences 
are inspected, the elderly, weak, sickly or disabled 
may be left to die out of sight of relief workers. 
Since no reliable death records are available in most 
areas, it is difficult to determine whether deaths of 
these individuals are due to malnutrition, 
malnutrition-related diseases or some other cause.
2. If recipients must travel long distances to collect dry
rations, it is impossible for a mother to carry a child 
to the center for monitoring. This makes it difficult 
to judge the impact of food aid in a family since there 
is no means of measuring nutritional status. In such 
cases, the basis used is the nutritional status of the 
children in the woreda. If stable, low levels of 
malnutrition are reached by the children in the woreda, 
it is assumed that the community is capable of
sustaining itself and food aid is no longer needed. 
Again, only on-site surveillance in the villages can 
determine the impact of food aid and whether those most 
in need are indeed receiving it.
3. If the criterion for receiving dry rations is a
malnourished child, it is possible that a family will 
starve a child in order to stay in the program. 
Instances of this have occurred but can generally be 
spotted if the child’s growth records do not show 
improvement over a period of time. Other factors, such 
as diarrhea or tuberculosis may also prevent weight 
gain and medical attention will determine this. If no 
other cause is found, the mother may be improperly 
preparing the premix, or the family may be too large to 
be sustained by the allotted ration.
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4. Numbers of deaths within a community can be 
misleading. If initially large numbers of people are 
dying regularly, reduced death rates in later months 
may not indicate that the situation is improving. It 
could mean that the weakest have died, and only the 
stronger individuals are left.
All of these issues affect a food program and indicate the 
need for surveillance within the community to accurately judge 
the effectiveness of a program. Records may show nutritional 
improvement of those within the food aid system, but may not be 
reflective of its impact on the general population. This leads 
to several questions regarding the impact of food aid on 
nutritional status in Ethiopia.
1• Is food relief reaching the most vulnerable groups?
Among those registered within the distribution centers, 
yes. Programs all over the country show tremendous 
reductions of levels of malnutrition (see Regional 
Summaries, at the end of this section) among young 
children. Most groups (including adults) surveyed by 
the assessment team at the distribution centers 
appeared healthy. However, weaned children appeared 
more malnourished than the younger group and, in 
general population surveys, have higher mortality rates 
than the younger children. Some deaths may not be 
directly attributable to malnutrition, but malnutrition 
does play a large part in a child's ability to fend off 
disease and develop immunities.
As few elderly, weak or disabled are able to travel to 
the distribution centers or carry the monthly ration, 
it is difficult to say whether or not they are being 
reached. This can only be determined through
door-to-door assessment by the implementing agencies or 
local administrators. In many communities where
pockets of famine are being discovered and which are 
not receiving food aid, it has been found that those 
with food share it with those who are destitute, 
begging, or incapable of feeding themselves. From this 
it appears there is a further allocation of food aid 
within the village.
2. Is food relief reaching those most in need?
In food programs where large percentages of the
population are being reached, figures indicate greatly 
reduced levels of malnutrition among the most
vulnerable groups.
Outside the programs, certain groups of people are less 
affected than others - families of government workers, 
townspeople, those provided with food in resettlement 
camps, and farmers’ cooperative members. It is the
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responsibility of the RRC and local administrators to 
determine those families most in need who in turn are 
screened by the agencies for eligibility for food aid. 
Generally, the RRC and administrators have been very 
cooperative in this process and will select those in 
the rural peasantry who are the most needy, as 
confirmed by local surveys conducted by the cooperating 
agencies.
More controversial is the question of whether or not 
the areas of greatest need are selected for the 
establishment of food aid programs. Several people 
interviewed in relief agencies had indicated that 
certain populous areas had not been designated by the 
RRC as needing food aid. Contradictory reports such as 
these again reflect the need for standard surveillance 
measures in order that political or non-objective 
motives are eliminated from the issue of saving lives.
3. Is food aid arriving when it is needed?
This depends on the location of the center, 
availability of transport, and conditions and security 
of the roads. Food distributed at the Northern 
Initiative sites is often erratic due to transport 
problems, unavailability of trucks, and security 
problems. Within the general distribution system, many 
of the logistics and storage problems have been 
eliminated, and capabilities to expand programs into 
developing famine areas have improved. Certain areas 
will remain problematic due to rugged terrain, long 
distances and fighting. Airdrops have been used 
recently in such places as Sekota, Debat, Debark, and 
Gonder, but are expensive and inconsistent. This may 
become a major issue in 1986 for several reasons. New 
famine pockets are being found in areas that are remote 
and can only be reached by mule or on foot. Many of 
these woredas may have been neglected in 1985, due to 
the relief efforts’ focus on areas where large 
populations were in need, or where roads afforded 
access, or simply due to the resources and extension 
capabilities of the agencies working in the country. 
Now, however, agencies are in a better position to 
monitor famine trends and watch for problems in more 
remote areas. Unfortunately, many of these areas are 
being found after the situation has reached extremely 
critical levels. Large percentages of malnourished 
populations continue to come to the attention of relief 
workers, and the ability to respond quickly depends 
greatly on the availability of trucks and emergency 
buffer stocks.
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4. Is the food ration adequate and appropriate?
Based upon reports from the cooperating agencies and 
the sites surveyed by the assessment team, the current 
food ration of 1400 kcal per person per day is 
adequate. This ration is intended only as a supplement 
to other foods available in the community, and not as 
the sole food source. The adequacy of this ration is 
reflected in the steadily lowering rates of 
malnutrition of those within the food programs. When 
on-site feeding is not possible, a premix supplement 
consisting of 1.5 liters of milk powder, oil and sugar 
is distributed weekly along with the dry ration for 
familiies with children less than 80% 
weight-for-height. This supplement is provided to
increase the child's weight as quickly as possible 
during an emergency. Most centers visited by the team 
by this time did not distribute premix, or have on-site 
supplemental feeding programs. This is another
indicator that general nutritional status has improved, 
as most young children and babies appeared active and 
healthy. Because the situation has largely improved 
for those receiving dry rations, mothers are better 
able to provide the added nourishment of their own milk 
to their very young children. However, those children 
not receiving mother's milk do show a greater degree of 
malnutrition and should be monitored through village 
surveys to ascertain that their condition does not 
deteriorate.
5. Is the food basket appropriate?
According to villagers queried by the team, the current 
food basket is appropriate to Ethiopian tastes. Bulgar 
wheat is the primary grain distributed, but in some 
areas soy-fortified sorghum grits are provided {and are 
more popular). Along with the grain ration, soy 
vegetable oil and non-fat dry milk are distributed in 
the dry ration program. Premix consists of dry milk 
powder, oil, and sugar; faffa porridge is served by 
some agencies to smaller children or the severely 
malnourished. Since the traditional Ethiopian diet 
consists largely of cereals, these foods have been very 
acceptable to the population.
6. Is the premix being properly administered by the 
mothers to the children?
Because premix is designed as a take-home supplement 
for the malnourished child, mothers must be instructed 
about how it should be prepared and served. Premix 
will spoil after one week. By most accounts, lactating 
mothers are not using the premix as a substitute for 
their own milk, and are following instructions 
correctly.
40
The premix is a supplement provided in addition to the 
dry ration distribution to families with children 
70-80% weight/height and under 5 years old. 1.5 liters 
of the mixture are distributed in a plastic bag, 
providing a one-week supply. Most CRS programs use a 
mix which contains, by dry measure, 6 parts dry skim 
milk (DSM), 2 parts oil, and 1 part sugar. Other 
programs use different ingredients, sometimes 
containing faffa or c o m  soy milk (CSM) .
It has been found that CSM is not as easily absorbed by 
malnourished children as DSM. Because of this, 
children on a CSM supplement gain weight less rapidly 
than those on DSM. Part of the reason is that 
malnourished children lack the enzymes needed to break 
down the large cornstarch molecules, thus less is 
absorbed and the nutritional value is reduced.
It is recommended by the Centers for Disease Control in 
Atlanta that the use of CSM in a premix or supplemental 
feeding program be replaced by DSM or instant CSM. 
Instant CSM has been put through a high temperature 
process which breaks down the carbohydrates (cornstarch 
molecules), making it much easier for the child to 
absorb and thus gain weight. Instant CSM costs and 
weighs the same as regular CSM but, given the choice, 
is much more nutritionally effective and less difficult 
for the child to digest.
Further information on instant CSM can be found in The 
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 1) 1971, Vol. 
24, p. 416-422, George G. Graham, et. al.; 2) 1973, 
Vol. 26, p. 491-496, George G. Graham, et. al.
7. Where are nutritional problems still occurring?
Problems are still occurring in areas where food 
distribution has not taken place or where only limited 
rations are available. Recent surveys have revealed 
high levels of malnutrition among the rural peasantry 
in parts of northern Keffa, in the Rift Lakes area of 
Shewa; in northern Sidamo; in inaccessible areas of 
Gonder; in Wag awraja in Wello; in southeastern areas 
of Tigrai, central Inderta, and parts of Axum and Adwa; 
in southern Eritrea and Senafe environs; and throughout 
Harerge, especially in lowland areas, the western 
highlands, and parts of the Ogaden.
It is difficult to assess the nutritional status of 
populations in contested areas around Northern
Initiative sites. Monitoring is impossible due to 
logistics and security problems, and the fact that 
usually only the head of a household picks up the food 
without bringing a child for monitoring purposes. 
Local priests are often aware of problems in their 
communities, as they work closely with the villagers 
and help supervise the distributions. Priests in 
several areas report food shortages, increasing numbers 
of malnourished, and lack of medical facilities. 
Another problem they anticipate is a shortage of food 
after the current harvest is consumed. They foresee 
problems in the very near future as traditional back-up 
mechanisms continue to fail, e.g., no surplus, no 
stocks, few if any animals for milk, and few available 
commodities left for trading. There is concern in 
certain areas that limited local storage prevents a 
build-up of food aid reserves for future needs.
In conjunction with this is a fear that stores might be 
confiscated by the GOE. Means of reducing the 
possibility of confiscation are discussed in Section 
VIII, "Buffer Stocks". Whatever means is used, it is 
certain that growing numbers of the population will 
experience tremendous increases in malnutrition if the 
stocks are not readily available as local sources are 
depleted.
8. Is the food aid reducing morbidity and mortality 
levels?
In every area visited by the assessment team where food 
had been distributed for 5 months to a year, death 
rates decreased substantially. This data was available 
from records maintained at the distribution centers.
Health records are maintained at the distribution 
centers or shelters, indicating nutrition-related 
problems and other diseases. Some of the most 
prevalent problems are diarrhea, measles, anemia, 
tuberculosis, malaria, Vitamin A deficiency, cholera 
and protein-energy malnutrition (kwashiorkor, marasmus, 
oedema) . Recovery can be complicated by these 
problems, so medical aid and immunizations are jointly 
administered to those coming into the centers or 
shelters. In most programs, Vitamin A tablets are 
distributed with the dry ration or mixed with the milk 
powder to combat such problems as xerophthalmia which 
can cause blindness. Children in some programs still 
show Vitamin A deficiency and scabies; very few 
children (of sites surveyed) showed signs of 
protein-energy malnutrition. However, outside the 
feeding programs, uncontrolled measles and cholera 
epidemics had been reported in certain areas, and 
greater percentages of children show anemia, Vitamin A 
deficiencies, pedal oedema (swelling of the feet), and
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kwashiorkor. These are all strong indications of a 
malnourished population) without the food and medical 
attention provided by relief agencies, levels of 
disease and death are likely to increase.
9. When should the food urogram be phased out?
Opinions on this vary from agency to agency, but 
specific criteria should be established by agency 
personnel to determine when bulk rations should be 
stopped. It is not unusual for host governments and 
organizations to justify continued food aid beyond the 
end of an emergency. Therefore, it is important that 
the donors, and especially the UN system, help force 
the hard decisions to end the emergency assistance when 
it is no longer warranted. If data show that numbers 
of malnourished children have decreased and that levels 
of malnutrition have stabilized in the low percentiles 
for several consecutive feedings, the need for the 
program should be re-examined. A random sample of 
children under 5 years might be taken to determine the 
percentage (or "x") measuring less than 80% wt/ht for 
"y" consecutive surveys. "x" would have to be based on 
normal levels of malnutrition for the area, although 
this in itself is difficult to assess. However, if 
malnutrition levels have stabilized to where 
fewer of the children are less than 80% for y 
surveys, and other indicators show that the population 
has some resources to rely on, then the program can be 
stopped, or alternative methods of distribution might 
be examined as a means of monitoring status.
I. REGIONAL NUTRITIONAL DATA
REGION Eritrea 
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
12
1
2
3
8
84
85 
85 
85 
85 
85 
85 
85 
85
2917
2164
3078
4040
4033
3899
3802
3443
3366
14
13
14 
16 
17 
16 
14 
13 
12
89
90 
89 
89 
88
89
90 
90 
90
6.4
8.9
8.9
9.4 
9.8
9.2
9.3 
9.2
10.4
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REGION Sidamo
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Std.
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean Dev
1 85 1444 11 90 8.9
2 85 3320 16 88 8.7
3 85 4702 19 88 8.8
4 85 6995 24 86 9.0
5 85 7811 19 88 9.4
6 85 6296 23 87 9.6
7 85 9204 19 88 9.6
8 85 5928 14 89 10.5
9 85 4968 11 90 9.7
REGION Tigrai
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Std.
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean Dev.
1 85 2640 8 92 9.3
2 85 2152 8 93 9.3
3 85 2708 9 92 9.0
4 85 3016 10 91 9.4
5 85 5882 12 90 9.2
6 85 4605 10 , 91 9.0
7 85 3698 10 91 8.8
8 85 3968 9 91 8.9
9 85 4509 9 91 8.8
REGION Gamo Gofa
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Std.
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean Dev.
4 85 400 11 92 9.4
5 85 2031 49 80 7.0
6 85 1329 17 89 9.4
7 85 597 11 89 8.3
8 85 545 7 92 7.7
9 85 492 4 93 8.0
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REGION North Shewa
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean
Std
Dev
3 85 516 32 84 8.9
4 85 2474 32 84 8.4
5 85 3399 27 85 8.0
6 85 2264 26 85 8.3
7 85 1776 19 87 8.5
8 85 1069 15 88 8.1
9 85 1247 13 89 8.3
REGION South Shewa 
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean
Std
Dev
2 85 54 11 89 8.1
3 85 847 30 85 9.6
4 85 815 31 85 9.7
5 85 1700 36 84 9.6
6 85 3555 32 85 12.6
7 85 1737 28 85 9.8
8 85 964 28 86 10.3
9 85 1793 18 90 11.7
REGION Wello 
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
12 84 3223 25 86 9.8
1 85 5242 20 87 9.4
2 85 6377 16 88 8.3
3 85 8993 17 88 9.2
4 85 8511 15 89 9.1
5 85 8014 13 90 8.9
6 85 6858 13 89 8.8
7 85 4508 11 90 8.7
8 85 9139 13 90 6.7
9 85 5506 10 90 9.1
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REGION Bale
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Std.
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean Dev.
6 85 489 23 87 9.4
7 85 428 11 91 8.9
8 85 81 3 95 8.0
9 85 65 2 96 7.7
REGION Wellega
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
Std.
Month Year <80% %<80 Mean Dev.
5 85 481 92 73 6.7
6 85 1172 76 75 7.9
7 85 749 62 78 8.0
8 85 1392 45 81 8.1
9 85 1464 43 81 8.8
Month Year
REGION Gonder 
REGIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
<80% %<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
3 85 474 34 81 8.3
4 85 1481 20 87 9.3
5 85 1295 16 88 8.7
6 85 637 18 87 9.1
7 85 970 18 88 9.3
8 85 1298 27 85 8.7
9 85 1271 26 85 9.3
REGION Harerge
Month Year
REGIONAL
<80%
SUMMARY REPORT 
%<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
1 85 423 27 85 9.9
2 85 587 27 86 9.6
3 85 986 32 84 10.2
4 85 1816 30 85 10.1
5 85 1572 37 83 9.8
6 85 2249 30 85 9.7
7 85 3591 31 84 10.0
8 85 3070 22 87 9.5
9 85 2182 15 89 9.3
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For all eleven regions, total average %<80% wt./ht. = 
14.81%. This is based upon most recently available figures from 
the cooperating agencies’ reports.
Countrywide nutritional trends are reflected in the 
following cooperating agencies’ reports showing regions listed 
in increasing order of percentages less than 80% wt./ht.
SEPTEMBER 1985
REGIONS LISTED IN INCREASING ORDER OF %<80
Region Total <80% %<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
Bale 3339 65 2 96 7.7
Gamo Gofa 11609 492 4 93 8.0
Tigrai 48399 4509 9 91 8.8
Wello 55771 5506 10 90 9.1
Sidamo 46441 4968 11 90 9.7
North Shewa 9264 1247 13 89 8.3
Harerge 14694 2182 15 89 9.3
South Shewa 10036 1793 18 90 11.7
Gonder 4894 1271 26 85 9.3
Wellega 3436 1464 43 81 8.8
REGIONS LISTED
AUGUST 1985 
IN INCREASING ORDER OF /\ 00 o
Region Total <80% %<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
Bale 2469 81 3 95 8.0
Gamo Gofa 8129 545 7 92 7.7
Tigrai 45023 3968 9 91 8.9
Eritrea 29087 3386 12 90 10.4
Wello 70092 9139 13 90 6.7
Sidamo 43047 5928 14 89 10.5
North Shewa 7227 1069 15 88 8.1
Harerge 13964 3070 22 87 9.5
Gonder 4781 1298 27 85 8.7
South Shewa 3497 964 28 86 10.3
Wellega 3103 1392 45 81 8.1
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REGIONS LISTED
JULY 1985 
IN INCREASING ORDER OF o00
Region Total <80% %<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
Tigrai 37614 3698 10 91 8.8Wello 42719 4508 11 90 8.7Gamo Gofa 5392 597 11 , 89 8.3Bale 3898 428 11 91 8.9Eritrea 26819 3443 13 90 9.2Gonder 5276 970 18 88 9.3North Shewa 9233 1776 19 87 8.5Sidamo 47337 9204 19 88 9.6South Shewa 6282 1737 28 85 9.8Harerge 11613 3591 31 84 10.0Wellega 1209 749 62 78 8.0
JUNE 1985
REGIONS LISTED IN INCREASING ORDER OF 00 o
Std.
Region Total <80% %<80 Mean Dev.
Tigrai 45042 4605 10 91 9.0
Wello 51076 6858 13 89 8.8
Eritrea 26614 3802 14 90 9.3
Gamo Gofa 7802 1329 17 89 9.4
Gonder 3490 637 18 87 9.1
Bale 2144 489 23 87 9.4
Sidamo 27493 6296 23 87 9.6
North Shewa 8649 2264 26 85 8.3
Harerge 7445 2249 30 85 9.7
South Shewa 11218 3555 32 85 12.6
Wellega 1548 1172 76 75 7.9
MAY 1985
REGIONS LISTED IN INCREASING ORDER OF %<80
StdRegion Total <80% %<80 Mean Dev
Tigrai 47641 5882 12 90 9.2Wello 63706 8014 13 90 8.9Eritrea 24902 3899 16 89 9.2Gonder 8146 1295 16 88 8.7Sidamo 41741 7811 19 88 9.4North Shewa 12379 3399 27 85 8.0South Shewa 4664 1700 36 84 9.6
Harerge 4229 1572 37 83 9.8
Gamo Gofa 4132 2031 49 80 7.0
Wellega 523 481 92 73 6.7
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APRIL 1985
REGIONS LISTED IN INCREASING ORDER OF %<80
Std.
Region Total <80% %<80 Mean Dev.
Tigrai 30184 3016 10 91 9.4
Gamo Gofa 3566 400 11 92 9.4
Wello 56799 8511 15 89 9.1
Eritrea 23908 4033 17 88 9.8
Gonder 7545 1481 20 87 9.3
Sidamo 28905 6995 24 86 9.0
Harerge 6145 1816 30 85 10.1
South Shewa 2631 815 31 85 9.7
North Shewa 7772 2474 32 64 8.4
REGIONS LISTED
MARCH 1985 
IN INCREASING ORDER OF %<80
Region Total <80% %<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
Tigrai 30172 2708 9 92 9.0
Eritrea 25124 4040 16 89 9.4
Wello 53859 8993 17 88 9.2
Sidamo 24957 4702 19 88 8.8
South Shewa 2811 847 30 85 9.6
North Shewa 1628 516 32 84 8.9
Harerge 3082 986 32 84 10.2
Gonder 1377 474 34 81 8.3
REGIONS LISTED
FEBRUARY 1985 
IN INCREASING ORDER OF %<80
Region Total <80% %<80 Mean
Std.
Dev.
Tigrai 26121 2152 8 93 9.3
South Shewa 474 54 11 89 8.1
Eritrea 22134 3078 14 89 8.9
Wello 39409 6377 16 88 8.3
Sidamo 21322 3320 16 88 8.7
Harerge 2214 587 27 86 9.6
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JANUARY 1985
REGIONS LISTED IN INCREASING ORDER OF %<80
Std
Region Total <80% %<80 Mean Dev
Tigrai 31141 2640 8 92 9.3
Sidamo 12844 1444 11 90 8.9
Eritrea 16498 2164 13 90 8.9
Wello 26255 5242 20 87 9.4
Harerge 1550 423 27 85 9.9
Notable are Southern Shewa -
Program opens: Feb. 1985 - 474 persons receiving food aid
with 11% < 80%
Sept. ’85 - 10,036 persons receiving food aid 
with 18% < 80%
Wellega -
Program opens: May ’85 - 523 persons receiving food aid
with 92% < 80%
Sept. ’85 - 3,436 persons receiving food aid 
with 43% < 80%
Gonder -
Program opens: Mar. ’85 - 1,377 persons receiving food aid
with 34% < 80%. This figure drops 
to 16% < 80% by May 1985, and 
jumps to 27% < 80% in August.
Sept. ’85 - 4,894 persons receiving food aid 
with 26% < 80%
Harerge -
Program opens: Jan. ’85 - 1,550 persons receiving food aid
with 27% < 80%
Sept. ’85 - 14,694 persons receiving food aid 
with 15% < 80%
These areas continue to show indications of greater need in 
1986 and should be monitored for shifting pockets of famine.
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ANALYSIS OF DATA
Paper from workshop on "Chronic Dietary Energy Deficiency 
in Developing Country Populations", Oct. 30 - Nov. 1, 1985,
Washington,D.C .
Weight-for-height expressed as % of median by age group and sex.
Age in JNSP A.Ababa Survey Vit.A Survey
months >90% <80% >90% <80% >90% <80%
12 M 37.4 11.8 15.6 3.3 27.1 7.8
F 34.6 9.0 21.5 3.6
12-23 M 45.1 11.0 23.4 2.5 46.0 11.9
F 47.8 10.4 36.2 6.0
24-35 M 40.7 7.4 23.7 3.0 40.4 6.3
F 42.1 7.2 19.3 0.7
36-47 M 38.7 9.5 16.7 1.8 36.2 5.9
F 42.7 7.4 9.1 0.6
48-60 M 42.3 5.4 22.8 2.1
39.2 4.4
F 43.1 4.1 20.3 0.6
All
ages M 40.7 9.3 20.4 2.5 - -
F 41.8 8.7 21.3 2.3 - -
M+F 41.3 9.1 20.8 2.4 38.1 7.0
Children
measured 4065 1510 2863
(Total)
Sources: 1. JNSP Baseline Survey (Rural Areas) Preliminary
Report. ENI, 1985.
2. Report on the Nutritional Status of Pre-school 
Children in Addis Ababa. ENI, 1985.
3. Vitamin A Status of Pre-school Children (Semi- 
urban). ENI, 1985.
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V. ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTHERN INITIATIVE
A. BACKGROUND
The Northern Initiative was established in mid-1985 as a 
program to feed people in the contested areas of Eritrea and 
Tigrai. The civil wars in those two regions had disrupted 
agriculture and these disruptions, coupled with extensive drought 
conditions, contributed to accelerating and intensifying the 
effects of the famine. While many famine victims left their 
villages and moved into camps in the larger government-controlled 
towns, fighting, terrain and logistical problems combined to make 
it difficult for many people to receive food. Some international 
relief agencies sent food from Sudan into the rebel held areas. 
However, logistical obstacles were enormous and relief convoys 
could only deliver limited, and often sporadic, supplies.
By the fall of 1984, drought victims were faced with two 
choices: moving into relief centers in the government-held areas,
or moving westward and crossing into Sudan in search of food. 
Both options were seen as being disruptive, because as long as the 
refugees or displaced persons were being fed in relief centers, 
away from their villages, chances for agricultural recovery were 
minimal.
After much negotiation, the Ethiopian Government agreed to a 
program that would permit the famine victims in rebel-held 
territories to come into government-controlled areas to pick up 
food and carry it back to their villages. The primary objectives 
were:
——  To feed the famine victims.
--  To provide food in such a way that the people would
remain in their villages and not move into the feeding 
centers or go to Sudan.
Eritrea and Tigrai were assigned to CRS and World Vision, 
respectively. CRS in turn established its programs through the 
Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat and the churches in the government- 
controlled towns and along government-controlled routes in 
Eritrea. (It should be remembered that CRS also has "regular" 
famine relief programs in many of these same areas for people in 
the government-controlled zones).
B. FOOD DISTRIBUTION
The CRS food logistics system delivers the food to secondary 
warehouses located in the frontline areas. From these centers, 
smaller trucks carry the food out to distribution points. Village 
leaders prepare lists of the number of families and "destitutes” 
that are in need of assistance and submit these to church 
authorities. Based on these lists, food supplies are calculated
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and delivered. Persons from the villages come forth at regular 
intervals (usually monthly) to the distribution points and 
collect the food for the villages. Upon returning to the 
villages, the village elders are responsible for ensuring that 
the food reaches those persons most in need.
The basis for distribution is 12.5 kilos of grain and 2 
kilos of DSM per person per month. This brings the average 
monthly total for distribution by CRS in Eritrea to 3,000 metric 
tons of food per month. A map of the distribution centers is 
shown on Figure 5-1.
C. MONITORING
Distribution in the villages is monitored by priests in the 
area. These priests have freedom to move across the lines and 
make spot-checks on distribution days and also talk to villagers 
to ensure that the food is being distributed equitably. Some of 
the priests have also made spot-checks of the nutritional status 
of people, although this has primarily been by observation and 
not by arm circumference, weight-for-height or other accepted 
measures.
Another rough means of monitoring distribution is by 
monitoring death rates. In those areas where the priests might 
be called upon to officiate at funerals, a rough indication of 
the progress of the food distribution can be estimated.
D. CONSTRAINTS
Distribution in remote forward areas is often difficult. 
Some sites are hard to supply due to rough terrain and poor 
roads. This necessitates the use of smaller trucks at many of 
the sites and means that an increased number of runs must be 
made to supply various distribution centers.
Some areas, such as Barentu, are isolated towns that are 
normally cutoff from the main government-controlled areas around 
Asmara. Periodically, these roads may be impassable due to 
nearby fighting, mining by insurgent forces, or simply an 
inability of the government to repair war damages to bridges and 
key portions of the road bed. In several towns, arrangements 
were made to airlift food. As the number of relief planes has 
dwindled, some observers question the likelihood that the more 
remote towns will continue to receive food on a regular basis.
The most serious constraint on the program, however, is the 
difficulty in monitoring food distribution. The priests who 
cross the lines have neither the time nor the resources to do 
more than interview a few selected families or observe the 
distributions as they occur. It would be difficult for them to 
detect abuses, food diversion, etc., unless the practices were 
widespread. The actual distribution at the village level,
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Northern Initiative Distribution Sites
Figure 5-1
therefore, could be affected by intentional diversion, 
withholding of supplies, or outright thefts. Even more 
probable, unintentional inequitable distribution caused by a 
combination of inaccurate weighing or measuring of the food as 
it is distributed, and poor record-keeping on the part of those 
responsible for distributing the food, is likely to occur.
The final constraint is that the areas from which the food 
is distributed to the villages must be government-controlled. 
In more rugged terrain the maximum distance that people will be 
willing to go for the food is approximately a three-day 
journey. In areas where government control is linear, i.e., 
along the roads, there may be pockets where the people are not 
receiving food because the distances are too far.
Based on these constraints, a number of questions can be 
identified that must be answered. They include:
1. Is food reaching those most in need?
The answer is a qualified yes. According to the 
priests who regularly visit and monitor the program, 
the food is reaching the village level without undue 
irregularities. Of the distributions they have
witnessed, there are no major problems observed in the 
village distribution systems.
2. Are the distribution sites well situated?
Food is reaching those villages in a limited radius of 
the distribution points. Some areas are simply 
unreachable and it is unlikely that populations from 
those areas are currently receiving any large amounts 
of food from the CRS program. Selection of the 
distribution sites is dictated by several factors. 
First, the government must approve the sites based on 
the security situation and they must be in government- 
controlled areas. Second, the sites must be along a 
road or in a town with a major airstrip (no airdrops 
are permitted in the contested areas). Thus, not all 
sites may be situated in the worst-affected areas and 
some badly affected areas may not be included. 
However, given the political constraints on the program 
and the logistics difficulties, the sites are, in the 
opinion of the assessment team, the best that could be 
arranged under the circumstances. The number of 
distribution sites and the proximity of one site to 
another has ensured that a substantial area beyond the 
government-controlled lines is being effectively
reached.
3. What percentage of the people receive food?
The priests in the area report that approximately 65% 
of the people in need are receiving food. This is 
based on the tonnages delivered to the distribution 
sites and assumes that only minimal amounts of food are 
being diverted between the distribution center and the
in-village distribution. This 65% figure is also based 
on a rough estimate of village populations and the 
total population. Since the census in this area is old 
and outdated, and the population overall has likely- 
increased above the last official estimated population, 
the figure may be off by 15-20%.
4. Are people receiving all the food to which they are 
entitled?
When the village distributions take place, a number of 
problems are likely to occur. The measuring devices 
used to distribute grains are usually tins that have 
been roughly cut and marked to use as scoops. As the 
villagers have no way' of actually knowing how these 
scoops were constructed, in theory it is possible for a 
certain amount of food to be regularly skimmed at the 
village distribution point. In more remote villages, 
it would also be possible for the village distribution 
teams to charge the local people for delivering and 
distributing the food. Since the village elders are in 
charge of identifying who may receive the food, it is 
not unlikely that some of the village elders receive a 
kickback of food for identifying each family on the 
food rolls. And finally, in some villages food may 
simply be "taxed” by, or voluntarily diverted to, 
insurgents.
All of these potential diversions or inequities are 
possible, but the most likely problem is one of bogus 
recipients being put on the food rolls. In other 
words, the most likely inequity is that some persons or 
villages receive more food than the amount to which 
they are entitled by virtue of cheating the system, 
rather than cheating their fellow villagers.
At the present time, there are no reported major 
problems in the distribution system. However, this 
does not mean that they do not exist. A special area 
of concern is the program in Barentu. Due to fighting 
in the area and the presence of many government troops 
in and around the villages, it is likely that 
distribution inequities are greater here than in other 
areas. Where possible, program staff should attempt to 
maintain a close watch on the village distribution 
systems to ensure that the food is reaching those most 
in need in adequate quantities.
5. Is other food reaching the persons being served by the 
Northern Initiative?
In the N.I. areas, there are two additional sources of 
food. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
distributes food in villages that are within the same 
geographic areas, and some of their food may be "within 
reach" of persons receiving Northern Initiative food.
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A second source is the food that is being brought in 
from Sudan by the cross-border operation there. 
Approximately 15,000 tons per year are brought into 
Eritrea and distributed at various sites in the rebel- 
held areas.
The ICRC distribution program, in theory, is designated 
for other areas. The cross-border distribution points 
are not publicly known. Some observers have reported 
food from Sudan in the villages being served by the 
Northern Initiative. However, it is not clear how this 
food got there, or even if it is food from the 
cross-border operation or simply food distributed by 
ICRC or bartered from other Northern Initiative
recipients.
Assuming that 3,000 tons per month are supplied by CRS, 
2,600 by ICRC and 15,000 tons per year by the 
cross-border operation, and assuming a 10% diversion 
loss or waste rate, the theoretical deficit in Eritrea 
would be 76,000 metric tons per year.
6. Is food taken by the government?
There are a few reports of food being taken from 
Northern Initiative stockpiles by government troops. 
CRS administrators are concerned about these reports, 
although at present no pattern exists in these 
confiscations.
A more widespread practice, and one of major concern, 
is that food is periodically taken from people 
returning to the villages by individual soldiers or 
small patrols. Again, there is no pattern in these 
thefts and they are more likely attributable to poor 
discipline and control of troops by local commanders 
than to a policy of disruption by the government.
7. Are villagers who receive food safe from government 
forces?
Protection of people who have received food and of 
family members left behind by the food transporters is 
a major concern. There were reports to members of the 
team of instances of government troops harassing food 
carriers as they passed through the lines. More 
serious were reported instances of soldiers molesting 
women engaged in food distribution and reports of 
soldiers molesting women while their husbands were away 
collecting the food.
8. Have villages receiving food been raided by government 
troops?
Troops are reported to have entered homes and taken 
food but there are no reports, at least to the 
assessment team, of villages being attacked and all the 
food in the village being taken.
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9. Is the food ration adequate?
The assessment team considers that the food ration 
allocation basis (i.e., 1,500 calories per person per
day) is not adequate for all families in the Northern 
Initiative area and feels that the persons most at risk 
in these areas (i.e., small children) may not be fully 
reached by the calculated level.* Due to a combination 
of fighting, a breakdown of the market structure and 
the fact that many of the milk animals have been sold 
in order to keep families alive, the primary food 
sources for small children have been radically 
depleted. It is the feeling of the assessment team 
that children in the Northern Initiative areas should 
be receiving premix, DSM and other specially-targeted 
foods. While the basic food ration provides an
adequate amount of grain, without edible oils and 
without specially-fortified foods, children in these 
areas are likely to suffer more than those in other 
areas. Furthermore, there is no way to guarantee that 
food being distributed in bulk is reaching the
vulnerables.
*A check of those agencies working with Eritrean refugees who 
have recently entered Sudan seems to bear out this problem. The 
children reaching the border suffer an extremely high percentage 
of malnutrition, and problems such as vitamin A deficiency 
(xerophthalmia) are very common.
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VI. FAMINE TRENDS
In order to understand what the level of need will be for 
the next several years and where specific needs are likely to 
be, it is important to note the geographical trends of famine in 
the country. It has been pointed out that Ethiopia is extremely 
vulnerable to famines. At any time famine or near famine 
conditions exist in some part of the country, often with as many 
as 10% of the population classified as severely malnourished. 
Since the situation is always precarious, any number or 
combination of factors could easily create a.multiplier effect 
that would push large regions of the country into a famine 
situation.
All famines are known to exhibit certain characteristics. 
The principal characteristics are:
1. Famines last until food supplies from normal sources 
can be provided in such quantity that the price is 
within reach of the rural poor.
2. Famines that are influenced by natural causes require 
several years for full recovery to take place. This is 
because seeds, draught animals, herds and natural 
resources such as soils, fodder, etc., cannot be 
restored over a short period of time. In other words, 
one good growing season is not enough, no matter how 
good the rains or the crops.
3. Famine conditions often shift their locality as a 
famine progresses. Thus, one region may be recovering 
from a famine while another is declining.
A. THE GEOGRAPHY OF FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA
Numerous observers have noted repetitive trends or shifts in 
famines in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian geographer, Mesfin
Wolde-Mariam, has mapped famine conditions in Ethiopia dating 
back to the late 1800s. He notes that famines move in a 
"tightening circle" around Ethiopia. He points out that 
Ethiopia is perpetually in a famine situation and that the 
conditions simply shift from region to region. This shifting is 
driven by a flow of resources from the areas where marginal 
production exists into areas where severe 1 deficits have 
developed. Since the regions sending food into the deficit 
areas are themselves in a precarious situation, the sending of 
too much food can create shortages and high prices in the 
originating area, and nutritional levels can rapidly
deteriorate. Wolde-Mariam illustrates the effect of this
phenomenon, which he calls "spatial extension", in Figure 6-1.
( 1 )
The importance of the spatial dimension of famine in 
Ethiopia can be seen when the relative extent of the famine is
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compared to the number of awrajas that are experiencing famine 
conditions in any one year. In the 20-year period that 
Wolde-Mariam examined (1958-1977), out of 102 awrajas in the 
country, only seven did not experience any famine. Table 6-A 
shows the number of awrajas under famine in each year from 
1958-1977. (2) The initial number of awrajas under famine in 
1958 was 12. Then in each of the subsequent 19 years, one or 
more new awrajas fell under famine. There were only 3 years 
(1967, 1968 and 1971) during which famine did not conquer any 
new awrajas. On average, four new awrajas were falling under 
famine each year. It can also be seen that, by the end of 1966, 
already 81 of the 102 awrajas had come under the grip of 
famine. This means that, for the following 12 years, famine 
conditions were merely revisiting areas which had already 
experienced famine in the previous decade.
From this pattern it can be seen that the larger the 
contiguous area under famine, the greater the destructive 
capacity and the greater the likelihood that the conditions 
which fuel and drive the "famine machine" will become perpetual.
B. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT TRENDS
Analysis of the existing situation, especially crop 
production and nutritional levels, indicates that famine 
conditions are shifting, although the complete nationwide 
pattern is obscured to a large degree by the efficiency of the 
national relief effort and artificial constraints on the flow of 
food in the country. Analysis of food production levels would 
indicate that the famine is taking a generally southeasterly 
movement. Food production trends in Wello and Harerge also tend 
to confirm the shift in that area which is of direct concern to 
CRS. According to the ERC Early Warning System 1986 Food Supply 
Prospect Supplemental Report, the Harerge 1985 crop production 
will be 51% below normal and 5% below 1984 production levels. 
On the other hand, Wello's 1985 crop production will be 60% 
below normal but 35% above the 1984 production levels. This may 
indicate that the crop production situation in Wello is showing 
an improving trend, whereas the crop production situation in 
Harerge appears to be further deteriorating.
What this means to the overall relief effort is that, while 
the food situation has greatly improved due to a combination of 
massive international relief aid and marginal agricultural 
recovery in some areas, the primary conditions of famine 
vulnerability have not changed, need levels remain high, and the 
location of need has shifted from regions greatly affected last 
year into other areas. This indicates that large-scale food aid 
will still be needed for the foreseeable future.
In some areas of the country, such as Wollaita, observers 
have noted that agriculture appears normal and are often 
surprised to learn that food deficits are forecast. These 
areas, referred to as "green famine zones", are expected to 
produce deficits because seeds were either insufficient or late;
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Spatial Extension of Famine
All other things remaining equal, 
Potential supply area for L is R + N 
Potential supply area for R is N 
Potential supply area for N is external
As the famine area expands 
the potential demand increases 
while the potential supply area 
diminishes.
Figure 6-1
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rains stopped early, thereby preventing the standing crops from 
maturing; or in some cases hail, frosts, insects or other 
natural calamities diminished the expected yields. In the case 
of Wollaita, however, even in the best of years, high density 
populations serve to reduce the amount of food distributed among 
the population; were it not for production of coffee, a cash 
crop, the region would be in a perpetually famine-prone 
situation.
C. SITUATION FORECAST FOR 1986-87
For 1986 through 1987, the nature and primary operational 
areas of the relief effort are likely to change. In the most 
severely affected areas of the north and central portions of the 
country, there should be modest agricultural recovery that 
should lead to a gradual reduction of food aid needs. If 
properly phased out, food aid could be reduced in the 
non-conflict areas by as much as 25% by 1987.
In Wello and Harerge, relief needs are likely to remain high 
and to increase dramatically in Harerge during the next year.
Throughout the central and southern regions, isolated 
pockets of "local famine" will continue. These areas will be 
difficult to identify because the pockets will be small and 
present detection methods will not be able to monitor the
deterioration of people until large numbers in a community are 
affected. Collectively, these scattered pockets will create a 
fairly substantial demand for food aid, probably offsetting food 
reductions made possible by the improving situation in the 
north.
In addition to the above, there are likely to be pockets of 
"artificial" need created by political events. Eritrea and
Tigrai will continue to be troublesome areas, and Harerge and 
Gambella could have pockets of need.
In summary, there will be a continuing need to maintain food 
aid levels at current or higher tonnages through 1986 and 
possibly well into 1987. Reduction of food aid at this time 
could result in severe hardships for some areas and a general 
backsliding into famine and hunger conditions in many areas.
D. REGIONAL TRENDS
The regional summaries shown in Appendix D provide an
overall view of the current situation and present an estimate of
the near-term food and nutrition prospects.
(1) Wolde-Mariam, p. 153.
(2) Wolde-Mariam, pp. 148-150.
61
VII. EMERGENCY FOOD NEEDS FOR 1986
The purpose of estimating the 1986 emergency food needs is 
to produce a rough idea of Ethiopia's food aid requirements for 
1986, so that planning and procurement procedures for these 
foods can get underway. This is an attempt to arrive at an 
estimated national emergency food aid requirement and to apply 
this total food aid requirement to the apparent regional food 
aid needs (by weighing the EWS estimated 1986 needy population 
figures), so that the logistical framework for the distribution 
of these foods, should they arrive, can be reviewed and improved 
if necessary.
There are many assumptions used in this estimation that may 
not be accurate or appropriate, but every effort has been made 
by this team to utilize available information that appears to be 
representative of the situation of Ethiopia in 1986. Some of 
these assumptions are presented below:
1. The average daily consumption requirement of main foods 
for 1986 is assumed to be 1893 kcal per person (that 
is, the long-term nutritional standard caloric intake 
of 2100 kcal, less 207 kcal, the caloric intake from 
foods other than main foods referred to in Appendix
B.).
2. The structural food deficit for 1986 is assumed to be 
704,925 metric tons, as determined in Appendix B.
3. The 1986 population is assumed to be 40,235,464, as 
determined in Appendix A.
4. Vegetable production in the country is not considered. 
Although vegetable production and consumption play an 
important role in some areas of the country, they are 
considered zero for the purpose of this estimation.
5. On-farm reserves of food are considered to be zero. 
Although this is likely not the case nationwide, it is 
believed that on-farm stocks are generally low. In 
severe drought-stricken areas, on-farm reserves are 
likely to be zero.
6. Food exports are considered zero. Since exports are 
expected to be small in 1986, they are assumed to be 
zero.
7. It is not possible to determine the food movements from 
surplus-producing areas to deficit areas with the 
information available to the team. Therefore, it is 
assumed that food will flow in such a way so as to 
create the needy populations and their locations as 
indicated in the EWS report Food Supply Prospect, 
Supplement, reproduced in part in Table E-2 of 
Appendix E.
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Using these assumptions and various sources of information, 
the team was able to make an estimate of Ethiopia’s 1986 
emergency food needs. Appendix E indicates the methodology and 
the calculations used to arrive at the 1986 estimated emergency 
food needs. It was determined that:
The 1986 emergency
food aid needs = 1,386,408 MT (or 115,534 MT/month)
The team believes that this estimated amount of needed
emergency food aid is representative of the current situation in
Ethiopia.
Given this total 1986 emergency food aid requirement and the
estimated EWS 1986 needy people, a regional relative food needs
estimate can be constructed as shown below:
EWS 1986 Estimated Regional
Needy People Relative Food Needs
Region Estimate (MT)
Arssi 10,000 2,383
Bale 60,000 14,299
Goma Gofa 113,000 26,929
Gojjam 0 0
Gonder 135,390 32,265
Eritrea 650,000 154,903
Harerge 1,200,340 286,055
Illubabor 25,000 5,958
Kef fa 90,000 21,448
Shewa 632,800 150,804
Sidamo 446,300 106,359
Tigrai 1,000,000 238,312
Wellega 0 0
Wello 1,454,790 346,694
TOTALS 5,817,620 1,386,408
As can be seen, very large amounts of food are expected to 
be needed in Eritrea, Harerge, Shewa, Sidamo, Tigrai and Wello.
It was determined through interviews with relief staff and 
farmers that the 1985 meher harvest food would meet most 
drought-stricken families’ food needs for a period of 2 to 6 
months, depending on the specific area. If we assume an average 
of 4 months supply of food for most families, that means 
critical food shortages probably will not begin until May. Also 
assuming that the belg harvest in mid-1986 will have relatively 
small regional impacts, and that during the first 4 months of 
1986 only 1/3 of the monthly emergency food requirements are 
needed (because of the availability of the 1985 meher harvest), 
a rough food needs calendar can be constructed as shown on next 
page:
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As can be seen, relatively small amounts of food will be 
required during the first 4 months of 1986. But, from May until 
the end of 1986, food aid will be required in amounts that will 
push the national logistical framework to its limits (in 
Appendix C, the maximum port take-away capacity was estimated to 
be 150,000 metric tons). During the last 8 months of 1986, 
1,232,240 metric tons of food aid will be required to pass 
through the national logistics system. This is approximately 
90% of the total food aid required for 1986.
If the total estimated food need tonnage (1,386,408 metric 
tons) does not begin arriving until June (as is likely), then a 
food distribution rate of 198,058 metric tons per month will be 
required to reach the total 1986 food aid level. This monthly 
distribution rate is approximately 50,000 metric tons per month 
more than the national logistical system is able to handle. It 
is therefore imperative to begin receiving this food aid now to 
avoid major port and other logistics backups.
Caution Levels for Emergency Food Imports
Emergency food aid can be considered a short-term "fix" that 
should be targeted to alleviate critical, acute food shortages 
beyond normal food shortages (or the structural deficit) to 
allow a reasonable period for recovery* However, emergency food 
aid should not be allowed to interfere with the local food 
pricing structures, or the local crop production incentives of 
farmers. If this occurs, then the aid becomes disruptive to the 
economic and social fabric of an area, and may even exacerbate 
further acute food shortages.
It is important to determine at what levels emergency food 
becomes disruptive and undercuts market conditions and 
agricultural prices. While this is difficult to determine, it 
is possible to establish a "warning line" whereby emergency food 
levels, exceeding certain pre-determined levels, must be 
monitored carefully in order to avoid potential disruptive 
effects.
With information already developed in this report, it is 
possible to make an estimate of the amount of food aid that can 
be imported without creating major disruptions to existing 
market conditions and/or agricultural incentive policies. This 
estimate is based on arbitrary assumptions; but it is carried 
out here in order to point out that a potential danger exists of 
creating major national economic disruptions, should food aid 
imports become excessive.
For 1986, it is estimated that 1,024,504 MT of emergency 
food aid can be imported into Ethiopia without potential 
disruptive effects to the market conditions or agricultural 
incentive policies. Any food aid imports above this amount, 
although necessary (as determined in this report), must be 
carefully monitored. Appendix F contains details of these 
conclusions.
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VIII. BUFFER STOCKS
A. BACKGROUND
In past years the KRC has advocated, and in some years 
maintained, a small food reserve in order to provide buffer 
stocks against various unforeseen contingencies. In 1983, these 
buffer stocks were depleted as famine conditions spread. In 
1984 and 1985, the ERC appealed to donors to help replenish the 
food reserve and, in 1985, the U.S. Government contributed to 
the reserve. USAID claims and has expressed its dismay, 
however, that in 1985 the entire strategic reserve was diverted 
to provide food for the capital and for the military. Thus, for 
1986, USAID has not allocated any food for the reserve and has 
prohibited relief agencies receiving U.S. food from contributing 
to regional stockpiles.
Internationally, food reserves have proven to be one of the 
most effective famine-fighting methods. At the international 
level, regional "food banks" have been established as a means of 
placing large quantities of food near countries with chronic 
food deficits. In India, agricultural experts credit local and 
regional food reserves as one of the major reasons why 
widespread famines have been averted in that country in the last 
decade. In a USDA publication entitled The World Food Situation 
and Prospects to 1985, the establishment of in-country buffer 
stocks is highlighted as one of the most important measures in 
an overall famine-fighting strategy.(1)
Since 1974, many experts working on famine relief have 
recommended that international agencies help the government 
establish a dispersed buffer stock of food as a means of 
responding quickly to food shortages in various regions.(2)
The assessment team feels that failure to support 
development of buffer stocks may be a short-sighted policy. 
Buffer stocks are likely to be the most effective means of 
meeting unforeseen emergencies. Because the nature of the 
famine has shifted, it is likely that some large concentrations 
will occur in new areas and there will be many small, isolated, 
scattered sites that require food. Because food is now 
distributed not at centers but to the villages in place, it will 
be much harder to detect pockets of need and acute malnutrition 
when it occurs in new areas. Because detection will be slow, 
when a problem is detected, there will be a need to respond 
quickly. Given the existing lag-times from procurement to 
delivery in the distribution centers, large numbers of people 
could theoretically be hurt if buffer stocks were not available 
in the interim. In short, the situation is simply still too 
precarious not to have buffer stocks in place.
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B. A BUFFER STOCK STRATEGY
Given the current political situation, an alternative to 
large regional buffer stocks could be sought. One approach must 
be the development of many dispersed, sub-regional stockpiles 
and the intentional overstocking of secondary distribution 
centers, especially those centers that are near areas predicted 
to be troublesome in the next calendar year.
Another strategy for holding food in reserve would be to 
continue to supply remote food centers where current or future 
needs are less than those of last year. In this way, large 
amounts of food could be quietly held without arousing undue 
attention from the Ethiopian Government and would be available 
on relatively short notice if a contingency occurred in a nearby 
area.
The rationale for widely-dispersed stocks is as follows:
1. Widely-dispersed stocks are needed to more rapidly 
respend to isolated needs. Because needs will be 
spetty and widely dispersed, it will be important for 
local program personnel to have the capability of 
respending quickly when the need first arises.
2. Widely-dispersed stockpiles would make it difficult and 
more costly for the government to confiscate. The food 
would be in the hands of relief agencies, and it would 
be problematic for the government to try to accumulate 
a large amount of food from many different groups and 
sites.
3. If the food is placed in or near centers where p>eople 
receive food directly, confiscation would make the 
government vulnerable to unfavorable publicity (such as 
accusations of "taking food from lines of starving 
p>eople") .
4. If the government started to confiscate food, wide 
disp>ersement would give relief agencies and major 
donors time to organize a protest before large amounts 
of food could be taken.
The most important rationale, however, is that, if a massive 
new need were to arise, small amounts of food from many 
distribution centers throughout the less-affected areas could be 
sent to the crisis areas. These, collectively, could hold the 
line until food could be procured and delivered. If food buffer 
stocks in each area were not needed, they could be cycled out 
and eventually the total food kept on hand could be reduced.
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C. SPECIFIC CONTINGENCIES FOR WHICH BUFFERS MAY BE NEEDED
Regional buffer stocks should be planned for the following 
contingencies:
1. Returnees from Somalia now re-integrating into the 
Ogaden. Relief agencies report that approximately 
250,000 to 400,000 people have returned from Somalia 
and are now trying to re-integrate into Harerge. Most 
of these persons are pastoralists and traditionally 
maintain herds of animals as a source of milk and a 
show of wealth. For CRS, these people are of potential 
concern. During the winter months the pastoralists 
traditionally graze along the more grassy areas near 
the Wabi Shibele River. As summer comes to the Ogaden, 
many move their herds from the Ogaden up into the 
valleys of the highlands to the west of the province, 
where they spend the rainy season fattening up their 
animals.
At the present time, many returnees are receiving 
rations from the World University Service of Canada 
(WUSC). However, due to a dispute between the UNHCR 
and the RRC regarding who should feed these groups, 
additional food has not been forthcoming and WUSC has 
been forced to substantially reduce the amount of 
rations provided. If more food is not allocated, 
existing stocks could run out sometime in the spring. 
Depending on where the people are when the food runs 
out and how much local food is available, large numbers 
of returnees could either re-enter Somalia in search of 
food or seek food from CRS food distribution centers 
located in the highlands. Therefore, a contingency 
food reserve for approximately 100,000-150,000 people 
should be considered for the Harerge area.
2. A second population of concern in Harerge are the
approximately 100,000 Ethiopians who have sought food 
during the drought in Somalia but have neither 
requested nor received refugee status. CARE has been 
the primary agency operating in the area where the 
majority of these people originated (around Jijiga and 
the eastern highlands). CAKE is contemplating opening 
a new distribution center near Jijiga and, if this 
center opens, it is possible that large numbers of the 
Ethiopians now being fed in Somalia could return to 
Ethiopia. An influx of 50,000 to 100,000 people is
possible, according to representatives of UNHCR, and it 
is likely that CRS could be called upon to help supply 
a portion of the food if CARE does not have sufficient 
stockpiles to meet this influx.
3. Another population which could require a buffer stock 
are those people currently being resettled. It is 
already known that large percentages of those resettled
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leave the new villages and migrate back to their 
original areas. Large numbers, however, remain; and 
recent reports indicate that conditions in these areas 
are often harsh and that many people do not receive 
adequate levels of food. It is not difficult to 
imagine a situation where a combination of factors 
could produce pockets of acute food need. In the event 
that this should occur, international public opinion 
could force a temporary change in policy and dictate 
that American foods be used as a lifesaving 
intervention. Therefore, in areas near the 
resettlement zones, it would not be unwise to stockpile 
minimal surpluses of food which, collectively, could be 
accumulated and diverted to meet such a crisis.
D. RECOMMENDED FOOD LEVELS FOR BUFFER STOCKS
Nationwide, it is recommended that a contingency of 
approximately 90,000 metric tons of food be kept on hand to meet 
emergency needs. This figure represents 20% of the total 
monthly need times 4 (which represents the optimum lag-time from 
procurement to delivery.)
For the CRS regular program, a food reserve of approximately 
7,800 metric tons should be developed and sequestered at remote 
sites. (A stockpile of food for the Northern Initiative program 
is probably not needed since the level of need in these areas is 
not likely to change and, were it to do so, food could be taken 
from regular program stocks in those areas and loaned to the 
Northern Initiative program).
E. IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS
If a dispersed buffer stock is to be developed and 
maintained, additional warehouse capacities may be needed at 
various distribution centers. For the near term, one means of 
providing temporary storage space would be the procurement and 
erection of additional flexible warehouses such as those already 
in use in various areas. A buffer stock of 7,800 MT will 
require an additional 7-8,000 square meters of warehouse floor 
space. The portable warehouses curently used in some areas of 
the country are approximately 4.5 meters by 22 meters (100 sq. 
meters) and can store approximately 100 metric tons of bagged 
cereals or grains. (Another warehouse that could be used is 
described in Appendix G.) Not only are these warehouses capable 
of storing the buffer stocks, they can also be disassembled and 
moved to a crisis area. This would allow CRS to be more 
flexible in meeting contingencies.
No additional transport requirement should be necessary to 
move buffer stocks to new areas. Since trucks return from the 
warehouses empty, a portion of the fleet could be rerouted to 
move the stocks on their way back to the port or primary 
warehouses, and trucks from the secondary centers could be used 
on a temporary basis in rotation.
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(1) U .S . Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, The 
World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985, Foreign 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 98, December 1974.
(2) Hararghe Under Drought: A Survey of the Effects of Drought
upon Human Nutrition in Hararghe Province, John Seaman & 
Julius Holt, Ethiopian RRC, Addis Ababa, 1971, p. 90.
IX. DEPENDENCY ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION METHODS
Throughout the relief system, there is growing concern about 
the possibility of long-term food aid creating dependencies 
which would ultimately lead to greater hardships for the famine 
victims. Many agencies feel that it is now appropriate to 
switch from dry ration distribution to food-for-work or other 
food distribution mechanisms as a means of reducing the 
likelihood that dependencies could be created. Other agencies, 
however, criticize all food distribution systems as 
anti-developmental and are examining means of closing out food 
distribution altogether and going directly to development 
assistance to promote agricultural recovery and stimulate food 
production.
A. DEFINING DEPENDENCY
It is appropriate at this time to examine more closely the 
types of dependencies associated with food aid. Several 
development specialists have pointed out that there are two 
types: perceived dependency and situational dependency.
Perceived dependency is a personal attitude. It can result 
from apathy, lethargy, frustration and, commonly, paternalism. 
The latter two are of the most concern to development agencies. 
They are often a result of long-duration programs that have 
little victim input and continuously provide free goods and 
services. As a result, victims often find it more convenient 
not to work and to receive food than to work to produce the food 
that would remove them from the distribution rolls. Thus, in 
food programs, perceived dependency is a feeling on the part of 
the recipients that it is easier to receive food than to work. 
This syndrome is exhibited when disaster victims refuse to 
participate in self-help activities, when they demand more be 
given to them, or when they refuse to participate in programs 
such as food-for-work.
While this type of behavior is depressing and frustrating 
for relief agency personnel, it is not too serious and may 
indicate that there is an excess of food aid going into the 
community or that some of the persons on the food rolls could be 
excluded. It is generally a sign of persons taking advantage of 
a program or the benevolence of the donors rather than a true 
dependency situation.
At the present time, there are reports that people in the 
southern part of Shewa and the northern part of Wolaita have 
exhibited this behavior.
The type of dependency that should be of far more concern to 
relief agencies is situational dependency. Situational 
dependency is an actual economic situation where forces created 
by the relief program have disrupted local economies and food
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production cycles. Three types of dependencies can be created: 
individual dependency, local economic dependency and national 
agricultural dependency.
Individual dependencies are a result of situations that have 
developed where people can receive more food by not working at 
their normal endeavor. There are hidden disincentives that tend 
to discourage food production. Probably the best known example 
is a situation where food-for-work programs make it easier to 
work for food than to produce it in the fields. If a person can 
earn more food by working than by toiling in his fields, and if 
the work project requires that the majority of the farmer’s time 
be spent on the project, it is likely that he will spend the 
time working for the project and not tilling his fields. If 
this occurs during the planting season, the person could be 
dependent on food aid for the remainder of the year.
Local economic dependency is a situation that is far more 
serious. It occurs when the agro-economy of an entire community 
is affected by food aid distributions. If food aid is 
maintained at a high level throughout the year, local farmers 
who produce only slightly more than subsistence needs may find 
that there is a depressed market after harvest. If they cannot 
sell enough food to recoup their investment or to buy seeds 
needed for the following year, they may be forced to seek work 
off their farms. This results in less production the following 
year and further lowering of the overall harvest level. When 
this occurs, more people can be forced onto the relief rolls and 
eventually a vicious dependency cycle can develop.
National food dependency occurs when levels of food being 
imported have the nationwide effect of undercutting food prices 
and creating disincentives to food production. As a general 
rule, this will occur when imported food exceeds the Maximum 
Feasible Production level and approaches or exceeds the 
structural deficit. As a general rule, national dependencies 
are not a result of famine assistance programs, but of normal 
food aid being imported without considering the amount of food 
that can be produced above the structural deficit. When this 
happens, there are no incentives for farmers to produce more.
B. PROBLEMS OF CONCERN TO CRS
For CRS, the two major problems of concern are individual 
situational dependencies and local economic dependencies. The 
overall food aid program is now entering those stages when such 
dependencies could be created if proper targeting, detailed 
program planning and impact monitoring are not carried out. It 
will require a great deal of sophistication on the part of all 
concerned to ensure that an appropriate mix of program 
approaches is used and that food aid reaches those most in need 
without creating disincentives to local agricultural 
production. Of special concern are food-for-work programs in 
areas where food yields are expected to be approaching normal in 
the coming harvests.
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C. APPROACHES TO REDUCE LIKELIHOOD OF DEPENDENCIES
The following steps can help reduce the likelihood that
dependencies will be inadvertently created by the food aid 
programs.
1. Careful targeting of food aid.
2. Using caution in establishing food-for-work programs.
3. Utilizing a food store/coupon approach in lieu of
f ood-for-work.
4. Phasing out food aid as quickly as possible whenever
feasible. Experimental reduction of food aid based on 
linkages to food production should be tried
continually.
D. PRESERVING THE VICTIM’S DIGNITY
The problem of perceived dependency is a problem of the
spirit more than anything else. Obtaining free food as a 
recipient for a long period of time can rob a person of his/her 
sense of personal worth, dignity and self-esteem. In order to 
avoid breaking people's spirits, several approaches should be 
considered.
The first approach is to provide work that can result in the
attainment of either money, script, coupons or credit for the
purchase of food. In these cases, food sales should be 
permitted.
A second way of permitting people to maintain their dignity 
in food aid programs of all types is to allow people to
contribute cash or barterable materials in return for the food 
received. Until recently, a number of the agencies
participating in the CRS consortium permitted cash contributions 
on a voluntary basis. Unfortunately, an unfavorable news
article criticized this practice and, subsequently, CRS 
instructed all the food distribution centers to stop the 
practice. By the time of the assessment team’s mission, all 
voluntary contributions had ceased.
In the opinion of the assessment team, CRS should consider 
seeking permission from AID to again permit voluntary 
contributions. It should be pointed out to critics of this 
practice that the contributions should not be considered a 
payment for food, or a hardship for those persons who can make 
the contributions. Rather, contributions should be seen as a 
means to help people preserve their dignity in the face of 
pressures which could very well create perceived dependencies.
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E. ALTERNATIVE FOOD DISTRIBUTION METHODS
The purpose of the current dry ration distribution program 
is to provide food in sufficient quantities for people to take 
back to their villages. This allows them to remain where they 
can work their fields and live normally between distribution 
dates. As famine relief operations enter their second year, 
however, questions naturally arise as to whether more 
appropriate mechanisms for food distribution should be used. 
Throughout the country, there is a growing awareness that 
massive food distributions could have a negative effect on 
agricultural production. If food aid continues above levels 
that are absolutely necessary (making it easier for people to 
receive free food than to work for increased harvests), 
dependencies on the part of the villagers could be created.
For this reason, alternatives to the dry ration distribution 
approach now in use are being proposed by many agencies. The 
two alternatives mentioned most often are:
1. Food-for-Work
Typically, FFW projects pay people with food for 
working on public works or community development
projects. In Ethiopia, food-for-work has primarily 
been used as a means of improving the land or making 
improvements that will aid agriculture, such as
terracing, building water catchments, erosion control 
measures, and improvement of farm-to-market roads.
Food-for-work proponents claim:
a) Food-for-work is less likely to create
dependencies.
b) Food-for-work accomplishes multiple objectives:
getting food into the hands of those most in need, 
and carrying out projects and improvements that 
serve everyone. Thus, both individuals and
communities are served.
c) Projects are not difficult to organize. The RRC 
has compiled lists of potential projects that 
could be implemented with food-for-work.
Food-for-work critics, however, refer to the record. 
They point out that, unless properly planned,
food-for-work often takes on a life of its own. As 
more food enters the community, some will inevitably be 
sold on the local market to buy things that people need 
other than food. The food is normally sold below the
market price, which depresses the prices that farmers 
can get for their produce. As prices for agricultural 
products decline, it soon pays more to work for food 
than to grow crops. Gradually, production drops,
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causing more hunger and forcing more people to go to 
work for food. More food is needed to meet the need, 
and soon a vicious cycle is established. Critics have 
noted that dry ration distribution is often easier to 
stop than food-for-work programs.
Critics also feel that food-for-work projects are often 
’’make work" activities and, if they are not really 
needed, can consume valuable resources. Many projects 
require detailed study and planning, and food-for-work 
programs are often conceived and planned by persons 
without proper training and skill. Therefore, the 
programs may not be environmentally sound and can have 
an adverse affect on local ecologies and agriculture.
The objective of any feeding program is to feed those 
most at risk and, in famines, those most at risk are 
children. Critics of FFW point out that it is 
difficult to establish a correlation between 
food-for-work programs and nutritional improvement. 
Usually able-bodied men participate in the 
food-for-work programs and, because they are 
undertaking strenuous work, they take a larger portion 
of the food. To compensate, more food may have to be 
given out. This in turn means that more food will be 
necessary. In a situation where food resources are 
scarce, it may be more expeditious to continue dry 
ration distribution than to phase into a more 
resource-consuming program.
It should also be noted that food-for-work programs 
require the same logistics inputs as dry ration 
distribution. Usually, food-for-work programs are 
considered an adjunct program or expanded approach to 
providing food, rather than a replacement for dry 
ration distribution.
2. Cash-for-Work
The primary alternative to food-for-work is 
cash-for-work. Cash-for-work proponents believe that 
cash is less disruptive, and that cash payments for 
work are more compatible with the local economy. They 
point out that the program is easier to administer 
since there are no commodity logistics to manage. They 
also feel that the projects are easier to terminate and 
to move from one area to another if needs dictate.
Cash-for-work also is said to infuse much-needed cash 
into economies that have been depleted of cash 
resources by drought and famine conditions. In some 
cases, this can stimulate local economic recovery.
Finally, cash-for-work advocates point out that cash is 
the best way to help restore dignity, in that it gives
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people a choice about how they use the money and it 
places the responsibility directly on them. Since it 
is known that some of the food in food-for-work and dry 
ration distributions is sold in order to buy household 
commodities such as soap, cooking' fuel, etc., 
cash-for-work does away with the restrictions imposed 
by the other programs.
Critics of cash-for-work claim that the people do not 
spend all the money on food; the purpose of the program 
is basically to fight famine and food is what is 
needed. (Studies of cash-for-work show that most money 
is spent for food; claims that people spend all their 
money on alcohol, tobacco and other non-essentials are 
exaggerated.) Critics also point out that money can 
have the same effect of making it more prof table to 
work for cash than to work in the fields, if the 
projects pay more than farming. Also, in a country 
like Ethiopia where there are restrictions on the 
movement of food between agricultural areas, and where 
natural market forces that would move surpluses to 
food-deficit areas do not exist, there may not be 
enough food to buy in the food-deficit areas. This 
could have the effect of pushing up prices in local 
markets and lowering the buying power of the cash 
received.
In reality, the answer lies somewhere between the two 
opinions. Both types of projects can be appropriate under 
certain circumstances if properly planned and carried out. The 
reality for most agencies is that western countries produce 
surpluses of food, not cash, and it is this food that the 
agencies can obtain for distribution, not money. Therefore, 
agencies are more likely to be carrying out food-for-work 
programs than cash-for-work, and CRS, the primary consignee of 
U.S. Government food, will be involved in numerous food-for-work 
projects. Thus, it is important for the organization to 
establish criteria for the formulation of food-for-work projects 
that will make the program as non-disruptive as possible, and to 
explore options (such as those outlined below) which could 
provide an alternative food distribution mechanism for the next 
year.
3. Other Options
Two alternatives developed for agencies that normally 
distribute food from western surpluses, are the "coupon 
and food store" program and "grain-sharing". Both
programs are new and do not yet have a proven track 
record. Yet, a number of experts have suggested that 
these approaches can help to remove many of the 
negative aspects of both food-for-work and 
cash-for-work programs.
a) The Coupon and Food Store program. Works
projects, similar to those established for
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food-for-work programs, are identified and 
organized. However, the workers are paid in 
coupons which can be redeemed only at a special 
relief store set up in each community. These 
stores stock food, but also carry other supplies 
such as health care items, charcoal, household 
utensils, and personal articles that can 
contribute to health and hygiene (soap, 
toothpaste, etc.). In addition, a limited number 
of personal luxury items may also be sold at the 
store, for which cash or a combination of cash and 
coupons can be used.
The rationale for this approach is that people 
will buy only what they need. This serves as a 
natural "regulator" of the amount of food coming 
into the community. Also, people will have the 
ability to buy those things which they would 
otherwise obtain by selling food. Therefore, food 
provided by the relief program will not be as 
likely to end up in the local market competing 
with food produced by local farmers.
If the luxury items are procured from the local 
market by the participating agencies, local 
shopkeepers will also benefit. The amount of 
input from the agencies should be minimal and, by 
having a greater range of items available at the 
food store, the program should be popular and a 
greater incentive to work should be promoted. 
Finally, the range of foods provided at the coupon 
store can include those that are specially 
targeted for vulnerable groups, theoretically 
ensuring that a greater number of those most in 
need of calorie and nutritional inputs will 
receive them. With items in the store being 
controlled by the relief agencies, it will be 
possible to ensure that the workers principally 
take home food.
Proponents of the coupon store programs also point 
out that it is easy to establish nutrition 
monitoring activities in conjunction with, and 
physically adjacent to, the relief store. Open 
hours can be established and redemption days can 
be printed on the coupons.
b) Grain-Sharing. Grain-sharing programs are similar 
to the American PIK (Payment-in-Kind) programs. 
They are designed to help support local farmers 
and to maintain or reconstruct the normal food 
marketing system. In this approach, farmers are 
paid in grains to improve their land with
counter-drought or counter-desertification
measures such as contouring, terracing, or
planting windbreaks, and for participating in 
community development projects such as developing 
water harvesting measures, etc., for a specified 
period of time. Instead of receiving wages, 
farmers receive an amount of food that is 
equivalent to the amount of grain they would have 
produced had conditions been normal. If their 
harvest has totally failed, they receive the full 
amount. If they harvest a percentage of their 
normal yield, they receive the balance.
Normally, the farmers are paid in un-mi lied 
grains. They can sell the grains at whatever 
price they can negotiate from their normal 
buyers. In this way, all persons and institutions 
normally engaged in the marketing system can carry 
on as if the drought had not occurred. The 
negative impact of drought on the normal market 
system can thus be substantially reduced.
The program should be closely monitored to ensure 
that farmers or merchants do not hoard the grains. 
If hoarding does take place, agencies can make 
free food distributions in the community to lower 
the cost to the poor and force the hoarders to 
release their reserves.
Advocates point out that grain-sharing provides an 
excellent means of informally controlling prices 
in local markets. This is done by adjusting the 
percentages of food provided according to the 
normal yields. By providing a greater percentage, 
prices should move downward; by providing less, 
prices would move upward.
A grain-sharing program is designed to be used in 
those areas that are beginning to experience 
drought conditions or where some agricultural 
recovery has been possible in the aftermath of 
widespread crop failures. It should not be used 
in an area where almost total crop failure is 
occurring beyond one year.
Proponents of grain-sharing claim that the program 
will be the least disruptive to the local market 
system. They also point out that having 
additional grains will enable farmers producing 
limited amounts of locally-acclimatized grains to 
reserve an adequate portion of their yield for 
seeds for the following season. This reduces the 
amount of seed to be supplied by relief agencies 
or the government.
Proponents also point out that, because the food 
system remains intact, the overall agro-economy
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can benefit others, not just the farmers. Some 
proponents also estimate that management 
requirements for grain-sharing are less than for 
other programs since the food is being handled 
through the normal market system and not through 
an artificial distribution system. (Food does not 
need to be delivered to each farmer but could be 
delivered to the granaries and allocated to 
farmers when their harvest is brought for sale.) 
In Ethiopia, grain-sharing programs could have the 
effect of stabilizing grain markets in areas that 
are marginally affected by drought and countering 
famine conditions in isolated food-deficit areas. 
Grain-sharing could also be used in those areas 
where food is growing, but not in sufficient 
quantities, such as Wolaita and portions of
Harerge.
As a famine control measure, grain-sharing would 
be most effective in countering the "bleed over" 
effect that famine geographer Wolde-Mariam cites 
as a major contribution to the movement of famines 
in Ethiopia (see Section VI).
The success of a grain-sharing program in
Ethiopia, however, would be dependent upon the 
government’s willingness to permit foods allocated 
to a region to remain in that region and not be 
transferred to the urban areas.
F. CRITERIA FOR SELECTING PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
It is recommended that the following criteria be considered
when planning alternative food distribution projects.
1. Criteria for Food-for-Work Programs
a) Food-for-work programs should be designed to 
provide short-term work only. To ensure that this 
happens, projects should be small-scale activities 
that can be completed in a short period of time. 
Projects such as road construction that take many 
months or even years to complete, or that could be 
intentionally prolonged by workers or program 
administrators, should be avoided.
b) Programs should be conducted between planting and 
harvest periods, or during the period beginning 
three months after the normal harvest until the 
next planting season begins. If projects are 
carried out during the planting season, they could 
conceivably reduce the amount of food being 
planted. If run during the harvest season or 
immediately thereafter, the food could have the 
effect of depressing local prices.
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c) Programs should be targeted for areas where food 
deficits are high.
d) An appropriate mix of different types of projects
should be planned for the same area. Not all 
projects should be targeted strictly to the
agricultural sector but should also include works 
that will improve overall living conditions in the 
famine zones.
e) Payment for work should be according to production 
rather than a daily wage (i.e., piecework).
f) When farmers are the primary target group, the
work should be on a part-time basis only (two or 
three days per week) in order to permit the 
farmers to work their fields.
g) In areas where agricultural recovery is taking
place, food-for-work should be seen as a
preliminary step to phasing out all food aid. The 
criterion for determining when this should occur 
is when nutritional levels have stabilized and 
remained high for a period of 3 months or longer.
h) In order to ensure that the vulnerable groups
receive food, food-for-work projects should be 
developed for women. A list of potential
food-for-work projects for women is attached as 
Appendix H.
i) Effective screening procedures should be 
established to ensure that the men working in 
food-for-work programs represent the neediest 
households and those with a high percentage of 
vulnerable individuals.
j) Premix can be distributed as part of the
food-for-work payment, in the form of a bonus or 
through women’s food-for-work projects.
2. Criteria for Cash-for-Work Projects*
The criteria for establishing cash-for-work projects 
are similar to those for food-for-work programs except 
that the projects can be carried out irrespective of 
season. Two additional requirements are that they 
should be in areas where agricultural recovery is
*UNICEF has carried out a number of cash-for-work programs in 
Ethiopia. Their experience, as well as experience gained by CRS 
in the OMNIBUS cash-for-work projects, should be reviewed as a 
means of further fine-tuning this approach.
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occurring or where crop yields will be at least 60% of 
normal. In these areas, it is necessary to establish
the cash-for-work programs near the markets where local 
harvests will be sold (within a 30-40 kilometer 
radius).
Cash-for-work projects should also: (a) be short-term; 
(b) be part-time work only; (c) be paid on a piecework 
basis; (d) include women as potential recipients, and 
(e) use a screening process to determine the persons 
eligible.
Cash-for-work programs should be considered as a final 
program in areas where food aid has been completely 
phased out. This will inject much-needed capital into 
the local economy and help continue both agricultural 
and economic recovery.
3. Criteria for Coupon and Food Store Programs
The criteria for the coupon food store program are the 
same as for establishing food-for-work projects. 
However, since the food store concept is less likely to 
put surplus food into the market, the program may be 
carried out on a year-round basis.
4. Criteria for Establishing a Grain-Sharing Program
Grain-sharing programs should be targeted for areas 
where:
a) famine conditions do not currently exist but food 
availability is decreasing;
b) famine conditions do exist but food deficits are 
decreasing (i.e., agricultural recovery is taking 
place);
c) food deficits occur adjacent to acute famine 
areas; and
d) isolated pockets of food deficit are surrounded by 
areas of food sufficiency (though not major 
surpluses).
G. PHASING OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION METHODS
Rather than considering the various distribution methods as 
"either/or" approaches, planners should consider using a mix of 
programs in different phases of the agricultural and famine 
recovery cycle. Figure 9-1 depicts a drought-induced famine 
continuum, and shows how different approaches might be applied 
at different phases of the famine to improve the targeting of 
food aid and, at the same time, promote agricultural recovery.
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X. STRATEGIES FOR STRETCHING FOOD AID
In the eventuality that food aid allocations for 1986 are 
below those forecast in this report and the RRC projections, the 
amount of food imported by CRS can be "stretched" in various 
ways. (It should be pointed out, however, that stretching the 
available food does not imply that existing food levels are 
adequate or that there are major surpluses of relief food in any 
specific area. If all the persons in need of food in Ethiopia
were to apply, the food needs could be as high as 1.6 million 
tons. In those areas where any additional food beyond real 
needs for the specific recipients has been provided, these 
amounts have probably found their way through barter and trade 
into the unseen market where a sizable portion has reached 
hungry families, although at a price. This "spillover" should 
be regarded as a positive aspect of the food program, given the 
fact that there are so many persons who should qualify for food 
but who for official reasons are not eligible.)
Strategies for extending the food aid include:
A. Better Targeting
This can be accomplished by utilizing more accurate 
recipient targeting methods (which would include using 
weight-for-height measurements) as the basis for selecting 
families. By getting more accurate individual family data 
regarding needs and by determining project areas on the 
basis of nutritional deficiencies as a percentage of the 
total population, some food requirements in some areas could 
be reduced by 10-20%.
B. Discharging Healthy Children from the Rolls
Current program criteria require that children who are 
held at a normal weight-for-height range for 3 months be 
phased out of the program. If this standard were to be 
enforced, approximately 25% of the children could be taken 
off the distribution lists. If this were to be done hastily 
and without continued monitoring of the children, many 
families could suffer. The assessment team estimates that 
with more precise admission criteria, replacement families 
for a large percentage of those currently on the rolls would 
be found. Therefore, the net reduction is likely to be at 
most 5-10% in those areas where the food deficit is still 
high.
C . Instituting a Sliding Scale for Food Rations
Currently the approach for feeding has been to provide 
a full ration to any family whose children are enrolled in 
the program. If food supplies were to dwindle, it might be 
more appropriate to develop a sliding scale based on 
nutritional status. The program would provide full rations
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until children have reached 90-100% of the weight-for-height 
standards for a period of 3 months. At that point, rations 
could be reduced 10% per month until the ration allocation 
is 70% of the full ration. If at that time children show no 
further deterioration, rations could be reduced to 50% for 
an additional 3 months and, if no deterioration in 
nutritional status was found, they could then be phased out 
of the program. By stepping down the food rations, it is
estimated that an additional 10% savings could be made 
(taking into account that, in the food deficit areas, 
replacement families would be found).
D. Reducing Rations in Areas Showing Major Improvements in Food 
Production or Only Marginal Deficits
In some areas (Gonder, Illubabor, Wellega and Gamo
Gofa), it should be possible to gradually reduce rations to 
70-75% of the normal ration. While it is recognized that a 
large portion of the food harvest will be collected by the 
Agricultural Marketing Corporation for distribution to other 
areas, the amount of food retained by farmers for their own 
needs, as well as for sale at local markets, should provide 
enough food so that the current ration could be
substantially reduced. Coffee is produced in Illubabor and 
Wellega, so farmers in this area should also have some
purchasing power. Since it is hoped that these areas will 
continue to be food, surplus areas, providing continuous full 
food rations could have a negative effect on local market 
prices and be a disincentive to production. Therefore, food 
in these areas should be phased out anyway. By phasing out
of these areas, it is estimated that 21,000 lyTTs of food
could be reprogrammed to other areas.
E. Reducing or Halting Food Distribution Immediately After
Harvests.
In most areas some amounts of food have been produced; 
in those areas food distribution could be drastically cut
back or even temporarily halted for periods of one to three 
months, depending upon the amount of harvest. This would 
allow the normal market to function as usual and would have 
the added benefit of ensuring that food distribution would 
not have an adverse impact in those areas where limited
recovery is taking place.
F. Reducing All Rations by 5%
A simple way of stretching the food would be to reduce 
all rations by 5%. That amount is not likely to have a 
noticeable effect on nutrition levels.
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G. Restricting Food-for-Work Programs
Since food-for-work programs require approximately 38% 
more food*, a tightening of the criteria for food-for-work 
programs, aimed at reducing the total number, could be 
imposed. An alternative would be to stop food-for-work 
altogether and utilize the food coupon/food store approach. 
If drastic measures are needed to stretch available food to 
meet unseen contingencies or increased needs, the following 
measures could be taken:
1. Target food rations specifically at vulnerable groups
and not to families in general. Heavier emphasis would 
be placed on providing supplemental-type foods such as 
DSM (dried skim milk), various premixes and other foods 
most likely to be consumed by children and pregnant and 
lactating women. The effect of this strategy, however, 
will depend on inter-family food allocations. If 
severe famine conditions continue it is likely that, 
even with the distribution of these types of food,
small children would suffer.
2. Distribute a higher percentage of high calorie,
low-bulk foods. Foods such as CSM generally provide 
more calories per kilo of food than do basic grains. 
If greater supplies of these foods are available, it 
might be possible to substitute them for bulgar wheat. 
Thus, while the same tonnage levels might be fixed, the 
amount of calories could be increased (although the
„„x. innrease since high protein foods
tsic grains).
3. Experiment with phase-outs. By increasing the
nutrition surveillance capabilities and using more 
accurate measuring systems, it would be possible to 
experiment with gradual stepping down and phase-outs in 
many areas. This program (which should be considered 
only as a last resort) would begin with an initial 5% 
program-wide food reduction and, in subsequent months, 
additional cut-backs of 2-1/2% per month would be made 
until such time as there was a noted downward trend in 
the nutritional status of children being monitored in 
the program. If a decline were detected, rations would 
be increased 2-1/2% the next month and held at that 
level for a 3-month period. If at that time 
nutritional levels remained constant, the cutbacks 
could then be tried again.
*Based on a normal distribution of 52 kilos per month vs. a FFW 
allocation of 72 kilos per month.
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In some areas the phase-down approach could result in a 
net food reduction of 25% or greater, at which point 
the entire area should be assessed and a determination 
made as to whether the program should be phased out 
altogether.
It should be pointed out that all of the above strategies 
for stretching food are dependent upon strict nutritional 
surveillance and increasing the total number of persons who are 
being monitored. They also require that all programs use the 
more accurate weight-for-height measuring standard and that 
total at-risk populations be enumerated at each woreda level. 
This will require more staff and statistical monitoring capacity 
on the part of all the agencies and thus will be more expensive 
in terms of personnel.
It is also important that the phenomenon of "rotating the 
victims" be detected early and prevented. This phenomenon 
occurs when persons who had been malnourished are brought back 
up to the basic standard as a result of the intervention of the 
food program and then phased out of the program without adequate 
means for maintaining their nutritional status. After leaving 
the program, they quickly deteriorate and several months later 
require readmission. This phasing in and out of a program will 
occur so long as major food deficits are present and the natural 
corrective forces of a food market are prevented.
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APPENDIX A: ESTABLISHING THE POPULATION BASE
ISSUES
Determining representative population estimates for Ethiopia 
is extremely difficult, if not impossible. This is due to data 
collection difficulties created by the rugged terrain, the 
dispersion of the population and transportation difficulties. 
The disparity between the 1984 CSO population estimates and the 
1984 Ethiopian Population and Housing Census Preliminary Report 
is therefore not surprising.
For the purpose of this report, an estimation of the 
population of Ethiopia was made by weighing the 1984 CSO 
population estimates and the 1984 Ethiopian Population and 
Housing Census Preliminary Report. Since the latter is a 
preliminary report reflecting data representing approximately 
85% of the country, and CSO has carried out population estimates 
in the past, it appears reasonable to weigh each estimate 
equally.
Although it appears as though deaths due to the recent 
famine may be in the hundreds of thousands, no accurate 
information on this issue is available. Therefore, no
adjustment to population figures is made for these famine-caused 
deaths.
It has been estimated that 500,000 people from Tigrai and 
Wello have been resettled during the past few years in the 
southwest, primarily in Illubabor and Wellega. However, it is 
reported that many of these people have returned to their 
homelands. Because of the lack of accurate information, no
adjustments to population figures are made for population 
resettlement movements.
METHODOLOGY
The estimated total 1986 Ethiopian population was determined 
by averaging the 1984 CSO population estimate and the 1984 
Population and Housing Census Preliminary Report estimates on a 
regional basis, adjusting for 1986 at an annual population 
growth rate of 2.76%, and adding the regional populations to 
arrive at a total. The population growth rate used (2.76%) is 
the average population growth from 1981 to 1984 using CSO 
population estimates.
(1984 CSO estimate + x
1986 Population = 1984 Housing Census Estimate) x (1.0276)
2
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ADJUSTED POPULATION OF ETHIOPIA FOR 1986
The chart below indicates the adjusted population estimates for 
1986 using the methodology described above.
Adjustments made to these figures to reflect 1986 
populations include specific modifications to the figures in:
1. Eritrea - In 1985, it is estimated that approximately
200.000 rural people migrated to Sudan. 50,000 people 
may return in 1986, resulting in a net reduction of the 
rural and total populations of 150,000.
2. Tigrai - In 1985, it is estimated that approximately
180.000 rural people migrated to Sudan. Approximately
50.000 people returned that same year, and 50,000 
additional people may return in 1986, resulting in a 
net reduction of the rural and total populations of 
80,000.
After taking into account these adjustments, the standard 
population figures used in this report for 1986 are:
POPULATION
REGION URBAN RURAL TOTAL
Arssi 139,458 1,414,513 1,553,971
Bale 73,551 975,172 1,048,723
Gamo Gofa 69,510 1,179,869 1,249,379
Gojjam 264,089 2,648,297 2,912,386
Gonder 224,741 2,517,571 2,742,312
Eritrea 696,740 2,158,580 2,855,320
Harerge 345,300 3,685,679 4,030,979
Illubabor 70,523 915,176 985,699
Kef fa 166,915 2,077,409 2,244,324
Shewa 2,321,763 6,439,468 8,761,231
Sidamo 271,582 3,382,299 3,653,881
Tigrai 231,802 2,312,749 2,544,551
Wellega 153,788 2,285,577 2,439,365
Wello 252,926 3,190,417 3,443,343
TOTALS 5,282,688 34,952,776 40,235,464
87
APPENDIX B: ESTABLISHING THE STRUCTURAL FOOD DEFICIT
DEFINITION
The structural food deficit, for the purpose of this report, 
is defined as a chronic food shortage in an agricultural system 
due to the system’s inability to produce sufficient food to meet 
its consumption requirements. Inherent factors within the 
system cause this food production shortage, even in years of 
generally favorable production conditions (good and timely 
rainfall, sufficient and reasonable quality seeds, necessary 
land preparation/cultivation inputs, etc.). Factors that 
contribute towards this food shortage, i.e., factors that have 
chronic negative effects on the food production system, are:
1. Erratic climate conditions. Even though an area may 
receive generally favorable climatic conditions 
overall, there will be "pockets" that do not receive 
favorable conditions, resulting in food production 
below the system’s requirements. (Because Ethiopia has 
almost no irrigation systems to provide supplemental 
water during crop "moisture stress" periods, overall 
crop production is largely dependent upon the timely 
distribution of adequate rainfall.)
2. Agricultural policies that do not encourage farmers to 
produce enough to meet normal consumption requirements, 
much less produce a surplus of food. For example, if 
farmers have difficulty obtaining production inputs 
(seeds, fertilizers, tools, draught oxen, etc.), if 
these inputs are exorbitantly expensive (if available), 
if they are required to contribute portions of their 
surplus harvest to the government (a tax), and if they 
do not receive an "encouraging" price from surplus crop 
sales, then the farmers probably will not produce 
surplus food. Rather, they will plan to produce only 
what they estimate to be their family's food 
consumption requirements, and then often fall short of 
that mark due to erratic climatic conditions.
3. Limited maximum potential productivity of land within 
the system. Even under "ideal" production conditions 
(favorable supplies of all production input 
requirements), an area of land is only able to produce 
a limited amount of food. If the consumption 
requirements of a group of people on an area of land 
exceed the production capabilities of that land, then a 
food shortage will exist.
Ethiopia suffers from a chronic food shortage, i.e., it 
consistently falls short of producing the food it requires. The 
following is an estimation of Ethiopia’s "structural food 
deficit", based on a period of production and consumption 
(1979-83) that will be considered "normal” for this
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report and based on the nutritional and population bases
established in Section IV and Appendix A.
METHODOLOGY
The following assumptions are made:
1. A minimum average "normal" caloric intake requirement
for long-term nutritional maintenance (Cl) = 2100
kcal/person/day.
2. A minimum average caloric intake requirement for
emergency subsistence (Ce) = 1500 kcal/person/day.
3. A "normal" national average main food annual
consumption requirement (Fc), being defined as
6,527,000 MTs. The average annual consumption rate was 
taken from the USAID report, 1986 Emergency Food Need 
Assessment for Ethiopia by David Atwood. It reflects 
an average annual consumption of all main foods between 
the period of 1979/80 - 1983/84, a period defined here 
as a "normal" production period.
4. A per capita consumption of 207 kcal from foods other 
than main foods (Co). In addition to the per capita 
caloric intake of main foods, it is estimated that the 
average Ethiopian consumes approximately 207 additional 
calories from foods such as meat, fish, nuts, 
vegetables, eggs, oil, fat, honey, fruits, sugar, and 
seeds. This estimate is also taken from the USAID 
Atwood Report.
5. An estimated population during 1982 (Pop 82) based on 
this report’s population estimate for 1986 (without the 
Eritrean and Trigraian regional population adjustments) 
and adjusted for an average 2.76% population regression 
rate to 1982 (the middle year of the 1979/80 - 1983/84 
period, of which Fc was estimated).
Based on these assumptions, we are able to estimate the 
following:
1. the "normal" daily per capita caloric intake of all
foods (Cn) as:
Cn = (Fc)(Kc) + Co
(Pop 82)
where Kc = unit conversion factor,
Co = per capita average daily 
caloric intake from other 
foods (USAID report)
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2. percentages of the population receiving Cl and Ce 
during a "normal” period:
(x%)(Cl) + (l-x%)(Ce) = Cn
where x% = percent population at Cl 
l-x% = percent population at Ce
This is carried out just to get an idea of the possible 
percentage of the population that is consuming at least 
2100 kcal per person per day and the possible 
percentage of the population consuming 1500 kcal per 
person per day.
3. the structural food deficit (SD) for Ethiopia in 1986:
CALCULATIONS
1. Determining Cn ("normal" daily per capita caloric
(36,290,098)
= 1,932 kcalories
which is considered the "normal" average daily per 
capita caloric intake for this report.
SD
"normal"
caloric
intake
required
x 1986 Pop. x Kc
where Kc = unit conversion factor
intake of all foods):
Cn = (Fc) (Kc) +Co
(Pop 82)
If,
Fc = 6,527,000 F-TT (From USAID report) 
Co = 207 kcalories (From USAID report)
Pop 82 = (Pop 86)( 1 )
(1.0276)4
= 36,290,098
Kc = unit conversion factor, assuming 1 gm cereal 
equivalent = 3.5 kcalories
Then,
Cn = ( 6,527,000) (Kc) + 207
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2. Determining ’’normal" % population @ Cl, and 
"normal" % population @ Ce.
(x%)(Cl) + (l-x%)(Ce) = Cn
(x)(2100) + (1-x)(1500) = 1932
x = (1932 - 1500)
(2100 - 1500)
= 0.72 or 72% 
and 1-x = 0.28 or 28%
Therefore, 72% of the population of Ethiopia during a recent 
"normal" period consumed the minimum average daily 
consumption requirement to meet long-term 
nutritional maintenance standards, 2100 kcalories 
per person per day,
and
28% of the population consumed the minimum average 
daily consumption requirement to meet emergency 
subsistence standards of 1500 kcalories per person 
per day.
This is consistent with previous FAO estimates, such as:
a) FAO 1969-71 estimate of 26% of population of Ethiopia 
receiving less than 1512 calories per capita (a period 
considered "normal" for that time).
b) FAO statement that the average per capita consumption
of people in Ethiopia is declining (2168 cal per capita 
in 1969-71 vs. this estimate of 1932 calories).
3. Estimating the structural food deficit for Ethiopia in 1986:
SD = (Cl - actual)(1986 Population)(Kc)
= (2100 - 1932)(40,235,464)(Kc)
= 704,925 MT
This "structural deficit” will be considered the base
structural deficit in this report and will be utilized to 
determine the national estimated emergency food requirement for 
Ethiopia in 1986. This estimation is by no means a suggestion 
that Ethiopia or donor agencies should not address issues to 
help reduce this structural deficit. Rather, it is an 
estimation of the current "normal” (non-drought-affected) food 
shortages in Ethiopia, beyond the emergency food shortages 
(drought-affected) existing in Ethiopia now.
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APPENDIX C: ESTABLISHING LOGISTICAL CAPACITIES
Although it was beyond the scope of this assessment to carry 
out a detailed analysis of the expected monthly logistical 
capabilities of the overall Ethiopian relief system, broad 
capacities have been estimated here based on information about 
logistical capabilities supplied by CRS.
The majority of food aid commodities enter Ethiopia at three 
ports: Massawa, Assab and Djibouti (see Figure 2-5). All 
incoming commodities are cleared by the Maritime Transit Service 
Corp., an Ethiopian quasi-governmental organization. Food aid 
commodities are then off-loaded at the respective ports and 
transported to the various primary storage centers by truck (and 
a limited amount by air) from Massawa and Assab and by rail from 
Djibouti. The RRC is responsible for coordinating all food aid 
distributions. The major primary storage and distribution 
centers are located at Nazareth, Addis Ababa, Dessi/Kumbolche, 
Asmara and Dira Dawa. From the primary centers, food is 
delivered to secondary distribution centers, the bulk by truck 
and some by air to critical areas cut off by conflict. Figure 
2-5 indicates the major distribution centers, main paved 
highways, and sections of the main roads cut off by conflict.
Various reports provided by CRS, as well as data compiled 
from interviews, were reviewed to estimate the logistical 
capacities of systems that can be expected to be reliable in 
1986. The following tables indicate these capacities, and form 
the logistical bases for this report.
C
PORT CONDITIONS
a. Offtake capacities (in metric tons per month)
Port
Adjusted Total
Total maximum Maximum Offtake
offtake capacity Capacity*
Massawa
Assab
Djibouti
45.000 MT/Mo. 
135,000 MT/Mo.**
30.000 MT/Mo.
33,750 MT/Mo. 
101,250 MT/Mo. 
22,500 MT/Mo.
Total 210,000 MT/Mo. 157,500 MT/Mo.
*It is arbitrarily assumed that the maximum offtake capacities 
at each port could be maintained on an average of 9 out of 12 
months of the year during emergency situations.
**CRS estimates current post off-take capacity at Assab to be
75.000 MT/Mo. However, anticipated upgrading of the port 
facilities is expected to permit an off-take capacity of
135.000 MT/Mo. by early 1986.
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b. Storage Capacities (average maximum storage capacity):
Port
Covered
Storage
Open
Storage
Storage 
Under 
Const.
Total 
Covered 
Storage 
Expected 
for 1986
Massawa
Assab
Djibouti
30.000 MT
30.000 m  
300 MT
10.000 m
Unlimited
15.000 m
50,000 m
30.000 m
80.000 MT 
300 MT
Total 110,300 MT
The additional storage facility under construction at Assab 
should help maintain steady off-loading at that port and allow a 
desired one month "buffer" stock capability should truck haulage 
drastically decrease. However, the port at Djibouti remains 
severely curtailed, due not only to the limited discharge 
capacity by rail, but also to the limited covered storage 
facilities, which hamper steady off-take potential.
Take-Away Capabilities from Port to Primary/Secondary 
Distribution Centers
The bulk of the food at the ports is taken away by trucks 
and by rail at Djibouti. Although some air services are 
utilized on a limited scale to serve "restricted" areas, this 
service was expected to cease for the most part by the end of 
1985. The total trucks available in the country is a 
combination of GOE trucks from the National Transportation 
Corporation (NATRACOR), private trucks operating under NATRACOR 
(Ketena), RRC trucks, and trucks supplied by various NGOs. It 
was reported that approximately 80% of the Ketena trucks can be 
assumed to be used in relief operations. (See chart on next 
page.)
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AVAILABLE TRUCKS
# of Vehicles Haulage Capacity
Agency or Trucks of Trucks (MT)
NATROCOR 1,000 Various
KETENA 5,000 Various
RRC 170 22
230 5-8
80 40
CRS 12 22
12 7
55 (Just arrived) 32
ECS 8 8
6 12
LWF 19 6
2 11
10 22
2 dump Various
CRDA 22 32
4 22
19 7
In addition, a UN trucking fleet should be operational in 
1986, consisting of 270 vehicles that are estimated to be able 
to transport up to 36,000 MT per month from Assab to N. Shewa, 
Wello and South Tigrai.
The maximum take-away capacities indicated below reflect 
actual take-away capabilities of the existing trucking fleet 
(and a small percentage of air take-away) and the existing rail 
take-away capabilities at Djibouti. Assuming that these 
capabilities will exist in 1986 (a reasonable assumption with 
the addition of fifty-five 32MT trucks for CRS and the UN 
trucking fleets), the total net expected take-away capabilities 
of the system are indicated below:
TOTAL NET TAKE-AWAY CAPACITY
Take-away
Port/Primary Warehouse Centers Capacity
Adj. Tot. 
Take-away Cap. 
(Reflecting 
Adj. Avg.
Port Capacity)
Massawa/Asmara (by road) 45,000 MT/Mo. 33,750 MT/Mo.
Assab/Naz, Addis, Dessi (by road) 120,000 MT/Mo. 101,250 MT/Mo.
Djibouti/Dira Dawa (by rail) 15,000 MT/Mo. 15,000 MT/Mo.
Total 150,000 MT/Mo.
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Reports from CRS and other NGOs indicate that the trucking 
fleets available in Ethiopia now (and the additional trucks 
anticipated for 1986) are adequate to meet the port-to-primary 
warehouse distribution tasks.
The primary distribution warehouse capacities for CRS 
programs (as reported by CRS) are shown below:
PRIMARY DISTRIBUTION WAREHOUSE CAPACITIES
Region
Primary 
Dist. Center
Warehouse
Storage Capacity (MT)
Eritrea Asmara 10,000
Tigrai Mekele
Other
10,000
10,000
Shewa Nazareth 
Addis Ababa
13,000
11,400
Sidamo Various 17,000
Wello Dessi/Kumbolche
Various
6,900
1,450
Gonder Gonder 1,500
Harerge Dira Dawa 7,000
TOTAL 88,250
CRS reports that they, along with their operational 
counterparts, currently have the trucking fleets and warehouse 
capacities to generally meet their 1986 expected monthly tonnage 
distribution levels. Combined, CRS and their respective 
operational partners currently have the warehousing and 
transportation necessary for the delivery of 21,673 MTs of food 
aid per month in 1986.
In summary, the logistical assumptions for this report are:
1 . Maximum average expected talie-away capacity from all 
three ports: 150,000 MT per month.
2. CRS current available secondary warehouse storage
capacities: 88,250 MT.
3. CRS current and expected transport capabilities: 
21,673 MT per month.
(CRS has indicated that, if additional secondary warehouse space 
is needed, the means are available for securing the facilities.)
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REGION - ERITREA
Awrajas - 8 X  /
Woredas - 39 x r^ —'—^
\ __
The majority of the awrajas are primarily cropping areas. 
Most pastoralists are in the eastern and southeast regions.
RRC Nov. 1985 Report:
Estimate of affected population: Dec. 1984 - 827,000
Oct. 1985 - 650,000
Awrajas showing greatest need: Hamassien (186,000)
CDAA Regional Summary Reports (from distribution centers):
Generally downward and stabilizing trends of percentages of 
children <80% wt/ht.
Grain Price Indices (RRC Nov. 1985 report):
Not enough price information is available from this region 
to make a detailed analysis. But special assessments show 
prices to be among the highest in the country with no signs 
of decrease. Teff is presently 350-380 birr per quintal in 
Asmara, compared to 200 birr in Addis Ababa. Other grains 
vary from 200-240 birr per quintal.
General Comments (from Dec. FAO and ECS Nov. reports):
Rainfall in 1985 was not good but better than the last five
of seed, oxen, late planting, lack of off-season rain, 
locusts, and displacement. Hail storms seriously affected 
crops in Serai and Akele Guzay awrajas. Eritrea has always 
been a deficit area; farmers can produce only 20-30% of the 
food needed to feed the population. Livestock in most 
pastoral areas have been diminished due to drought. 
Livestock in the pastoral areas were either sold or died. 
ICRC claims there is a shift of trends towards the areas 
south of Asmara (Senafe and surroundings) where needs have 
increased and high levels of malnutrition have been noted. 
In the southeast pastoral area, Akale Guzay region, the 
rains also failed. North of Asmara (Agordat and 
surroundings), the situation has largely improved.
Akale Guzay (120,000)
Dec. 1984 - 14% <80% of 20,221 children 
Aug. 1985 - 12% <80% of 29,087 children
years. Cropped areas were significantly reduced due to lack
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Problem Areas (information taken from field reports, interviews 
with RRC, farmers, local clergy, etc.):
Hamassien (central region):
This is the most populated area. Large numbers of the 
population are expected to continue to be affected in 
1986. Rains were poor in the area.
Areza (Northern Initiative site approximately 40 kilometers 
from Mandeferra and 70 kilometers from Tigrai border): 
Harvests were generally poor and yields were low 
although better than in 1984. 250,000 people live
around Areza which includes a displaced population of 
50,000. Of these, 40,000 are from the area, while
10,000 are from Tigrai. The GOE administrator claimed 
these were equally displaced by famine and war, and 
create a major drain on food supplies. Area harvest is 
expected to last only through February. Harvests in 
good areas are expected to last through March. Because 
cattle were affected by drought, little milk is 
available. Many pastoralists migrated to Tigrai in 
search of grass. Much land from Mandeferra to Areza 
was non-productive due to the ’’dry wind" which takes 
and disperses newly-sown seed. Critical needs are water 
and medical facilities. Food stocks are critically 
low; the water reservoir had very little water left. 
In this area there is no small harvest due to belg 
rains; only one belg rain had fallen in the past ten 
years.
Barentu (Northern Initiative site):
Rains have been poor, although better than past years. 
Yet 90% of the farmers were unable to sow their fields 
due to the conflict.
Keren & Sahil:
Harvests in these areas haven’t been normal for ten 
years. Due to conflict, farmers have left fields 
unplowed for ten years. Harvest is expected to last 
5-6 months but needs are expected to be great, 
especially in NI areas and regions of conflict. In 
Sahil, crop is expected to last only 4 months and 
possibly less due to lack of livestock.
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REGION - WELLO
Awrajas - 12 
Woredas - 37
All awrajas are cropping areas except for Awssa (pastoral) 
and Kalu (mixed cropping and pastoral).
RRC Nov. 85 Report:
Estimate of affected population: Dec. 1984 - 2,587,420
Oct. 1985 - 1,454,790
Awrajas showing greatest need: Dessi, Wag (Wafla & Sekota
areas), Ambassel, Yeju, Kalu
CDAA Regional Summary Reports (from distribution centers):
Generally downward trends in percentages of children <80% 
wt/ht, stabilizing at low levels of malnutrition.
December 1984 - 25% <80% of 12,718 
Sept. 1984 - 10% <80% of 55,771
Grain Price Indices (RRC Nov. 1985 Report):
Over 260% above normal. Prices remain at high levels due to 
lack of grain on stock and low expectations from this year's 
crop. Desse Zuria - 376% above normal
Borena - 495% above normal
General Comments (from FAO Dec. assessment):
Belg rains were short and late. Cropped area was 
significantly reduced due to lack of seed and draft animals 
and displacement in certain areas. The meher rains stopped 
short at critical stages of growth. Army worm outbreaks 
affected the quality of some harvests.
Problem Areas (information taken from field trip interviews with
SCF, RRC, fanners, and other reports):
SEKOTA:
This area had no rain for four years and only a 3-5 day 
rain in July 1985. Most animals have died; only about 
5% of the animals are still alive, therefore very 
little milk is available. Army worm and other insect 
infestations damaged most crops in Sekota, especially 
in the lowland areas. Displacement of farmers due to 
food needs drastically reduced areas planted. Some 
peasants from Sekota have been in camps for over two 
years, so have not planted and have nothing to return 
to. The area is densely populated with the average
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farm being 1/2 - 1 hectare. Great needs for seed, oxen 
and agricultural inputs exist. Returnees from the 
camps received no seed. In December, 14,000 returned 
to Sekota from the RRC camp at Korem; 6000 were sent 
back from the SCF Korem camp. Currently, ICRC 
distributes to 15,000, World Vision to 25,000, and RRC 
up to 60,000 persons in the Sekota area. ICRC is using 
air drops due to inaccessibility of roads and security 
problems. One of the main problems in reaching this 
area is road security; the road is often closed and 
convoys are vulnerable to guerilla attacks. A major 
concern expressed is that, if there are no regular 
distributions here, the people will return to the camps 
around Korem.
Wafla - woreda:
Many farmers from this area left their lands unplowed 
to migrate for food. Harvests are better than in 1984, 
but still low due to seed and oxen shortages. In 1985, 
the highlands areas had two harvests, while there was 
only one harvest in the lowlands. Of the twelve 
farmers’ associations in the area, seven had poor 
production, and five had better production but expect 
it to last only 2-4 months (depending on with whom we 
talked) . Lentil and bean seeds are needed in this 
area.
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REGION - TIGRAI
Awrajas - 8
Woredas - 58
4 of the awrajas are primarily cropping (Axum, Adwa, 
Shire, Tembien); the other 4 (Enderta, Rayana Azebo, 
Agame and Kilte) are mixed cropping and pastoral.
KRC Nov. 1985 Report:
Awrajas showing greatest need: Kilte, Adwa, Agame, Rayana
Azebo.
CDAA Regional Summary Reports:
Most reports show decreasing levels of malnutrition or 
stabilization at low levels due to food aid.
January 1985 - 8% <80% of 31,141 children 
September 1985 - 9% <80% of 48,399 children
Price Indices (RRC November 1985 report):
Not enough price information to make a detailed analysis. 
Special assessments show prices to be among the highest in 
the country with no sign of decrease observable.
General Comments:
In Tigrai, rainfall was not good but better than last year. 
However, the crop is expected to be as bad as in 1984 due to 
shortages of seed and oxen, late planting, and the lack of 
off-season rain. Cropped area was significantly reduced and 
was damaged in some areas by hail and insect infestations. 
50-60,000 left the camp at Mekele too late to plant. 
Livestock was greatly reduced in most areas due to drought. 
East Tigrai had poor rains; other regions around Zalambesa 
had no rain. Rains were also poor in the lowlands of
Maichow, in Rayana Azebo, east of Wukro and Tambien, and 
failed in September in central Inderta. Most crop reports 
point out that harvests will have low yields due to 
insufficient rainfall. Apparently, some areas had adequate 
seed. Shortage of oxen caused land to be tilled late,
decreasing the chances of a good harvest. In the Zalambesa 
area, many oxen had died or were sold; those that had been 
left were taken to the lowlands of Eritrea or towards the 
Danakil. Because of irregularities of rainfall, specific 
areas will have to be watched for signs of need in 1986.
Problem Areas:
Areas of concern will be those in which there was lack of 
seed, oxen, poor rainfall, and damages by hail or insect 
infestations. In field interviews, problems are expected 
around Idaga Hamus where it was claimed there was no rain,
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no harvest and no seed. In areas around Wukro, it was 
reported that the rain stopped prematurely in August and 
that the shortage of seeds and oxen compounded the 
shortfall. Poor harvests are expected around Mekele; yields 
are expected to be low primarily due to insufficient 
rainfall in some areas, and severe hailstorm and crop 
infestations. Short, interrupted rains affected crop 
maturity, and insect infestations in certain areas around 
Zalambesa, are expected to reduce yields.
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REGION - SID.AMO
Awrajas - 6
Woredas - 35
RRC November 1985 Report:
Estimate of affected population: Dec. 
Sep. 
Oct.
1984
1985 
1985
698,410
300,000
446,300
Awrajas showing greatest need:
Wolaita - all cropping areas 
Arero - primarily pastoral
CDAA Regional Summary Reports:
Most areas show stabilization, but increasing malnutrition 
is expected in the northern areas.
Jan. 1985 - 11% <80% of 12,844 children 
Sep. 1985- 11% <80% of 46,441 children
Price Indices (RRC Nov. 1985 report):
In most areas, the price of maize (primary crop) started to 
decline in September, and was nearly half the previous 
month’s price in Gedio and Jemjem awrajas. However, prices 
were increasing in Wolaita to 201% as a result of poor 
production prospects. Prices were also abnormal in other 
markets with the indices between 130% and 178%.
General Comments:
Problems in Sidamo will be focused on the northern areas for 
1986. According to the USAID report, the drought reduced 
production in Sidamo by 30%, with 14% of the region
designated as drought-affected. Inadequate rains will
likely reduce c o m  yields by 40% on 40% of cropped areas in 
Wolaita and Sidamo awrajas. Coffee and teff are also grown 
as cash crops; the coffee was affected by blight, as was the 
enset (false banana) crop. No surplus is expected from the 
recent harvest which is expected to last only through March 
1986. Rapid population increases (400% since 1960) and 
heavy population densities are causing strains on the area. 
The average farm is 1/2 hectare - too small to support the 
average family, which could possibly create dependencies on 
food aid out of no other alternative. Because of drought, 
seed was poor and scarce in 1985, contributing to reduced 
yields and even greater shortages of seed for 1986. .Agency 
reports on distributions for woredas below Soto show high 
levels of malnutrition, ranging from 24-49% in November. 
This area is designated for resettlement out of which 50,000 
families are expected to be moved.
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REGION - SHEWA
z 7Awrajas - 11 Z  _/
Woredas - 104 ' '
Majority of the awrajas are cropping, with mixed 
pastoral/cropping in Yifatna Timuga, and pastoral in Yererna 
Kereyu.
RRC November 1985 report:
Estimate of affected population: Dec. 1984 - 779,820
Oct. 1985 - 632,800
Awrajas showing greatest need:
Menzna Gishe
Haykochna (Zewai, Dalocha)
Yifatna
CDAA Regional Summary reports:
Generally upward trends in percents of malnourished and 
numbers of recipients in Southern Shewa. Programs in North 
Shewa show stabilization of malnutrition levels at 9-12%.
North Shewa - Mar. 1985 - 32% <80% of 1,628 children
Sep. 1985 - 13% <80% of 9,264 children
South Shewa - Feb. 1985 - 11% <80% of 474 children
Sep. 1985 - 18% <80% of 10,036 children
Grain Price Indices (RRC Nov. 1985 report):
Prices remained high in most markets in September, ranging 
from 232% to 378%. Lower prices observed only in 
Merehabete, parts of Yererna Keryu and Chebona Gurage.
General Comments:
Inadequate rains severely affected crops at critical stages 
of growth in the Rift Lakes area of Southern Shewa and in 
the lowlands adjoining Wello in Northwest Shewa (FAO). 
According to the USAID report, the drought had a devastating 
effect on the southern c o m  and sorghum areas in 1984, but 
in 1985 the area planted and yields are considered normal. 
However, recent assessments and FAO reports show increasing 
problems due to poor rains, shortages of seed, a mediocre 
teff harvest, and maize harvests 60% below what is needed. 
Rain in the Rift Lakes area is said to be decreasing every 
year. In nothem Shewa, the first crops failed.
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Problem Areas:
Recent surveys show areas of great need and rapidly 
increasing levels of malnutrition in Southern Shewa. UNOEOE 
Sept. 1985 report indicates problems around Meki, Dugda, 
Wareda, Dalocha, Haykochna, and Butajira awrajas. These are 
all in the Rift Lakes area of Shewa. Deaths are increasing 
due to malnutrition around Dalocha; in September at least 
2,360 families departed to other awrajas in search of food. 
1984 maize production was low in the Rift Valley, affecting 
the populations in these areas which depend mainly on the 
maize crop. This resulted in seed shortages for 1985, so
areas planted were reduced. Meher harvest was estimated to 
be 60-70% below normal by local officials. Certain areas 
were affected by grasshopper infestations and army worm 
outbreaks.
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REGION - GONDER
Awrajas - 7
Woredas - 29
RRC Nov. 1985 Report:
Estimate of affected population: Oct. 1984 - 376,500
Oct. 1985 - 135,390 
Area of greatest need: Gayint awraja - all cropping.
CDAA Regional Summary Reports:
Reports show decreases, then moderate increases in levels of 
malnutrition in August and September.
March 1985 - 34% <80% wt/ht of 1,377 children 
Sept. 1985 - 26% <80% wt/ht of 4,894 children
Grain Price Indices (RRC Nov. 1985 report):
Prices started to decline in September. Trend is expected 
to continue in view of better production in the region. 
However, the level was still high and up to 393% in Gayint 
awraja.
General Comments:
ICRC has been airlifting food into Gonder directly from 
Massawa. Distribution is low in this area due to a shortage 
of stocks and security problems preventing movements towards 
Debat and Debark. Access by road is continually
interrupted, hampering transport to distribution points in 
areas of need.
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REGION - HARERGE
Awrajas - 13 
Woredas - 61
Areas which are primarily pastoral: Gode, Kelato, Degahabor, 
Warder and Kebri Dehar. Awrajas which are primarily 
cropping: Habro, Harar Zuria and Wobera. Those which are 
mixed cropping and pastoral are Jijiga, Chercher, Gursum and 
Dira Dawa.
RRC Nov. 1985 Report:
Estimates of affected population: Oct. 1984 - 419,120
Oct. 1985 - 1,200,340
Areas of greatest need: Harar, Chercher, Jijiga.
CDAA Regional Summary Reports:
Reports show general reductions in levels of malnutrition 
among recipients in food programs, but increasing numbers of 
newly registered and high rates of malnutrition among those 
currently not receiving food aid.
January 1985 - 27% <80% wt/ht of 1,550 children 
Sept. 1985 - 15% <80% wt/ht of 14,694 children
Grain Price Indices (RRC Nov. 1985 report):
Prices continued to increase through September, indicating 
poor production prospects and indices as high as 314% in 
Garamuleta awraja.
General Comments:
Greatly increased needs for food aid are expected for 1986 
although the crop was slightly better in 1985 than in the 
previous year. Harerge1s harvest was much worse than
anticipated; as a result, people have depleted reserves. 
The meher rains stopped short in September, also affecting 
the quality of the harvest. Cropped area was significantly 
reduced. Highland areas had poor belg rains and experienced 
unusual freezing rains, "Amedya", from the end of September 
to December. This affected both crops and animals. Most 
agriculture is limited to the eight highland awrajas where 
the majority of the population lives (3.2 million). 89% of 
the lowlands areas are used by pastoralists or nomaxis; 
highlands consist of settled peasants. Major factors 
affecting 1986 status: lack of and unevenly-distributed
rains; short meher rain; shortages of plow oxen, seeds and 
agricultural inputs; due to short rains, good crops didn’t 
reach maturation or produce seed, dying in late September
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and early October; frost damage in highlands; army worm 
infestations especially bad after short rains.
Problem Areas:
Western lowlands are experiencing problems due primarily to 
poor rains • Areas of the western highlands had poor 
harvests due to frost damage and army worm infestations. 
Harvests around the Chelenko distribution center (visited by 
the assessment team) are expected to last only 1 - 2  months 
(through February). Children entering the supplemental 
feeding program in the lowland center at Error are all 
listed as below 80% wt/ht. The greatest problem in the 
Ogaden affecting pastoralists is lack of water. Food aid is 
difficult to set up in the area due to registration and 
monitoring problems, roving populations, logistics problems 
and lack of security. Other strains in the Ogaden include 
approximately 400,000 persons returning from Somalia.
Areas experiencing large or total crop failures were Habro 
with 25-30% failure, Jijiga with 100% failure, and Chercher 
where 75% failure is expected.
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REGION - KEFFA
Awrajas - 6 w  /
Woredas - 38 --n. /
RRC Nov. 1985 report:
Estimate of affected population: Oct. 1984 - 1,500
Jan. 1985 - 0
Oct. 1985 - 90,000
All needs are focused in ' Limu and Jimma awrajas, both 
cropping areas.
CDAA Regional Summary Reports:
No centers had been established in Keffa until recently. 
Those newly opened show high rates of malnutrition in the 
population.
General Survey date: Sept. 1985 - Limu awraja (pre-harvest): 
63% <80% wt/ht, 25% <70% wt/ht, out of 396 children
surveyed.
Date Program Opened: end of Oct. 1985 - 47% <80% wt/ht,
15% <70% wt/ht, out of 300 children enrolled. Most had been
receiving food for one month at this point.
Price Indices (RRC Nov. 1985 report):
Introduction of price controls earlier in the year created 
monitoring problems. But levels in August were very high 
and increasing in September. September indices ranged from 
128% in Keffa to 269% in Jimma awrajas.
General Comments:
Little or no food aid was sent to Keffa in 1985; however, 
current surveys show that areas of great need have already 
developed. Local surveys conducted through EECMY show 
improvements in areas reached by food aid and small 
harvests. EECMY and UNEOE surveys have found harvests less 
than 1/4 normal in certain areas surveyed. Earlier FAO and 
USAID assessments claim the harvest will be normal for 
Keffa, yet current findings point to remote areas possibly 
overlooked by these reports.
Problem Areas: Limu Kosa and Limu Saka
Large numbers of deaths due to hunger occurred between March 
and date of EECMY survey in September. Families have 
migrated out of the areas in search of food. .Almost all 
livestock have died over the past four years due to the 
disease trypanosomiasis. Land cultivated was low and
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harvests small due to drought, lack of seed and lack of plow 
oxen. Peasants had been suffering from food shortages since 
last April.
110
OTHER REGIONS
The following regions have estimates of affected populations 
ranging from 0 in Gojjam and Wellega, to 113,000 in Gamo Gofa, 
according to the November RRC report. Little information was 
collected by the assessment team on conditions in these regions 
because areas visited were primarily those with consortium food 
programs. However, pockets of need continue to become apparent, 
as relief agencies and the RRC survey areas potentially affected 
by short or inadequate rains, notably in Gamo Gofa and some 
parts of Arssi. Although the RRC report shows Wellega as having 
no shortages in 1986, other reports have pointed out problem 
areas here with high percentages of malnourished. Another issue 
creating problems of its own is the resettlement of groups of 
people into areas of Illubabor which are not supportable by 
agriculture.
RRC Nov. 1985 Report - Estimates of affected populations:
Bale - Oct. 1984 - 188,200
Oct. 1985 - 60,000
Elkere awraja shows greatest need; primarily pastoral 
area.
Price Indices: Decreasing trends but still above
normal. 249% in Genale.
CDAA Regional Summary Report: Those on food programs
show greatly reduced percentages of malnourished.
June 1985 - 23% <80% wt/ht of 2,144 children 
Sept.1985 - 2% <80% wt/ht of 3,339 children
Gamo Gofa - Oct. 1984 - 187,000
Oct. 1985 - 113,000
Gelebna Hamero awraja shows greatest need; primarily 
pastoral.
Price Indices: Prices declining but still far above
normal ranging from 140% to 175%.
CDAA Regional Summary Report:
April 1985 - 11% <80% wt/ht of 3,566 children 
Sept. 1985 - 4% <80% wt/ht of 11,609 children
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Arssi - Oct. 1984 - 33,077 
Oct. 1985 - 10,000
Only area showing need is one woreda in Chilado; all 
cropping.
Price Indices: Starting to decline but still high, up
to 308% in Assela (regional capital).
Illubabor - Oct. 1984 - 33,077 
Oct. 1985 - 25,000
Buno Bedelle awraja shows greatest need; all 
cropping.
Price Indices: Not enough information available, but
stable to declining. Still generally high.
Gojjam & Wellega - show no food shortages in 1986, according
to ERC November 1985 report.
Price Indices: Gojjam - despite better production
prospects, prices were increasing except for barley. 
Indices range from 217% in Kola to 328% in Bichena.
Wellega - Declining prices in many areas; prices 
for most crops low. Arjo awraja still shows 276%.
CDAA reports for Wellega (General population survey):
Program opened: May 1985: Wamo Hagaio 
(this was the 2nd month 31% <80% wt/ht of 1,945 
for half of these children,
children)
Program opened: May-June 1985: Nekemte area 
26% <80% wt/ht of 1,925 children.
General population survey - Sept. 1985 - Nunokumba 
41% <80% wt/ht of 273 children surveyed.
CDAA Food Program regional summary (Wellega):
May 1985 - 92% <80% wt/ht of 523 children 
Sept. 1985 - 43% <80% wt/ht of 3,436 children
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APPENDIX E: 1986 EMERGENCY FOOD NEEDS
METHODOLOGY
To estimate the 1986 emergency food needs of Ethiopia, 
information was utilized from previous reports and assessments, 
specifically:
1. The Central Statistics Office (CSO) Agricultural Sample 
Survey 1984/85, Results of Area and Production 
(referred to here as "CSO Report").
2. Early Warning System (EWS) 1986 Food Supply Prospect,
(Supplement) (referred to here as "EWS Report").
3. USAID 1986 .Emergency Food Need Assessment for Ethiopia 
by David Atwood (referred to here as "Atwood Report").
4. Other EWS and CSO reports, as well as information from 
the recent FAO Crop Assessment Mission preliminary 
report.
5. Other information developed in this report.
Utilizing information from these sources, as well as the 
assumptions presented earlier in this report, a national
emergency food requirement estimation can be made by considering 
the following equation:
Emergency food needs equals total main food consumption 
requirements minus structural deficit minus total main food 
availability.
The 1986 structural deficit is calculated in Appendix B of 
this report. The 1986 total food consumption requirements and 
the 1986 total foods expected to be available must then be 
estimated to determine the 1986 emergency food needs.
FINDINGS
1. Estimating the 1986 total main food consumption requirement:
If the average daily normal per capita caloric requirement 
of main foods (Cal. Avg.) is 1893 kcal (that is, 2100 - 207 
kcal, as explained in Appendix B), and if the 1986 Ethiopian 
population (Pop) is 40,235,464, then the total main food 
consumption requirement for 1986 (CONS. REQ.) can be 
calculated:
CONS. REQ. = (Cal. Avg.) x (Pop) x (Kc)
where Kc = unit conversion factor
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or,
CONS. REQ. = (1893) x (40,235,464) x (Kc)
= 7,942,998 metric tons
2. Estimating the 1986 total main foods available:
Main foods in 1986 will come from 2 sources: 
locally-produced peasant farm foods and foods not 
locally-produced by peasant farms.
a) Locally-produced peasant farm foods: these include
meher crop productions, belg crop production, enset or 
false banana production, and milk production.
Table E-l below estimates the 1985 peasant main crop 
production, by region.
TABLE E-l
Meher 1985 Net Meher
Peasant Prod. Peasant Prod.
Region Cereal/Pulses Cereal/Pulses
(MT) (MT)
Arssi 474,825 384,842
Bale 78,420 58,856
Gamo Gofa 57,738 43,847
Gojjam 850,029 679,584
Gonder 527,068 413,348
Eritrea 225,860 191,981
Harerge 182,600 141,543
Illubabor 124,144 99,499
Kef fa 260,398 207,475
Shewa 1,486,481 1,188,187
Sidamo 163,932 132,068
Tigrai 274,670 233,470
Wellega 368,843 290,821
Wello 202,528 149,895
Totals 5,272,536 4,215,415
The gross meher crop production was estimated by taking the
1984/85 main crop production estimates of the CSO report and
increasing or decreasing that amount by the estimated
percentages given in the EWS report. For example, the CSO
report estimated the main crop production in Arssi in 1984/85 to
be 365,250 metric tons. The EWS report estimates that the main
crop production in Arssi is expected to be 30% above the 1984/85
levels. Therefore, the 1985 main crop production for Arssi is
estimated to be:
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Arssi main crop production (365,250) x (1.30)
474,825 metric tons
and so on for each region.
The figures for Eritrea and Tigrai are those used in the CSO 
1977/78 crop production estimates, as no other information was 
available.
[Note: The total gross 1985 meher crop production estimate of
5,272,536 metric tons is in line with FAO's preliminary report 
for the 1985 meher peasant crop production of 5.3 to 5.4 million 
metric tons.]
The net meher crop production for each region is determined 
by deducting 15% from the gross crop for harvest and other
losses, and deducting amounts for seeds at the rate of 58 kg per 
hectare of area planted in crops. The area under crops is also 
taken from the CSO report and assumed to be approximately the 
same for 1985/86.
As indicated, the total 1985 meher net crop production is
estimated to be approximately 4,215,415 metric tons.
The gross belg production is assumed to be 265,000 metric 
tons of cereals and pulses. This figure reflects the FAO 
Mission estimate that belg production can be expected to be 
250,000-280,000 metric tons. This figure also falls in line 
with previous normal belg harvests of around 250,000 metric 
tons.
The net belg harvest is arrived at by deducting 15% for 
losses (no deduction for seeds), or
net belg = (0.85) x (265,000)
= 225,250 metric tons
The net production of enset is estimated to be 525,000 
metric tons in cereal equivalent. This is taken from estimates 
of the Atwood report, and is also in line with the FAO 
preliminary report that indicates enset production should fall 
within the range of 500,000-600,000 MT of cereal equivalent.
The cereal equivalent of milk production is estimated to be
207,000 metric tons, also taken from estimates of the Atwood 
report.
The total locally-produced peasant foods estimated to be 
available in 1986 can then be arrived at by totalling the net 
meher and belg crops, the enset production, and the milk 
off-take or:
Total locally 
produced peasant 
main foods
= (4,215,415)+(255,250)+(525,000)+(207,000)
= 5,172,665 metric tons
b) Foods not locally-produced by peasant farms: These are
foods from sources other than local production. (These 
food sources and estimates are taken directly from the 
Atwood report, estimates from FAO and of this team. ) 
They consist of foods from state farms, 1985 food 
carry-overs, commercial imports, and other food 
sources.
The following is a list of these food estimates and 
their respective information sources.
State Farms 250,000 M 1 (estimate from FAO & CSO reports)
Carry-over 218,000 MT (from Atwood Report)
Commerical Imports 79,000 J*TT (from Atwood Report)
Other Food Sources 132,000 MT (see * below)
TOTAL 679,000 MT
[*It is estimated by this team that approximately
100,000 metric tons of food aid is currently available 
in storage. Also, it is reported from unconfirmed but 
reliable sources that food aid is entering Eritrea and 
Tigrai from Sudan at the rate of 15,000 and 17,000 
metric tons respectively, per year.]
Therefore, a total of 679,000 metric tons is estimated 
to be available from sources other than
locally-produced peasant farm foods.
The total main food available can now be determined by 
adding the locally-produced peasant foods (peasant foods) with 
the foods other than peasant foods (other foods):
Total main foods = (peasant foods) + (other foods) 
available
= (5,172,665) + (679,000)
= 5,851,665 metric tons.
We can now estimate the total emergency food needs for 
Ethiopia in 1986 as:
Structural
deficit
Total main food 
available
Emergency
food
needs
Total main food 
consumption 
requi rements
= 7,942,998 - 704,925 - 5,851,665
= 1,386,408 metric tons per year
= 115,534 metric tons per month, average
(This monthly average falls within the logistical limits of
150,000 metric tons per month as set forth in Appendix C.)
If we assume that the estimated numbers and locations of 
people depending totally on food aid in 1986 are accurate as 
described in the EWS report, we can then estimate the relative 
needs of each region, based on these population figures and the 
emergency food needs figure determined above.
For example, in Arssi, EWS estimated that there will be
10,000 people requiring emergency food aid out of a total 
national needy population of 5,817,620. Then, a rough estimate 
of the amount of emergency food that is needed in Arssi is:
Food needed = 10,000________ x 1,386,408 metric tons
in Arssi 5,817,620
= 2,383 metric tons.
and so on for each region. See Table E-2 below.
TABLE E-2
Region
EWS 1986 
Needy People 
Estimate
Estimated Regional 
Relative Food Needs 
(MT)
Arssi 10,000 2,383
Bale 60,000 14,299
Goma Gofa 113,000 26,929
Gojjam 0 0
Gonder 135,390 32,265
Eritrea 650,000 154,903
Harerge 1,200,340 286,055
Illubabor 25,000 5,958
Kef fa 90,000 21,448
Shewa 632,800 150,804
Sidamo 446,300 106,359
Tigrai 1 ,000,000 238,312
Wellega 0 0
Wello 1,454,790 346,694
TOTALS 5,817,620 1,386,408
117
.APPENDIX F: CAUTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY FOOD IMPORTS
The illustration below depicts the 1986 food requirements 
and availability levels for Ethiopia:
Line A-A’ represents the national main food requirements for 
the 1986 Ethiopian population (as determined in Appendix E). 
Line B-B’ represents the estimated actual average consumption of 
main foods for 1986 (with caloric intake of 1932 - 207 kcal, as 
determined in Appendix B). The gap between lines A-A’ and B-B’ 
represents the structural food deficit for 1986: 704,925 metric 
tons.
Line C-C’ represents the total locally produced foods 
available for consumption in Ethiopia in 1986, determined in 
Appendix E to be 5,422,665 metric tons. The gap between lines 
B-B’ and C-C’ represents the total food shortfall, that being 
the difference of normal average consumption of main foods and 
the total locally produced available foods, equal to 1,815,408 
metric tons.
The gap between lines B-B’ and C-C’ will be partially filled 
by food carry-over (218,000 metric tons), expected commercial 
imports (79,000 metric tons), and other food sources (132,000 
metric tons), all totalling 429,000 metric tons. These food 
sources are represented by the gap between lines C-C’ and D-D’.
The remaining gap between lines B-B' and D-D’ represents the 
1986 emergency food estimate of 1,386,408 metric tons.
Structural
Deficit 704,92!
(@ 1725 kcal/person/day)
Total Main Food
Requirements : 7,942,998 MT
((3 1893 kcal/person/day)
Warning Level (when food aid
reaches  1,024,504 MT)
Emergency
Food Aid : 1,386,408 MT
Total Normal Main 
Food Consumption : 7,238,073 MT
Total Food 
Shortfall 1,815,408 MT
■ C v Total Available
Locally Produced : 5,422,665 MT
Foods, 1986
D'
Requirements
Sources
Other
Food : 429,000 MT
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It is important that emergency food aid levels never exceed 
the normal, average consumption rate of main foods when added to 
the total local food available for consumption and the other 
foods and imports. That is, the total locally produced food 
plus food aid, plus other imports should not be greater than the 
total average consumption.
If food aid levels cause total foods available nationally to 
exceed normal average consumption levels, there is a great 
danger of disrupting market conditions and creating
disincentives to agricultural production.
If we define the "warning line" as that level of total 
national food availability that reaches 95% of the normal 
average food consumption of main foods, then for 1986,
warning level of
total foods available = (0.95) (7,238,073 metric tons)
= 6,876,169 metric tons.
In other words, when the total national food available (which is 
equal to total local foods produced + food aid + other imports) 
reaches 95% of the normal average consumption of main foods, it 
becomes extremely important to monitor markets carefully to 
ensure that any additional food does not undermine market 
conditions and agricultural prices.
For 1986 the warning level for total available food is 
6,876,169 metric tons. Assuming "other imports" (429,000 metric 
tons) and "locally produced foods" (5,422,665 metric tons) are 
constant, then acceptable levels of food aid that can enter the 
system without possible adverse disruptive effects would be:
Acceptable = (6,876,169 MT) - (local foods) - (other foods) 
Levels
3 (6,876,169 MT) - (5,422,665 MT) - (429,000 MT)
-  1,024,504 iyrr
In other words, 1,024,504 metric tons of food aid can enter 
Ethiopia during 1986 without great concern of disrupting market 
conditions.
Since the 1986 total emergency food needs estimate is 
1,386,408 metric tons, it is suggested that when total food aid 
imports reach about 75% of the total required, or 1 million 
metric tons, then extra monitoring should take place in order to 
ensure that no major disruptions take place. The Early Warning 
System does an excellent job of monitoring market conditions. 
This information should be utilized to act as a warning 
indicator of the potential effects of excessive food aid.
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APPENDIX G: SMALL TRANSPORTABLE WAREHOUSES
Information about this warehouse 
can be obtained from:
Disaster Supply Specialists 
P.0. Box 130667 
Tyler, Texas 75713 
Tel: (214) 561-9315
Attn: R. Fred Epperson
These steel framed, fabric covered structures are quickly 
and easily erected for storage, sports and exhibition 
facilities etc. They may be located on almost any type of 
surface keeping groundwork to a minimum.
All steel-work is hot dipped galvanised. The tailor-made 
covers are of a tough durable PVC coated reinforced 
fabric with a life expectancy of between 10 and 15 years. 
After this period the cover may be simply replaced.
A special white fabric is available for use in hot climates.
Manually operated sliding doors are available in 
standard sizes 2.5x2.5m (or as required).
Translucent roof but lighting may be installed where 
a power supply is available.
Dismantled and relocated when required_____
120

APPENDIX H: FOOD-FOR-WOEK FOR WOMEN
Women comprise 50% of the rural work force and are directly 
and indirectly involved in most agricultural activities. More 
and more women are becoming involved in activities and
leadership roles in the peasant associations, service
cooperatives, and producers cooperatives. Their working hours 
tend to be much longer than those of their male counterparts, as 
women are responsible for taking care of the family, working in 
the fields, collecting firewood and water, maintaining the home 
and helping with the cattle. In addition, they also are
frequently involved in sharing the responsibility of bringing in 
an income.* Because of the lack of technology, even the
simplest tasks can be burdensome and time-consuming, requiring 
great physical labor and limiting the woman’s ability to 
participate in social and economic development. This results in 
an under-utilization of a very productive sector of the
population.
In the planning of FFW programs for women, utilizing basic 
technologies based on traditional and natural resources could 
benefit women both physically and economically. Projects should 
be designed to allow women to continue to engage in the
necessary daily activities of maintaining the home. They should 
take place close to the home or village and should only involve 
a few hours a day so as not to interfere with other
responsibilities. Projects should also be designed to introduce 
new technologies to women in order to help reduce their daily 
burden. For example, rural women are traditionally responsible 
for fetching water for household consumption and for watering 
the animals. This can consume 3-5 hours of each day, especially 
when water resources are limited and often at great distances. 
This is estimated to take one-sixth of the energy expended by 
rural women. The installation of hand water pumps and training 
in their operation and maintenance can save women tremendous 
amounts of energy and time. This would also enable women to 
cultivate small vegetable gardens and benefit from small-produce 
sales.
Women can participate in anything the men can do so long as 
their tasks do not involve heavy labor. FFW projects for women 
which require organized labor should include the following 
conditions:
1. they should be close-to-home activities;
2. they should be in accessible areas;
3. they should require only a few hours a day;
4. they should not involve unusual and heavy labor; and
*"Women in Agricultural Development”. Paper by Semaneh Tamrat, 
Working Papers: National Workshop on Women in Agricultural 
Development.
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5. some sort of child-care program should be established 
to enable mothers to leave their infants and young 
children in proper care.
Types of projects appropriate for women include:
1. Earth-moving projects that require the carrying away of 
dirt and gravel. This includes terracing, road 
building, and the clearing of sites for construction 
projects, and diversions.
2. Tree planting in reforestation projects.
3. Clearing of light brush for farmland or reforestation 
projects.
4. Maintenance of windbreaks.
5. All aspects of small building projects including
clinics, outpatients facilities, MCH (Mother-Child 
Health) centers, schools and community centers. Women 
can be involved in everything from ground-clearing to 
roofing, so long as heavy labor is not involved.
6. In the preparation of cooperatively-produced or
marketed crops such as coffee, women can help roast and 
turn the beans. Women can also be involved in the
winnowing of the wheat and thrashing on a cooperative 
level.
7. Operating and maintenance of day-care centers and 
involvement in food-distribution center activities.
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